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WHEN QUESTIONS DO NOT YIELD ANSWERS 
Studies on racism are like a barber shop. The conversation does not begin when we enter 
the door; rather, we enter into a dialogue that has been in progress for some time. Its rules 
and content are structured. Once there, we may exert some influence, add our “two 
cents,” and stir the discussion. To a certain degree, however, it takes on a life of its own. 
The conversation will carry on long after we have left. A funny thing about barber shop 
talk, however, is that it almost always assumes a presentist state of mind. Past questions 
and ideas do not cease to exist entirely, but they do quickly fade from memory. Though 
unspoken, they become internalized. As sociologist Emile Durkheim ([1904] 1977) once 
noted:  
For the truth is that the present, to which we are invited to restrict our attention, is 
by itself nothing: it is no more than an extrapolation of the past, from which it 
cannot be served without losing the greater part of its significance. The present is 
composed of an infinite of elements which are so closely intertwined that it is 
difficult for us to see clearly where one begins and another ends, what each of the 
elements is by itself and what are the relationships which hold between them. (p. 
15) 
Those who study racism would do well to know the history of our barber shop.  
Sociologist Charles Tilly (1981) claimed that to understand the past’s effect on 
the present, we must move beyond our tendency to treat the present as eternal. Embedded 
within our disciplinary histories are presuppositional categories that set the parameters 
for what can be known—racial knowledge included. Studies on racism are often left to 
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frame the work within prevailing frameworks of the day. The questions sociologists ask 
filter information in ways that are relevant to established interests of the discipline. 
Rather than open up new possibilities of knowledge, this effectively forecloses upon 
alternative questions we might otherwise ask. Sociologist Margaret Somers (1996) has 
put it another way: “Questions, then, are the linchpins of theory construction” (p. 72). 
Knowingly and unknowingly, questions shape the conceptual boundaries and 
vocabularies we have to develop our research problems as well as the methods we have 
to go about solving them (see also Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passerson [1968] 1991; 
Harding 1987; Smith 1987).  
What We Know about Racism 
Borrowing the words of sociologist William Julius Wilson (1973), racism refers to “an 
ideology of racial domination or exploitation that (1) incorporates beliefs in a particular 
race’s cultural and/or inherent biological inferiority and (2) uses such beliefs to justify 
and prescribe inferior or unequal treatment for that group” (p. 32). Identifying racism as 
an ideology of racial domination or exploitation implies these ideas are tied to matters of 
power and group position. Only those who occupy dominant positions can be racist 
because they possess the capacity to propagate ideas and practices that preserve a 
hierarchal racial order (see also Wellman [1977] 1993).1 Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-
Silva (2003) has explained that those racialized as “white” (itself a shifting category) 
                                                           
1 The idea that only whites have the capacity to be “racist” runs contrary to sociologists Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994) who have argued “[t]here is nothing inherently white 
about racism” (p. 72). 
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inhabit “the visible uniform of the dominant racial group” and possess an “embodied 
racial power” (p. 271, emphasis original). Sociologist Amanda Lewis (2004) has further 
noted that this means that all whites, by virtue of forming a collectivity, develop an 
ideology to promote their group interests. This is true even as whites do not constitute a 
“real,” mobilized group of people.  
Because race operates systemically, all individuals are implicated in the 
rationalization of racial affairs (i.e., racial ideology)—though not to the same extent 
(Bonilla-Silva 1997). Proslavery advocates, for instance, tended to overtly promote their 
racial interests and defend their peculiar institution outright, while their antislavery foes 
who may be well-meaning and “tolerant” often advanced their interests in discretely 
nonracial terms (see also Hughey 2012; Lewis 2004). Even those who were members of 
manumission societies chose to support government nonintervention of slave-based 
commerce, allow slave enumeration in apportioning congressional members, and support 
reparations for slavemasters in exchange for emancipation—all by following the logics of 
“abstract liberalism” (see Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014 and Chapter Five). Nevertheless, this 
broad-sweeping implication does not mean that whites share a singular or coherent 
identity (Lewis 2004). What they do share is a social position within the racial order, one 
that confers common racial interests. As Joe Feagin (2000) has written, “A group interest 
can now be seen as a relation of being objectively concerned in something, of having a 
stake in something…. [W]hites are strong stakeholders in a centuries-old hierarchal 
structure of opportunities, wealth, and privileges that stems from a long history of 
exploitation and oppression” (p. 19, emphasis original; see also Harris 1993). 
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A case can be made that sociologists of racism, despite our disagreements, agree 
upon the importance of the following questions: What is the content, form, and style of 
racism, and how has it changed in patterned and resilient ways over time? Theoretical 
orientations from assimilationist (e.g., Park 1950) to psychological (e.g., Sears and 
Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981) to formational (e.g., Omi and Winant [1986] 1994) 
to structural (e.g., Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bonilla-Silva 1997) interpretations 
converge on this question, and their answers pervade our field’s habitual thought. These 
answers regard transformation, emphasizing a rupture between the racial past and 
present. With vocabularies that consist of words like “new racism” (Barker 1982), “post-
Civil Rights era” (Omi and Winant [1986] 1994), and “modern racism” (McConahay 
1986), as much is implied within the common language of the field. Reading even among 
the more critical interpretations of racism, one gets the sense that times have changed but 
not necessarily for the better.  
Marching Toward Change, Obsessions with Novelty 
Expressions of racism during periods of slavery and Jim Crow are typically understood as 
an explicit endorsement of white racial domination and exploitation directed at those 
racialized as “other”—especially those deemed as “black” (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 
1997; Bonilla-Silva and Lewis 1999; Bonilla-Silva 2001). Beliefs of inferiority permitted 
whites to rationalize racial subjugation on the basis that people of color deserved a lower 
social position in life, and these sentiments yielded ground to codify their white 
supremacy into law so that the state protected racial inequality. In virtually all areas of 
social life, this basis justified the enslavement of “subhumans,” “separate and unequal” 
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institutional arrangements (e.g., schools, voting), and collective murders like hanging and 
lynching. Racial stratification, in these contexts, was rigid, formal, and absolute. 
In contrast, today’s racism is often described as loose, informal, and permeable. 
Social psychologists David Sears and Donald Kinder (1971) have described the changing 
orientation of whites’ attitudes toward black folk as shifting from “old-fashioned” to 
“symbolic” racism. That is, key beliefs of biological racism have eroded due to suffering 
a cultural assault. They suggest new forms of anti-black prejudice have arisen in place of 
biologized and segregationist views, ones that blend a Protestant ethic-inspired ethos that 
emphasizes individuality, self-determination, and meritocratic ideals with racial 
apprehensions, fears, and stereotypes toward black people (see also Bobo, Kluegel, and 
Smith 1997; Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014; Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000). Key 
components of symbolic racism include the beliefs that blacks: 1) no longer face 
discrimination, 2) should work harder for social mobility, 3) need to quit being too 
demanding, and 4) have already received more than they deserve (Henry and Sears 2002; 
Sears and Henry 2004).  
Racism’s expression, in other words, has transitioned from formal to informal, 
overt to covert, and explicit to implicit. In the words of Eduardo Bonilla-Silva ([2003] 
2014):  
Unlike Jim Crow, the new racial order that emerged—the ‘new racism’—
reproduces racial domination mostly through subtle and covert practices that are 
often institutionalized, defended in coded language (“those urban people”), and 
bonded by the racial ideology of color-blind racism. Compared to Jim Crow, this 
new system seems genteel, but it is extremely effective in preserving systemic 
advantages for whites. The new regime is, in the immortal lyrics of Roberta 
Flack’s song, of the ‘killing me softly’ variety. (p. 260, emphasis original) 
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Sociologists Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, and Ryan Smith (1997) have described it as 
a “kinder, gentler” anti-black ideology than that of the past. According to linguist Teun 
van Dijk (2000), “contemporary forms of racism are different from the ‘old’ racism of 
slavery, segregation, apartheid, lynchings, and systematic discrimination, of white 
supremacy feelings, and of explicit derogation in public discourse and everyday 
conversation” (p. 33-34). The old racial dawn has ended and another has begun going by 
these perspectives. 
Just how colorblind is today’s racial world? Preoccupations with racism’s 
novelty may obscure more than it elucidates. Sociologists Adia Harvey Wingfield and 
Joe Feagin (2012) have argued “that since Obama’s election there has been a dramatic 
increase in public incidents, statements, and commentary [e.g., editorial caricatures 
portraying Obama as a monkey, a rise in hate group membership, and a few political 
candidates formally endorsing white supremacy] that reflect a strong reliance on the old 
and hard racist framing” (p. 147). In fact, many whites still associate blacks with apes and 
use these associations to justify today’s racial violence (Goff et al. 2008). These so-called 
“fringe” occurrences are not limited to highly visible media spectacles, nor are directed 
only at the nation’s first “black” president. In fact, they are much more mainstream than 
is often acknowledged.  
Racist discrimination persists across an array of institutional domains (Feagin and 
Eckberg 1980; Reskin 2012). These include, just to name a few, militarized immigration 
and deportation policies (Douglas and Sáenz 2013; Golash-Boza 2015), surging 
participation in white supremacist organizations (Daniels 2009), and the mass 
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incarceration of black men (Alexander 2010). Laws like New York City’s “Stop and 
Frisk” or Arizona’s “SB1070” (i.e., the “show your papers” law) and state-sanctioned 
white-on-black police brutality from Ferguson, Missouri to Staten Island, New York to 
Waller County, Texas are hardly of the colorblind or kinder, gentler variety. In what kind 
of colorblind world can the centrality of racial violence persist? “Perhaps in the quest to 
identify a wholly new post-Civil Rights form of racism,” as sociologist Moon-Kie Jung 
(2015) has claimed, “many analysts tend to gloss over the glaring continuities” (p. 45).  
A preoccupation with ideological change, for example, misses discrepancies 
between the colorblind discourse people espouse and the racist practices they pursue. The 
state-sanctioned killing of black people, for instance, is more akin to legal lynch mobs of 
the past than it is the present-day pretense of colorblindness and formal, juridical equality 
(see also Bracey 2015; Feagin and Elias 2013). This is not to say that change has not 
occurred. There are fundamental differences between slave and employee relations that 
should not be understated. It is altogether another point to claim or imply ideological 
displacement. In noting the discrepancy between ideas and praxis, studies of racism are 
primed to move away from claims of novelty toward discerning how colorblind 
discourses mutually constitute color-conscious practices, working together to solidify an 
enduring structure of racial hierarchy. 
A Case Study: Debates Surrounding the Three-Fifths Clause 
If overtly racist views persist in a supposedly post-racial world, perhaps the opposite 
could also be true. To frame it as a question, was colorblindness a prevailing ideology 
when slavery was the dominant racial arrangement? Among the provisions that helped 
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codify slavery into law was “the three-fifths clause.” The debates leading to what is 
commonly labeled “The Great Compromise of 1787,” if one can really label it a 
compromise at all, revolved around how to count slaves for the sake of determining 
congressional representation and direct tax liability. If slaves counted toward 
apportioning congressional representation, then states with many slaves would be 
advantaged. Meanwhile, if slaves counted toward the apportionment of direct taxes, then 
states with many slaves would assume larger tax liability. Most Northern delegates 
preferred a zero-fifths ratio for representation and a five-fifths ratio for taxation, and 
Southern delegates desired scales in the other directions. That way each could maximize 
their political clout and minimize what taxes would be owed.  
 The three-fifths clause acknowledged that some Americans were free and others 
were not. It imposed a ratio for valuing slave bodies and settled sectional disagreements 
over their worth in relation to freepersons. Questions of “worth” invariably came up in 
these debates because delegates centered the design of their new government around 
matters of private property, which made slavery a subject for discussion since the richest 
Americans held a bulk of their wealth in human bondage. This introduced unresolved 
debates that contributed to the failure of America’s first constitution.  
The founding fathers found themselves asking whether slaves were property. If 
they were, then at what rate should they be taxed?  And if they were taxed, how come 
other forms were not subjected to the same treatment—like the wealth Northern farmers 
held in livestock? Other delegates asked whether slaves could be considered people? If 
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they were, then should their vote be valued at the same rate as freepersons? And if they 
were to be represented, then why should Northern cows and horses not get their vote too?  
These debates took years to sort out, but were ultimately settled by the three-fifths 
“compromise.” It fractioned the personhood of slaves, reduced them to the status of 
property, and endorsed slavery as the basis for a formal racial state. These are among the 
factors that make it a counter-intuitive case for the study of colorblindness. After all, 
what need is there for subtle, covert, and implicit racism when whites agreed, with 
proportional exactitude, that slaves were valued at 60 percent the rate of freepersons? 
They would be enumerated as such for congressional representation and direct taxation.  
 The three-fifths clause is about much more than representation and taxation. 
Debates surrounding these issues, as the work of historian Robin Einhorn ([1991] 2001, 
2006) has revealed, shaped the structure of American political institutions for generations 
to come. Because representation and taxation inherently involve questions about what 
kinds of political demands can be imposed on commerce and property as well as which 
citizens are empowered to make such demands, they help mold the fundamental rules of 
government and what political actors can and cannot do. Slavemaster politicians and their 
complicit accommodators designed a constitution that pulled the national government in 
two opposing directions.  
Government was granted expansive powers that protected the institution of 
slavery, while at the same time it was stripped of most capacities that could interfere with 
the institution. Whereas the representation side of the three-fifths clause granted the 
South political clout that ensured their peculiar institution would endure, the taxation side 
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of the clause put in place barriers that prevented antislavery forces from indirectly 
regulating slavery out of practice. My dissertation documents how these outcomes 
unfolded through debates that spanned more than a decade and culminated in the 
enactment of the U.S. Constitution. My discussion centers the many faces of racial 
ideology, and perhaps counter-intuitively, it shows how “new,” “modern,” and 
“contemporary” racism played a salient role in justifying old racist arrangements.  
Did “New,” “Modern,” or “Contemporary” Racism Justify Old Racist Arrangements?  
 “Why would a study historicize racism, don’t we know this already?” I do not think so. 
Let me suggest that the tendency to juxtapose today’s “kinder, gentler” antiblack 
ideology with yesterday’s harsh and violent racism is quite tempting. It does not, 
however, permit analyses to detect the substantive “kinder, gentler” antiblack ideology 
that is embedded within yesterday’s racism. Rather than get caught up in methodological 
chauvinism, and declare one absolute method reigns supreme (see also Jung 2015), how 
sociologists answer our research questions depends on what we are asking. Each method 
yields “different kinds of data to answer different kinds of questions” (Trow 1957:33). 
That said, it is clear that some scholars of racism insist upon advancing arguments that 
exceed the scope of what their data support. Observing whether change in racism over 
time has occurred, by definition, requires an analytic orientation that is sensitive to 
history. Time is the medium through which these changes occur.  
There is a tendency within sociology and other social sciences to advance broad 
historical claims about racism without empirically anchoring these claims within a 
historical context (e.g., Barker 1981; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986; Omi and 
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Winant [1986] 1994; Sears and Kinder 1971).2 Sociologist Karen Fields and historian 
Barbara Fields (2012) have noted that interrogating ideology at one point in time can lead 
to misleading results, since it can appear as unquestioned “common sense” when 
observed in a cross-sectional context. Historicizing racial ideology of the past and present 
can help denaturalize it so that its depth and application can better be comprehended 
(Hall 1996; Jung 2015). The fact that much of our work has shied away from historical 
inquiries has undermined our ability to grasp the impact and reach of the past in all its 
complexities. At worse, historical claims in an ahistorical empirical context is a source of 
interdisciplinary amnesia that blocks our understanding of how racism endures over time. 
How can we truly contrast whether “new” or “modern” racism in the “post-Civil Rights” 
era is new or modern if our studies do not interrogate the past for comparative reference?  
Foreshadowing: The Organizational Roadmap of “No Taxation without Discrimination”   
The dissertation is divided into three sections: 1) the context, 2) the discourse, and 3) the 
implications. Comprising two chapters, the first section contextualizes the broader 
analysis within its proper sociohistorical backdrop. A major point of this discussion is to 
acknowledge the particularities of slavery, so I do not trivialize distinct legacies of 
oppression (see also Thomas 2010). In Chapter Two (“An Agreement with Hell”), I 
                                                           
2 Like much of historical sociology in general (see Stanfield 1993), those who historicize racism 
have exhibited a reluctance to formalize a methodological strategy (e.g., Collins 2005; Feagin 
2010). They do not speak to fundamental issues of how the analysis was performed, what 
motivations were considered for sampling, which sites and subjects were appropriate for study, 
what coding decisions were made, and what precautions were taken to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the analysis. Instead, these studies have prioritized theoretical development. Placing 
data and theory on equal planes is important, however, because it can specify under which 
circumstances a framework can be applied and more carefully distill its comprising elements. 
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discuss slavery in colonial America and the early republic as well as how the institution 
influenced state-making through the Articles of Confederation and the U.S. Constitution. 
Chapter Three (“The Three-fifths Clause, A Genealogy”) traces the three-fifths clause 
from its origins through what evolved into over a decade long debate over not just 
representation and taxation but slavery.  
In the second section, I thematically analyze the discourses that drove the three-
fifths debates—with each chapter drawing historical parallels with today’s racism and 
how scholars conceptualize it. This section is divided into three chapters. Chapter Four 
(“Innocence Constitutes the Crime”) shows the ways in which the founding fathers 
diminished the significance of slavery and presumed racial progress followed a linear, 
unidirectional path. Chapter Five (“Colorblind Discourse, Color-conscious Context”) 
reveals how delegates used the content and style of colorblindness to advance their 
political interests within debates over congressional representation and direct taxation. 
Chapter Six (“Principled Conservatism or Principled Racism?) highlights how racism 
cannot be reduced or explained away by conservatism. In fact, disputes over localism, 
liberty, and small governance were often contradictory ploys for an expansive federal 
government that protected slavery.  
In the concluding section, I relate the empirical findings offered in Chapters 3 
through 6 to contemporary discussions of theory within the sociology of racism. The 
point of Chapter Seven (“When the Present Becomes Past”) is to serve as a critical 
conscious of sorts to the field. Many of my findings run counter-intuitive to expectations 
set out by our dominant theoretical frameworks that contrast the present racial moment 
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from the past. Studying features of contemporary racism within the early republic 
provides pathways for understanding how American institutions are, in part, byproducts 
of the very racial ideology that many within the social sciences and humanities claim as 
novel today.  
The Need for Questioning Our Questions and Asking New Ones 
What is the content, form, and style of racism, and how has it changed in patterned and 
resilient ways over time? Answers to this question may vary, as do the perspectives and 
interests they advance, but in many ways, the substance remains the same. Narrow focus 
on a question or subset of questions preemptively sets boundaries for what answers can 
be offered. We fit empirical facts within the frameworks that our questions inherently 
necessitate, the frameworks that I suspect some take for granted. Too often these 
frameworks are bent on the idea of racial transcendence (e.g., Park 1950), claiming 
ideology has shifted from a biological to cultural basis (e.g., Sears and Kinder 1971; 
Kinder and Sears 1981), and contending that racism today is substantively unique from 
the past (e.g., Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2001; Bonilla-Silva and 
Lewis 1999). These themes represent a routinized convergence of intellectual thought: 
Change is prioritized. Rather than debate if this emphasis is correct, my suggestion is that 
there are other meaningful questions worth asking. In the case of this case study, that 
question is: how well does colorblind ideology transplant into historical soil that some 
presume it does not belong?  
Asking unasked questions has the potential to introduce an inventory of topics 
that have otherwise been neglected, and it probes at the fundamental structures that shape 
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how some topics become relevant while others do not. “[T]here is no sociology worthy of 
the name, which does not possess a historical character” (Durkheim [1895] 2013:160). 
Key assumptions we bring with us when entering the field should be questioned not as 
self-evident, but as products forged from broader dynamics of the established academic 
field. As philosopher Karl Marx ([1851] 1972) warned, “Men make their own history, but 
they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the 
past” (p. 437). Acknowledgment of this point requires historicized knowledge not to be 
thought of as mere products of the past, shaping what questions are worthy of attention. 
Instead, knowledge becomes seen as a verb, from historicized to historicizing, so that 
agency is explicitly restored to the knowledge production process.  
Our questions map out the parameters of scientific inquiry and represent partial 
perspectives by definition. Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins ([1990] 2000) has spelled out 
the implications of what this means in that research questions are laden with basic 
assumptions about what should be asked and how they should be answered. Therein lies 
much power to shape both blind spots and lines of sight. Being conscious of our 
assumptions places researchers in a better position to undo their effects. These 
assumptions are indicative of preconceptual frameworks that shape unfolding pathways 
of the “barbershop conversation.” New pathways become available when we discard 
what Emile Durkheim ([1895] 2013) referred to as “ghost-like creatures [that] distort the 
true appearance of things, but which we nevertheless mistake for things themselves” (p. 
31). In place of these things, an ontological and epistemological break walks away from 
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taken-for-granted truths, reflexively questions intellectual habits of what we know, and 
offers the opportunity to systematically develop alternative ways of knowing (Hunter 
2002). Since what we ask shapes what can be known, a good starting point to begin is 




AN AGREEMENT WITH HELL 
The United States Constitution was an “agreement with hell,” declared abolitionist 
William Lloyd Garrison ([1845] 1995:114). These are his words: 
Tyrants of the old world! contemners [sic] of the rights of man! disbelievers [sic] 
in human freedom and equality! enemies [sic] of mankind! console [sic] not 
yourselves with the delusion, that REPUBLICANISM and the AMERICAN 
UNION are synonymous terms—or that the downfall of the latter will be the 
extinction of the former, and, consequently, a proof of the incapacity of the people 
for self-government, and a confirmation of your own despotic claims! (Garrison 
[1845] 1995:112, emphasis original) 
Like some (but not all) abolitionists of the early republic, Garrison thought American 
democracy was bankrupt to its core (see also Jung 2015). There could be, he argued, “NO 
UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!” (Garrison [1845] 1995:115, emphasis original) so 
long as slavery was the foundational rock upon which the nation stood. 
 The nation was born out of violent revolution. Penning the Declaration of 
Independence, Thomas Jefferson (1776) of Virginia wrote, “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of 
Happiness” (p. 1). This bold vision helped lay the groundwork for a developing nation, 
one that asserted its independence from others and established a government that derived 
its powers from consent (Arendt [1963] 1990). Our “founding fathers” called out to 
liberty and disavowed slavery under the rubric of natural law. The slavery they forsake, 
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however, was more of the metaphorical variety. Actual slavery that reduced those of 
African descent to human bondage, which every state of the union practiced on the 
revolution’s eve, did not concern them.  
 Unseen were the connections between (white) political and (black) slavery. This 
is less a failure of the white imagination, and more an indication of its interests. At a 
fundamental level, whiteness represents a social position that cannot exist outside a 
persisting racial order of white supremacy (Lewis 2004; see also Bonilla-Silva 1997; 
Mills 1997). When white supremacy is the frame of reference from which one sees the 
world, contradictions between slavery and universal declarations of life, liberty, and 
happiness do not represent a paradox at all. “[T]he paradox dissolves,” as historian 
William Wiecek (1996) has written, “when we recall that American slavery was racial. 
White freedom was entirely compatible with black enslavement. African Americans 
were, as the framers of Virginia’s first Constitution determined, simply not part of the 
Lockean body politic” (p. 1791; see also Baum 2006).1 Black enslavement made for a 
more perfect white union beyond Virginia’s borders. Even antislavery advocates like 
John Adams of Massachusetts and Roger Sherman of Connecticut failed to draw 
distinctions between black freepersons and slaves, and interchangeably referred to all 
black people as property. 
                                                           
1 In addition to Virginia’s constitution, black slaves did not belong to the Lockean body politic in 
the Carolinas either. A passage of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina claims, “Every 
Freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves”—a document 
that philosopher John Locke, himself, helped write in 1669 (qtd. in Armitage 2004:619). 
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The covenant these young Americans would agree to under the Constitution 
centered around the protection of property, defined by what American studies scholar 
George Lipsitz (1998) has labeled a “possessive investment in whiteness.” Through 
reification, which social theorist Georg Lukács ([1923] 1971) described as a process of 
mystification that inverts subjects into objects,2 it vested an actual property interest in 
whiteness where property was defined not as a “thing” but a right. Slaves could not 
possess, by contrast, property because they became defined as such. Legal scholar Cheryl 
Harris (1993) has elaborated this point further:  
Because whites could not be enslaved or held as slaves, the racial line between 
white and Black was extremely critical; it became a line of protection and 
demarcation from the potential threat of commodification, and it determined the 
allocation of the benefits and burdens of this form of property. White identity and 
whiteness were sources of privilege and protection; their absence meant being the 
object of property. (p. 1720-1721)  
Slaves enjoyed no rights to possess, use, or dispose of property. Instead, property rights 
were entrenched in slavery so that slaves’ rights deferred to their master as his own. And 
property was broadly defined, to adapt the words of James Madison of Virginia ([1792] 
2006), as something that “embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and 
have a right” (p. 223).  
                                                           
2 In his own words, social theorist Georg Lukács ([1923] 1971) described the process of 
reification as follows: “Its basis is that a relation between people takes on a character of a thing 
and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature” (p. 83). He applied the concept, 
drawing from close readings of philosopher Karl Marx, to describe how capitalism strips 
humanity from human beings and treats them instrumentally not like people but “things.”  
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Legal scholar Derrick Bell (1987) reminded us that America’s “founders” 
subordinated others to their own social, political, and economic interests, defining the 
boundaries of full personhood by race so that some stood outside of its lines.3 These ideas 
of exclusion offered an intellectual edifice, one supported by even the most sophisticated 
philosophers of the day (e.g., Hume [1752] 1826; Kant [1764] 1960; Locke [1689] 1920, 
[1690] 2009; Mill [1859] 1986; Rousseau ([1762] 2008), to justify oppressive practices 
of conquest, colonization, genocide, and enslavement (Takaki 1993). Among black 
American experiences, slaves were separated from their humanity, and by consequence, 
alienated from self-dignity. Whites stripped from them control over the self, in terms of 
body, life choices, and possible future. Slaves may have stood in plain view on lands 
north or south of the Mason-Dixon Line, but they were invisible behind blue eyes and 
pale white skin. To adapt the ever-relevant words of the late poet Eduardo Galeano 
(1992), they were “los nadies” (translated as the nobodies): 
The nobodies: nobody’s children, owners of nothing.  
The nobodies: the no ones, the nobodied, running like rabbits, dying through life, 
screwed every which way….  
Who are not, but could be.  
Who don’t speak languages, but dialects.  
Who don’t have religions, but superstitions. 
Who don’t create art, but handicrafts. 
Who don’t have culture, but folklore. 
                                                           
3 In tracing white attitudes over several decades during the latter part of the twentieth century, 
political scientist Jennifer Hochschild (1995) has observed much of the same as legal scholar 
Derrick Bell. White Americans today, like their founding predecessors, have no problem 
endorsing broad-reaching definitions of freedom so long as it was reserved for those considered 
like themselves. This, however, is not total but truncated freedom that can be ideologically 
weaponized to preserve unequal relations.  
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Who are not human beings, but human resources. 
Who don’t have faces, but arms. 
Who do not have names, but numbers…. (p. 73) 
Modernity, the Promise of Emancipation Yet to Come 
A new world system, partly made possible by the emerging Age of Enlightenment fueled 
by Reason, provided foundational justification for restructuring society in the name of 
progress. Revolution in Colonial America, for example, can be seen as historical events 
exemplifying some Enlightenment ideals, ones that might displace European-style feudal 
societies with a more just alternative. This epoch ushered in emancipatory universalisms 
like individualism, egalitarianism, and meliorism, signaling a shift from “incarnated 
narrow-mindedness, dogmatism, and above all constraints of authority” (Wallerstein 
1995:127). Reason became the privileged mode of truth and basis for systematic 
knowledge that would reorganize society (Best and Kellner 1991). Whereas religion, 
tradition, and mysticism were sources of knowledge and authority during the Middle 
Ages, Enlightenment promised revolutionary social progress and a new egalitarian order 
in which Reason would dominate. 
Epochal shifts of Enlightenment were coupled with the nascent beginnings of 
capitalism. The mode of production was radically transformed by technological 
innovation and centralized organization, but with this new system came an inherent 
contradiction. Its chief crisis, claimed philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
([1848] 2002), is one of class conflict and implicit domination. In an uneven trajectory, 
capitalism displaced a system that was more rigidly oppressive and caste-like; it “put an 
end to all the feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations” (p. 222). It revolutionized production 
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so humankind could satisfy all its needs. In previous epochs, this undoubtedly “would 
have seemed an absurdity” (p. 226). 
 For classical thinkers, these transformations embodied beacons of hope that were 
impossible before. They represented not just a victory of humanity over nature, but “a 
triumph of humanity over itself, or over those with privilege” (Wallerstein 1995:127). 
Feudal rule could no longer impede substantive democracy as it had before, and universal 
interests could be served by government truly vested in the masses. The American 
Revolution testified to these promises and yielded opportunity for their fulfillment, as 
people had a “capacity for self-improvement and self-government, that progress might be 
a reality instead of fantasy, and that reason and humanity might become governing rather 
than merely critical principles” (Gay 1977:555). 
Racism and the Regressive Character of “Progress” 
As much as modernity was a racial project of global development (Smedley 1993; 
Winant 2001),4 more specifically it is one of a racist variety (Fields 1982; Jung 2015). 
Despite emancipatory promises of Enlightenment, modernity’s progress entails a 
regressive character. Never have these promises been inclusive of all groups. Philosopher 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau ([1762] 2008) argued humanity possesses an innate capacity for 
compassion and empathy, but thought people must have freedom forced upon them to 
“see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear” (p. 43). Philosopher 
                                                           
4 That said, the origins of racism are debated. Others like historian George Fredrickson (2002) 
describe race and racism as outgrowths of antisemitism during the late Middle Ages, in which 
Jews were seen as the pale of the earth under European expansionism—especially by the Spanish 
(see also Thomas 2010).  
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Charles Mills (1997) has pointed out that a careful reading reveals the only “noble 
savages” Rousseau provides examples of are nonwhite savages from countries outside 
Europe. Never does he ask, as social theorist Herbert Marcuse (1964) noted, why do 
people have to be unfree in the first place? And how is it that he uncritically accepts the 
presumed liberators as benevolent? Perhaps they are not liberators, but invaders. The 
point is Rousseau assumes to know other peoples’ interests better than the people 
themselves.   
Known for his thoughts on morality, philosopher Immanuel Kant ([1764] 1960) 
built a lesser known theory where he attributed perceived racial differences to inherent 
biological distinctions between whites and blacks. He said race determines intellectual 
ability: “So fundamental is the difference between that two races of man, and it appears 
to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color” (Kant [1764] 1960:111). On 
several occasions, Kant pinpointed what he saw as shortcomings of other groups too. 
Asians lack the capacity for abstract thought, he thought, and Native Americans are 
incapable of education and generally hopeless (Eze 1995). To this end, Charles Mills 
(1997) has argued, “the embarrassing fact for the white West (which doubtless explains 
its concealment) is that their most important moral theorist of the past three hundred 
years is also the foundational theorist in the modern period of division between 
Herrenvolk and Untermenschen, persons and subpersons, upon which Nazi theory would 
later draw” (p. 72, emphasis original). 
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The Declaration of Independence professed the ideals of equality, but in 
Orwellian (1945) fashion, some were more equal than others. It would be more accurate, 
as historian Barbara Fields (1990) has explained, if it declared from the beginning:  
Those holding liberty to be inalienable, and holding Afro-Americans as slaves 
were bound to end by holding race to be a self-evident truth. (p. 101) 
This was not only the position of Thomas Jefferson, but Rousseau, Kant, and other 
Enlightened thinkers too (e.g., Hume [1752] 1826; Locke [1689] 1920, [1690] 2009; Mill 
[1859] 1986).5 What conjoins these thinkers together is less about individual 
predispositions of prejudice and more about a common racialized worldview—one 
characterized by relations of power and domination. Modernity introduced the possibility 
of emancipation. It also introduced the formation of a racist rule, one that resolved the 
paradox brought about by Reason. Racial ideology offered justification for how a society 
that prided itself upon freedom and liberty could, at the same time, hold a significant 
portion of its population in bondage (Fields 1982, 1990; Fields and Fields 2012). Once 
persons of color were deemed racially inferior, or less than human to be specific, 
exceptions to a democratic rule warranted no further discussion. 
Before Slavery was Slavery  
Slavery unfolded along racial lines, but as Barbara Fields (1990) has argued, this 
unfolding was not inevitable. Americans were cognizant of racial distinctions during the 
1600s, but its boundaries were blurred. Historian George Fredrickson (2002) explained 
that even among American slave societies, Africans varied in their status from slaves, 
                                                           
5 Other examples of racist tendencies among philosophers are not explored here to avoid 
belaboring the point (see Eze 1997). 
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indentured servants, and freepersons. There is little evidence to suggest that white-on-
black animus was developed at this time (Jordan 1968). Race served more as a religious 
marker than a distinction between those who were chained to human bondage and those 
who were not. Many social activities were integrated up to that historical moment, and 
some lower-class whites even participated in urban slave revolts (Roediger 1991). When 
the planter class needed laborers for large-scale agricultural operations, mostly white 
indentured servants supplied this need at first (Jordan 1968). During early seventeenth 
century Virginia, for example, white indentured servants were preferred to black slaves 
because they were more profitable. As historian Edmund Morgan (1975) has argued, 
short life spans combined with the costly expense of slave purchases made such 
investments risky.  
 To maximize profits, Virginia’s planter class pursued a variety of strategies to 
control indentured servants (Morgan 1975). They created artificial land scarcity, extended 
terms of service, levied taxes, fees, and rents, and imposed severe penalties for preying 
on livestock for food. While economic opportunity seemed to grow scarcer and scarcer, 
the number of indentured servants multiplied. When the burdens placed on them ran too 
high, the whole colony was on the verge of anarchy. The largest colonial revolt to 
precede the revolution erupted in 1676 (Webb 1995). Not only was Governor William 
Berkeley driven from Jamestown, but the capital was torched. This was “Bacon’s 
Rebellion.” Unlike the later experiences of slaves, total domination over indentured 
servants was impossible and the threat of racial violence unavailable. These white folks 
were servants, but they had legal status and protections recognized by colonial courts 
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(Galenson 1981). They were not debased in the same ways as slaves. During the latter 
part of the century, as historian Winthrop Jordan (1968) explained, their social status 
would largely improve because they were neither black nor slave.   
In the words of Cheryl Harris (1993), “The construction of white identity and the 
ideology of racial hierarchy also were intimately tied to the evolution and expansion of 
the system of slavery. The further entrenchment of plantation slavery was in part an 
answer to a social crisis produced by the eroding capacity of the landed class to control 
the white labor population” (p. 1717). A gradual displacement of white indentured 
servants with slaves would go a long way to calm these white servants’ rebellions 
(Morgan 1975). Numerous factors culminated during the latter half of the seventeenth 
century to make slavery more economically appealing. These included factors like the 
dwindling supply of indentured servants, more favorable economic conditions for labor in 
England, westward colonial expansion though often violent displacement of indigenous 
peoples, an ever-increasing demand for agrarian work in the Southern colonies, declining 
mortality rates, and reduced costs in training slaves (Galenson 1981). These shifts made 
the purchase of slaves a more worthwhile investment to line the pockets of slavemasters.  
Racialized Expansion of Slavery 
The change in the slavemaster’s business model was simple: exploit the whole slave 
population and drive them to the limits of their existence. According to sociologist 
W.E.B. Du Bois ([1920] 2006), this is among slavery’s features that achieved novelty 
under modernity: 
The using of men for the benefit of masters is no new invention of modern 
Europe. It is as old as the world. But Europe proposed to apply it on a scale and 
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with an elaborateness of detail of which no former world ever dreamed. The 
imperial width of the thing—the heaven-defying audacity—makes its modern 
newness. (p. 41) 
Unlike the old world, enslavement of African men, women, and children was 
commercialized under expanding plantation capitalism (Blackburn 1997; Feagin 2000, 
2006). Slavemasters needed insurance they could reproduce a slave-driven labor force if 
this developing world market was to be possible. During 1662 in Virginia, for example, 
elite white men passed a statute at large, commonly referred to as “the birthright law,” for 
the specific purpose of sexually exploiting black women (Giddings [1984] 1996). They 
reformed British common law so that a child’s slave status was determined by the 
mother, not the father.  
No longer did slavemasters value female slaves strictly for their labor. This made 
slavery what sociologist Erving Goffman (1961) would have described as a “total 
institution,” an enclosed social system that controlled most every aspect of black bodies 
in general and black women’s bodies in particular. In a letter to John Jordan of Kentucky, 
for example, Thomas Jefferson later observed, “[Other slavemasters] saw their value as 
the 1st object and the raising of their children as secondary, [but he] consider[ed] the labor 
of a breeding woman as no object, and that a child raised every 2 years is of more profit 
than the crop of the best laboring men” (qtd. in Takaki [1979] 1990:44). White 
slavemasters saw black women as, in their own words, “breeders” that would multiply 
their fortunes (see also Harris 1993). Children were no longer children. They were 
profits. For these reasons, among others, as many as two-thirds of the Virginia electorate 
would own slaves by the mid-eighteenth century (Sydnor 1965).  
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What made slavery unique from previous forms of oppression was its totality, “its 
permanency and the total commodification attendant to the status of the slave” (Harris 
1993:1720). In contrast to indentured servants, women were sent to the fields (Morgan 
1975). Their children entered work at earlier ages. Slavemasters no longer felt compelled 
to provide education as with indentured servants. Nor did they feel the need to make 
pastors and ministers available for spiritual guidance. Some made sure slaves received 
less food than required for survival, forcing them to upkeep their own livestock and 
gardens on the side for basic sustenance. When slaves lost the incentive to work, 
slavemasters resorted to the lash. Those that were unproductive by their master’s 
standards would be beaten just short of death. “No matter how degraded the factory 
hand,” explained W.E.B. Du Bois ([1935] 1992), “he is not real estate. The tragedy of the 
black slave’s position was precisely this; his absolute subjection to the individual will of 
an owner” (p. 10). Slaves of color were not people under this system. They were “things” 
that could be bought, sold, and otherwise treated in the same manner as livestock. In 
these kinds of ways, slavery maximized profits by means that indentured servanthood 
never did.  
What is so Racial about Racism? 
Race cannot be reduced to any other basis for social relations—like class, ethnicity, and 
so on—despite claims otherwise (Omi and Winant [1986] 1994). Within the U.S. context, 
for instance, sociologist Oliver C. Cox (1948) explained that under a capitalist nation 
built upon racial oppression the so-called “American Creed,” or morality in general, is 
shaped by a material base (see also Marx and Engels [1846] 1970, [1848] 2002). 
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“Probably it may be said rather conclusively,” Cox (1948) wrote, “that the Negro 
problem cannot be solved ‘in principle’ because it is not basically an ideological 
problem” (p. 512). Racial antagonisms are byproducts of class from his vantage point.6 
“If we attempt to see race relations realistically,” Cox (1948) elaborated, “the meaning of 
the capitalist function is inescapable” (p. 537). Meanwhile, economist Gunnar Myrdal 
(1944) claimed racism was a temporary aberration to a young American democracy. 
Taking a moralist position, he thought internal tension over the mistreatment of blacks 
(e.g., slavery, Jim Crow) and principled ideals of equality or freedom would be a great 
source of guilt among whites. This guilt would eventually overwhelm any prejudices they 
held, and achieve a racial democracy where there was no “American dilemma.”7 Both 
attribute race and racism to some other underlying principles. 
According to sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994), race 
is simply defined as “a fundamental axis of social organization” (p. 13, emphasis 
original). It is not a cohesive identity to be formed or possessed among collectivities but a 
                                                           
6 Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997) has elaborated this critique more fully, and extends it 
to neo-marxian analyses (e.g., Bonacich 1980; Miles 1989, 1993; Solomos 1989) that privilege 
“class dynamics as the real engine of racial dynamics” (p. 466). 
7 Some studies have empirically tested economist Gunnar Myrdal’s “white guilt” proposition, 
only to find little to no support (e.g., Cummings and Pinnel 1988; Williams 1964). Instead many 
whites have become overwhelmed with what sociologist Tyrone Forman (2004) has described as 
indifference (see also Forman and Lewis 2006, 2015; Pettigrew and Meerten 1995). This is 
evident in growing response rates on surveys in which whites answer “no response” or “don’t 
know” to most any question related to race. Similarly, sociologist Matthew Hunt (2007) has 
observed that whites who reject all General Social Survey-provided accounts for racial inequality 
has increased from 5 to 15 percent between 1977 and 2004. That is, they contend that racial 




relation between socially defined groups (Lewis 2004). This axis arbitrarily organizes 
how rewards and penalties of social value (i.e., consensus agreements linked to material 
and symbolic power) are distributed within a particular historical context. Though race is 
fluidly articulated, as seen by census categories that change nearly every ten years as well 
as discrepancies between self-identification and ascription processes (e.g., Vargas 2015), 
it typically divides groups of people by markers like skin tone, eye shape, hair texture, 
and so on. This emphasis on physicality gives race some sense of recognition that divides 
people “by some notion of stock or collective heredity of traits” (Anthias and Yuval-
David 1992:2). As essayist James Baldwin ([1962] 1991) forewarned, however, race is 
about much more than appearance. “[C]olor is not a human or a personal reality,” he 
reminded us, “it is a political reality” (p. 139). This is among the reasons why processes 
of racialization, which refer to when previously unclassified social relations, practices, or 
groups take on racial meaning, have the capacity to acquire autonomy and independence 
(Omi and Winant [1986] 1994; see also Bonilla-Silva 1997).  
Though embedded within other forms of hierarchy, race takes on a unique 
character that cannot be attributed to any other social category. It has the capacity to lead 
a life of its own. Consider, for example, how W.E.B. Du Bois ([1933] 1995) 
distinguished class from race. Writing on asymmetrical relations between those who own 
the means of production and everyone else, he observes: 
The class struggle of exploiter and exploited is a reality. The capitalist still today 
owns the machines, materials, and wages with which to buy labor. The laborer in 
America owns little more than his ability to work. (p. 539, emphasis original)  
Workers go on to legitimate this relation when they advance a bootstrapping ideology 
that presumes individual liberty, equal opportunity, and self-determination are available 
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to all. Such ideas have thwarted potential revolutions against democratic capitalism in the 
U.S. because common labor “has been blinded by the American vision of the possibility 
of layer after layer of the workers escaping into the wealthy class and becoming 
managers and employers of labor” (Du Bois [1933] 1995:542).8 Resistance within 
bourgeois logic, in other words, offers no real solutions to the fundamental conflict of 
capitalism: class struggle. 
While class conflict is fundamental in its own right, it would be mistaken to 
presume racial conflict plays “second fiddle.” It cannot be subsumed under other bases 
for social organization (Omi and Winant [1986] 1994). Preemptively responding to 
claims that the colorline would be undermined by changes in the political economy like 
industrialization (e.g., Wilson 1978), sociologist Harold Blumer (1965) foresaw that 
“industrial imperatives accommodate themselves to the racial mold and continue to 
operate effectively in it” (p. 236). Since at least the 1700s, extracted surplus value from 
capitalism has been built upon the backs of exploited labor (Marable [1983] 2000).9 “In 
                                                           
8 The logic outlined here follows what philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ([1846] 
1970) highlighted in The German Ideology: “The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so 
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of material production are 
subject to it” (p .64). 
9 A similar argument can be made with respect to gender. American capitalism, much like 
capitalism throughout the world, was (and continues to be) organized by a gendered division of 
labor, making it what sociologist Charlotte Perkins Gilman ([1848] 2007) labeled a “sexuo-
economic arrangement.” Among other arrangements, this economic subordination is rooted in the 
institutions of marriage and family (Coontz 1992). Women’s labor has largely been excluded 
from the formal economy, as women are relegated to perform much domestic and emotion work 
such as upkeep and socialization for children. In the words of sociologist Juliet Schor (1992), “As 
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the case of race relations,” wrote Oliver Cox (1948), “the tendency of the bourgeoisie is 
to proletarianize a whole people—that is to say, the whole people is looked upon as a 
class—whereas white proletarianization involves only a section of the white people” (p. 
344). The racial ideology deployed to rationalize these labor arrangements is not an 
anachronism of American capitalism. Paths to this country’s modernization ran through 
the full-fledged development of an antiblack racism under slavery.  
The relative prosperity and liberty for some parts of the population came, and 
continues to come, at the subjugated expense of others. Racial distinctions of cultural 
value, ones that oppositionally define groups along a hierarchy, reach beyond the market 
to matters of mere personhood (Glenn 2002). People of color have had their human 
dignity questioned in ways unique from any other form of exploitation. Even to the 
poorest of the poor among whites, for instance, racial oppression provides what 
sociologist Lillian Rubin (1994) described as a status safety net. It can be captured in 
comments like “at least I’m not black.” These expressions serve as a reminder that “[n]o 
matter how low they may fall, there’s always someone below them, someone who serves 
as a reminder that they remain a step above any person of color, even a rich one” (Rubin 
1994:38). This is what W.E.B. Du Bois ([1935] 1992) spoke of when referring to 
“wages” of the dominant group (see also Roediger 1991). Afforded forms of symbolic 
compensation, “[whites] are given public deference and titles of courtesy” solely on the 
basis of their social identity (Du Bois [1935] 1992:700). Race is about recognition of 
                                                           
any woman can attest, the query, ‘Do you work?’ is meant to distinguish between those who are 
employed in the market economy, and those whose labors are confined to the home” (p. 84). 
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people as such, and people of color have been subjected to a status of subpersonhood that 
cannot be attributed to anything else (Omi and Winant [1986] 1994).   
The State as a Pre-eminent Site of Racial Conflict 
The making of American Empire10 has long been about who belongs to what political 
scientist Benedict Anderson ([1983] 2006) called the “imagined political community,” 
which is by definition a struggle over state-sanctioned rewards and penalties of social 
value. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ([1846] 1970) argued that “the State is the form in 
which the individuals of the ruling class assert their common interests” (p. 80). In this 
way, a state’s primary role is to promulgate laws, and the normative values behind them, 
that preserve a dominant group’s position within a stratified political, social, cultural, and 
economic order (see also Arjomand 1992). Among the stratified lines this order follows 
in the United States, to sociologist Joe Feagin’s (2000, 2006) point, is a racial one 
designed to systematically serve white interests (see also Bonilla-Silva 1997).  
According to Michael Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994), the state is “the 
pre-eminent site of racial conflict” because of its ability to unequally distribute social 
resources and liabilities through laws, court decisions, and other legal actions (p. 82; see 
also Goldberg 2002). These sociologists claim a state becomes racialized (i.e., a “racial 
state”) when it shapes the trajectory of an unstable but enduring racial hierarchy through 
                                                           
10 I follow the lead of sociologist Moon-Kie Jung (2015) in labeling the United States as an 
empire-state rather than nation-state for sake of precision. As he has explained, “nation-states 
imply politically homogeneous populations of citizens, or state members” (p. 58, emphasis 
original). Empire-states are, on the contrary, hierarchal and entail usurpation of sovereign 
territories and their inhabited populations (see also Cooper 2005; Jung and Kwon 2013).  
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cycles of conflict (e.g., abolition) and accommodation (e.g., the 13th Amendment). This 
means the state is neither a closed-off, banal instrument of power (e.g., Adorno et al. 
1950) nor is it comprised of its own independent and autonomous structure (e.g., Skocpol 
1980). Elaborating ideas about the state from social theorist Antonio Gramsci ([1946] 
1971) and extending them to racial matters, Omi and Winant ([1986] 1994) have claimed 
the state is an openly-contested terrain embedded within racial conflict that connects a 
host of public institutions.11  
Unlike much of the work on state theory, an area filled with no shortage of 
seminal works (e.g., Miliband 1969; Skocpol 1985), ideas about the state offered by 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994) have placed racial dynamics front and 
center. They take serious the deep history and ongoing practices of racial discrimination 
that the government either sanctions or seeks remedy. However, political scientists David 
James and Kent Redding (2005) have identified at least one problem with Omi and 
Winant’s conception of a racial state. It places emphasis on outcomes over the state’s 
internal structure. Such a narrow focus obscures how the racial state varies by 
transaction, composition, and web of interconnected institutions (Lieberman 1998). There 
could plausibly be, for instance, many racial states, from a racial neoliberal state (Hohle 
2015) to a racial mass incarceration state (Alexander 2010) to a racial welfare state 
(Brown 1999) to a racial segregation state (Massey and Denton 1993) to a racial 
                                                           
11 Whereas sociologist Michael Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994) have claimed the state’s 
function is to equilibrate racial conflict, my focus stresses how access to and control over the state 
is not neutral. It has long been a white enterprise (see also Feagin 2000; Harris 1993). 
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representation state to a racial tax state and so on, all operating under unique 
circumstances with their own functional particularities. A missed opportunity to pinpoint 
these variations means we do not know how to specify causally the state’s role in 
sustaining the racial order. “If all states are racial states, knowing that a state is racial 
provides no analytical leverage to understand how it creates racial inequalities and 
identities” (James and Redding 2005:193-194).  
From the Racial State to a Racial Representation and Tax State 
Because the American empire was built on slavery, so was its governing document. The 
Constitution represents, in the words of historian Herbert Aptheker (1976), a “bourgeois-
democratic document for the governing of a slaveholder-capitalist republic” (p. 55). This 
means the questions that give rise to the role of government in American “democracy,” as 
well as the state’s basic architecture, are foremost racial questions. In his last book before 
his death, civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1967) observed: “When the 
Constitution was written, a strange formula to determine taxes and representation 
declared that the Negro was 60 percent of a person” (p. 6). This strange formula is 
evidence that the framers of U.S. government, from its very inception, had political 
interests in defining races and distributing rewards and penalties accordingly.  
With regard to the three-fifths clause, these rewards and penalties regarded how to 
fractionally value slave bodies to determine allocate congressional representation and 
direct taxation among the states. Whereas representation determines the political voice to 
shape government policy, taxation represents the financial “lifeblood” that makes 
possible what services and protections the state provides. Each is a fundamental 
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component of legitimate civic authority embodied in “the social contract” (Rousseau 
[1762] 2008), and both have the capacity to formalize group relations of inequality. 
Matters of the political participation, bureaucratic administration, and 
distributions of public and private capital all run through representation and taxation.12 
Representation is important because, without the vote, disenfranchised groups lack a 
formal means of protecting their legally proscribed rights. As much was evident to slaves 
during the early republic. Though each slave counted as 60 percent a person in 
determining the number of representatives each state would receive, slave votes were not 
portioned at a 40 percent lesser rate than their voting counterparts. These votes went to 
slavemasters and were restricted to only white property-owning men in many states 
(Redding, James, and Klugman 2005), so the condition of slaves was “enumeration 
without representation.” Exclusionary laws surrounding the franchise deepened the 
formation of whiteness as a power position, one that paid real dividends like participating 
in government. On the contrary, disenfranchisement sealed the fate of exclusion. Even 
representatives sympathetic to antislavery causes, as we will see, were primed to ignore 
the plight of people of color generally, and slaves specifically, since holding office 
depends upon responding to and acting on behalf of constituents (i.e., other white people) 
who cast votes on their behalf (Richards 2000; see also Lawson 1985). Implicit in the 
                                                           
12 This point draws much insight from works on taxation within “the new fiscal sociology” 
(Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009; Martin and Prasad 2014), and expands it to encompass 
political representation. The term “fiscal sociology” is one coined by sociologist Joseph 
Schumpeter ([1918] 1991), though the field is quite interdisciplinary. 
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systematic disenfranchisement of certain groups is the normative judgment of whose 
interests should be represented by the state.  
 Part of the determination of who should access the democratic polity and have 
their political voice heard was shaped by perceptions of who pays taxes. When 
slavemaster politicians and accommodators labelled slaves a “public charge,” these 
groups were redefined as economic burdens rather than a source of white wealth. Slaves 
are not contributing citizens but helpless dependents incapable of self-determination. 
Seen this way, whites articulated a representative tax state akin to a “herrenvolk 
democracy” (van den Berghe 1967) 13 or “white republic” (Saxton 1990; see also 
Roediger 1991). As historian Camille Walsh (2016) has explained, taxes become the 
currency for citizenship and a pretext for exclusion. A false presumption by whites of the 
early republic is that they are the only ones to pay into the system—a point they used to 
justify sole discretion of budgetary spending.14 By making these claims, founding fathers 
across the sectional aisle created entrenchment strategies of taxation that protected what 
resources and infrastructure they already possessed. It was slavery in the case of Southern 
states, and industry and maritime interests in regard to Northern states.  
                                                           
13 “Herrenvolk democracy” refers to a government installed under the pretense of inclusion, 
equality, and other emancipatory ideals but nonetheless uses race as an organizing principle for 
citizenship and political participation. 
14 These discourses foreshadowed those heard in the post-Reconstruction era. “[R]edemption 
governments, often describing themselves as the ‘rule of the taxpayer,’” wrote historian C. Vann 
Woodward (1971), “frankly constituted themselves champions of the property owner against the 
property less and allegedly untaxed masses” (p. 59). To some extent, these narratives align with 
those that surrounded desegregation orders following the Brown v. Board decision and the 
nation’s neoliberal turn (Hohle 2015).  
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Slavery was an institution that implicated all of white America. It made the 
economy go round, with shipments of raw materials like tobacco and cotton from 
Massachusetts to the Chesapeake to Charleston. Wealthy planters of the low country and 
the industrial manufacturers of New England alike rested their entrepreneurship upon 
stolen slave labor—either directly or indirectly. In both degrees of engagement, a rigid 
color line was drawn. Slavery made for a more perfect union, and the three-fifths clause 
helped codify this arrangement into law. Once enacted the law conceded the point that 
some Americans were free while others were not, and from this basis should flow how 
political representation and taxation are distributed across the union. If slavery was the 
“agreement with hell,” as William Lloyd Garrison ([1845] 1995) claimed, then the terms 






THE THREE-FIFTHS CLAUSE, A GENEALOGY 
Reading the final text of the three-fifths clause, one might conclude that constitutional 
debates over taxation and representation unraveled simultaneously. They did not (cf. 
Rossiter [1966] 1987). They occurred on their own terms and did not converge until the 
ending days of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. The infamous ratio did not 
originate, however, out of the constitutional debates. Rather, the lineage of the three-
fifths clause began about a decade earlier. Its roots were planted during the Articles of 
Confederation in discussions over how to apportion taxes among states. From 1775 
onward, the three-fifths clause failed to become law many times over for two primary 
reasons. Firstly, unresolved conflicts over slavery between North and South were a 
persistent factor, and secondly, the rule-making procedures of the Articles prevented its 
own salvage. Both these problems would be more squarely addressed under the United 
States Constitution, and the three-fifths clause would finally come into full bloom under 
“The Great Compromise of 1787.” 
At stake was the matter of how to count slaves for the sake of determining  
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congressional representation and direct tax liability.1 If slaves counted toward 
apportioning congressional representation, then states with many slaves would be 
advantaged. Meanwhile, if slaves counted toward apportioning direct taxation, then states 
with many slaves would assume larger tax liability. This positioned Northerners to prefer 
a zero-fifths ratio for representation and a five-fifths ratio for taxation, and Southerners to 
desire scales in the other directions. This chapter is a genealogy of how these political 
conflicts were reconciled as “the three-fifths clause” (see Table 1), at least until the 
“cotton states” seceded in 1860 and 1861.2 
Table 1. Text of the Three-Fifths Clause in the U.S. Constitution 
Provision Legal Text 
 
Article I, Section 2 Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
states which may be included within this union, according to their respective 
numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free 
persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding 
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.       
 
America’s First Constitution, the Articles of Confederation 
The U.S. declared its independence from Great Britain about 16 months before the 
Continental Congress was ready to submit its first constitution for ratification, the 
Articles of Confederation. By design, the Articles required unanimous consent before any 
                                                           
1 Though “Indians” enter into the final text of the three-fifths clause, generally they were not 
mentioned throughout the debate. This reflects what should be considered an appalling omission 
by a self-proclaimed cosmopolitan group of politicians, one that denied the longstanding presence 
of Native Americans in favor of Eurocentric visions of civilization. 
2 Succession was prompted in December of 1860 when the South Carolina legislature met in 
Charleston to adopt the “Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the 
Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.” In January and February of the following 
year, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas followed suit.  
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national laws could be enacted or amended. Sensing some urgency since “none of the 
European powers will publicly acknowledge [the states] free and independent, until they 
are confederated” (LDC-VIII [1777] 1976:99), Congress requested the states offer their 
swift approval upon receipt. What they got, however, was far from swift. Many states 
requested amendments, causing new drafts to be completed and re-submitted for 
undisputed approval. Several drafts later and more than three years thereafter, Maryland 
was the last state to ratify in February of 1781.  
If the adoption process was any indication, the Articles were a failure by most 
measures (Robinson 1971). Special majorities were required to accomplish even minimal 
tasks, and unanimity across the states was to be achieved before the national government 
could be conferred additional powers. These rules did not enable effective governing. 
They prohibited it. Government under the Confederation got nothing done, and the nation 
was left in chaos after the revolution. Once the ink had dried on the Treaty of Paris, many 
Americans feared economic turmoil. They thought it threatened to tear their nation apart 
faster than an invading foreign army would. Massive debts were owed to creditors, both 
domestic and foreign. Thirteen unique states followed their own trade policies and court 
systems. They even circulated their own currencies. Inflation rose as commodity values 
declined. On top of these problems, the state lacked an adequate mechanism to generate 
revenue. Debates over taxation stalled because representatives from the North and South 





Early Tax Debates of the Articles 
Among the first passages regarding taxation proposed divided fiscal responsibility among 
the states by their corresponding population. New Englanders, and Northerners generally, 
wholeheartedly supported the plan, while Southerners found it unacceptable. Both sides 
agreed the purpose of government was to protect property. They followed the 
conventional wisdom of philosopher Adam Smith ([1766] 1978), who claimed: “Till 
there be property there can be no government, the very end of which is to secure wealth 
and to defend the rich from the poor” (p. 404). Where they disagreed was the issue of 
how to measure “property.” Counting the population to determine taxation, Southerners 
claimed, did not fairly distribute the fiscal responsibility. When property determined 
taxation but was measured by population only, they claimed Dixie would be penalized for 
their abundance of slaves.  
Rather than throw the baby out with the proverbial bathwater, Samuel Chase of 
Maryland sought to salvage the tax proposal. He thought population could be a suitable 
measure of property pending one qualification.  
Mr. CHASE moved that the quotas should be fixed, not by the number of 
inhabitants of every condition, but by that of the ‘white inhabitants.’ He admitted 
that taxation should be always in proportion to property; that this was, in theory, 
the true rule; but that, from a variety of difficulties, it was a rule which could 
never be adopted in practice. The value of the property in every state could never 
be estimated justly and equally. Some other measures for the wealth of the state 
must therefore be devised, some standard referred to, which would be more 
simple. (ED-I [1775] 1836:70-71) 
Dissenting from this argument, John Adams of Massachusetts argued since most 
everyone agreed that population was a proxy for wealth, it only made sense to include 
black labor, enslaved or not, in the apportionment. They, too, contributed to each state’s 
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generation of wealth. James Wilson of Pennsylvania added that if black labor contributed 
so little then why not consider their emancipation. This argument did not bode well with 
slavemaster politicians.  
Thomas Lynch of South Carolina articulated what was on the minds of many 
Southerners. “If it is debated, whether their slaves are their property,” he replied, “there is 
an end of the confederation” (JCC-V [1776] 1906:1080). Either the confederation 
accommodates slavery, or there would be no confederation at all. That was the price to be 
paid for a union with slaveholders. After giving Northerners an ultimatum, Lynch 
reiterated the point made earlier by Samuel Chase. “Our slaves being our property, why 
should they be taxed more than the land, sheep, cattle, horses, &c.?” (JCC-V [1776] 
1906:1080).3 Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania remained unconvinced.  
Sidestepping whether slaves and sheep were equal, Benjamin Franklin observed a 
crucial difference between the two: 
Slaves rather weaken than strengthen the State, and there is therefore some 
difference between them and sheep; sheep will never make any insurrections. 
(JCC-V [1776] 1906:1080) 
                                                           
3 Telling Northern representatives to accommodate slavery or watch the union dissolve was 
among the most repeated strategies of Southern representatives. This exhortation can be seen in 
the beginning debates of the Articles of Confederation, as seen by the comments of Thomas 
Lynch of South Carolina and Samuel Chase of Maryland, all the way to the enactment of the 
Constitution. In late July of 1787 for example, when the Constitutional Convention was finalizing 
a final draft of the Constitution, Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina “reminded the 
Convention, that, it the committee should fail to insert some security to Southern States against an 
emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he should be bound by duty to his state to vote 
against the report” (ED-V [1787] 1845:357).  
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His rebuttal offered an alternative to “happy slave” narratives that romanticized 
antebellum South as a racial utopia (see also Douglass 1845) and stroked Southern 
anxiety over disaffected slaves who were organizing revolutionary action (Aptheker 
1943).4 Franklin’s point held Southern racism accountable, claims like these did not 
advance the debate. They derailed it.  
No longer was the debate chiefly about taxation, but the moral politics of slavery. 
Reminiscent of charges of racism today (Blauner [1972] 2001; Doane 2006; Essed 1991), 
the founding fathers would oscillate between accusations and counter-accusations of 
being “racist”—or its eighteenth century equivalent. These exchanges trivialized racial 
conflict as prejudice, ignorance, or a disease. Meanwhile, structural dimensions of 
slavery were obscured. Southern delegates like John Rutledge of South Carolina would 
preface his views with comments like “I shall be happy to get rid of the idea of slavery” 
but then defend the peculiar institution from government intervention (JCC-V [1776] 
1906:1080). These exchanges personalized conflicts over slavery while concealing the 
                                                           
4 The example of opposition from Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania does not imply he 
consistently endorsed antiracism. He was obsessed with white purity, like other contemporaries of 
his time. Consider, for example, James Otis of Massachusetts—the same man who strongly 
rebuked slavery but was dismissed by his colleagues as erratic. Writing to a general English 
audience, he demanded respect for colonists on the basis that they, too, were free-born white 
subjects of Britain (Robinson 1971). He insisted his patriot brothers and sisters were untainted by 
blood of the indigenous or Africans. Meanwhile in Observations Concerning the Increase of 
Mankind, Franklin (1751) declared his desire for America to be a white country. More 
specifically, he encouraged migration of Anglo-Saxons and discouraged migration of Asians, 
Africans, and Germans. These groups, he thought, degraded the developing colonies as a whole 
(see also Feagin 2006, 2010).   
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institution’s structural dimensions. It left the intertwined issues of slavery and taxation 
unresolved, and therefore sustained.  
Spoilers: A Precursor to the Three-fifths Formula 
Over a decade before the three-fifths clause was enacted under the Constitution, a version 
of it was introduced in debates over the Articles. It did not concern representation but 
taxation, even though the nation was born out of a revolutionary slogan that linked the 
two (Wills 2003). Under the Articles, representation was determined by equal votes 
across the states. They followed one vote for one state scheme that can be traced to the 
Stamp Act Congress of 1765 (Robinson 1971).5 It was evident to the Continental 
Congress that the same representational plan could not be adapted and applied to 
taxation. This would mean less populous states like Rhode Island, Connecticut, and South 
Carolina would be subjected to the same tax liability as populous states like Virginia and 
New York. Congressional members knew no such confederation would occur under such 
terms. A population-based plan seemed to be the most practical alternative, so long as 
delegates could resolve their differences over how to value slave labor.  
 Representatives across the sectional aisle bought into pejorative stereotypes about 
slave labor, and black labor in general. They agreed that it produced less than white labor. 
That was, however, where their agreement ended. The question that remained has how 
                                                           
5 Though the Stamp Act Congress determined a representational rule that in part survives to this 
day (the U.S. Senate), their primary concerns for meeting in 1765 did not regard these matters. 
They were more interested in strategizing ways of resisting British Parliament and what they saw 
as oppressive taxation.  
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much? Benjamin Harrison of Virginia offered a compromise between the two sides in 
late July 1776, suggesting that slaves should only be partially considered:  
he affirmed that slaves did not do so much work as freemen, and doubted if two 
effected more than one. that [sic] this was proved by the price of labor, the hire of 
a labourer [sic] in the Southern colonies being from 8 to 12 £, while in the 
Northern it was generally 24 £. (JCC-V [1776] 1906:1100) 
Since slave labor was only half as productive as white labor, Harrison reasoned that “two 
slaves should be counted as one freeman” (JCC-V [1776] 1906:1100). James Wilson 
opposed the proposal. It cut taxes too much for slavemasters and in the process 
encouraged the expansion of slavery. The plan also reduced Southerners’ obligation to 
pay for the war (i.e., requisitions) as well as the number of soldiers they would provide 
for common defense (see also Einhorn 2006).  
Aside from James Wilson’s dissent, no one else engaged Benjamin Harrison’s 
proposal. It was disregarded without debate. Instead, the delegates reconsidered Lynch’s 
original plan, which would apportion taxes by the white population only. When voted 
upon, states divided along sectional lines6 and tax debate stalled for more than a year. 
Nonetheless, Harrison’s idea unknowingly foreshadowed the three-fifths law to come. 
During the meantime, the Continental Congress opted for a makeshift compromise that 
would not last and almost plunge a nation to ruin.  
From a “One-Halves” Clause to Article VIII 
In October of 1777, John Witherspoon of New Jersey introduced an alternative that 
would eventually be adopted as Article VIII. His plan was to set tax quotas for each state 
                                                           
6 Georgia’s vote was divided.  
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based on land- and house- values. Representatives from all five New England states 
opposed the plan, at least at first. They felt the plan was not evenhanded, as their land 
was appraised at much higher value than the rest of the country. Compound that bias on 
top of letting slaves go untaxed altogether, New Englanders felt they would be carrying 
everyone else’s tax burden. The plan was amended slightly before being taken to a vote:  
That the proportion of the public expence [sic] incurred by the United States for 
their common defence [sic] and general welfare, to be paid by each State into the 
treasury, be ascertained by the value of all land within each State granted to, or 
surveyed for any person, as such land, and the buildings and improvements 
thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as Congress shall, from time 
to time, direct and appoint. (JCC-IX [1777] 1907:801) 
Five votes to four approved the plan, and this text became ratified (eventually) under the 
Articles.  
 Roger Sherman of Connecticut predicted Article VIII would end in miserable 
failure. He was right on most counts. The plan was virtually unenforceable because it 
lacked a centralized administrative capacity to carry it through. Article VIII called for a 
tax plan based on a census of land and home values that had yet to be collected. 
“[However] only a few states,” as historian Robin Einhorn (2000) has written, “had the 
capacity to supply Congress with population totals, much less comprehensive data on real 
estate values” (p. 159). The plan relied upon voluntary compliance from states to develop 
a standardized means of taxation, reconcile divergent land valuations across the nation, 
and deliver the proceeds upon congressional request.  
To accomplish this deed, “We must imagine them doing one of the following: (1) 
sending a corps of trained assessors into the states, (2) relying upon state officials to 
observe uniform rules, or (3) letting state officials proceed and then agreeing on how to 
47 
 
equalize incommensurate results. Not only must we imagine one of these scenarios 
unfolding, but … we must imagine it unfolding during the Revolutionary War” (Einhorn 
2006:124-125). Article VIII would likely have been unworkable during times of peace. 
The War of Independence made it impossible. Real estate values not only fluctuated, but 
were under constant occupation or devastation. Most all states could not develop 
standardized means of survey and evaluation even if they wanted to. Among the political 
advantages, however, of a real estate-based over a population-based tax plan was that it 
permitted statesmen to skirt the sensitive issue of slavery.  
What the plan possessed in political savvy, it lacked in deliverable results. Article 
VIII provided no adequate means to generate revenues for the confederation. As the 
conflict with Britain waned, American soldiers were on the verge of mutiny. Many had 
served their country and willingly sacrificed their livelihood without pay. Meanwhile, 
American politicians made promises they did not keep. Soldiers’ patience grew thin and 
escalated into violence in some circumstances (Finkelman 1996; Robinson 1971). Article 
VIII was fundamentally defective and did not alleviate this situation. It made it worse. As 
an unfollowed tax plan, it structurally set up the government for fiscal failure (Brown 
1993; Rakove 1979).  
Should a Government that Cannot Pay for Itself be Kept? 
In diplomatic correspondence to Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin 
remarked, “Our people certainly ought to do more for themselves. It is absurd the 
pretending to be lovers of liberty while they grudge paying for the defence [sic] of it” 
(RDC-VI [1782] 1889:160). Nearly five years after the introduction of a land- and house-
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based tax, a growing consensus among Congress realized they needed an alternative 
(Rakove 1988).7 War-making, after all, depends upon the state’s ability to locate more 
capital and resources (Tilly 1985, 1990). Inherently this meant the establishment of a 
federally recognized currency, stripping states’ powers to regulate national commerce, 
making arrangements with domestic and foreign creditors, financing military efforts with 
supplies and support, and devising a tax scheme to help pay for it all.  
In a circular letter to the states, the delegates wrote:  
Had it not been for the aid of Money granted by our generous Ally—for the 
providential arrival of his Fleet in the Chesapeak [sic] and almost a miraculous 
coincidence of fortunate Circumstances, which by the blessing of God, were 
happily improved, our public Affairs must now have been in the most distressing 
Circumstances. (LDC-XVIII [1781] 1976:386) 
Questions of how to effectively finance a central government weighed on the delegates, 
as did the specifics of these policies (see also Rakove 1979). Delegates needed to depart 
from the Articles, which respected state sovereignty to its own detriment. One-by-one 
states began to default on their war debts as conflict with Britain abated (Robinson 1971).  
No mechanism was in place for the national government to hold states 
accountable. The delegates went on to write: 
This inattention in the States has almost endangered our very existence as a 
People, and indeed it is to the overruling providence of the great Governor of the 
Universe, that we must ascribe our political Salvation at this Day, amidst so many 
Tryals [sic], difficulties & distresses as have been struggled with in this 
complicated & bloody War with one of the first Powers in the Universe. (LDC-
XVIII [1781] 1976:386) 
                                                           
7 A group of dissenters, led by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia and George Clinton of New York, 
preferred to keep the Articles. They appreciated the emphasis on state sovereignty and restrained 
government. Rather than scrap it altogether, these delegates preferred amendments that granted 
temporary powers so that national government could generate revenue and regulate commerce.  
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It had become clear a stronger central government was needed. The founders needed to 
frame one with the capacity to develop, implement, and administer an assessment and 
appraisal system for collecting taxes, as well as offer assurance to European financiers 
like France so that additional loans could be procured (Einhorn 2006).8 The livelihood, 
functionality, and security of America depended upon it.  
American nationalism was the child of the revolution, not its parent. A deep 
desire to accommodate political differences—ones rooted in region, religion, economy, 
and above all slavery—served to cement an otherwise loose group of independent 
colonies. This spirit of accommodation was, in part, a matter of security and self-
preservation. As Benjamin Franklin remarked at the signing day of the Declaration of 
Independence, “we must, indeed all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang 
separately” (qtd. in Huang 1994:52). These words may seem glib now, but when they 
were said everyone knew of potential validity of such a pronouncement. The memory of 
the War of Independence further fostered a sense of common history and shared 
experiences. It also set a tone of urgency for state-building. Differences between North 
and South, though making for variation and complexity, helped knit together an 
interdependent socio-political country whereby slavery was at the center.  
 
 
                                                           
8 Early state formation of the U.S. represents, on many counts, what sociologist Charles Tilly 
(1985) described as a “protection racket.” This refers to when states trade or sell security to its 
citizens in exchange for revenues, or at least the negotiated consent to extract these resources. 
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From Article VIII to Taxes by Impost and Population 
America was on the brink of ending before it began. In 1783, James Madison of Virginia 
and Alexander Hamilton of New York jointly designed an alternative tax plan they 
thought might save the nation (JCC-XXV [1783] 1922). It introduced a two-pronged 
strategy that relied upon 1) an impost and 2) a population-based tax. The former half of 
this blueprint was adopted after nine congressional sessions, most federal revenues would 
be generated by the impost during America’s formative years (Einhorn 2000). Basically, 
this was an ad valorem duty of 5 percent that would be levied on imports, with higher 
duties on certain goods like wine, spirits, tea, coffee, sugar, pepper, and molasses. These 
compiled about 90 percent of federal revenue in any given year during the 1790s, and 
about 100 during the 1800s (see Figure 1). Whereas tax plans for the real estate option 
needed a standardized assessment plan to be devised, tax revenues could be immediately 
generated with the impost wherever imported goods were exchanged. 
Delegates from the North and South liked the idea for its practical ingenuity (at 
least at first). Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the finance minister of Louis XIV before the French 
Revolution, once declared, 
The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest 
amount of feathers with the least possible amount of hissing. (qtd. in Evans 
[1665] 1968:680) 
The impost was ingenious in this way. It was an implicit tax that did not impose the will 
of the people, and no one was certain from whom these revenues would come. There 




Figure 1. Composition of Federal Taxation by Dollars and Percents, 1791-1815 
                
 
Source: Dewey [1903] 1934.  
Even Adam Smith ([1776] 2007) praised the qualities of consumptive taxes that 
the impost seemed to embody:  
the circumstance that every man’s contribution is altogether voluntary; it being 
altogether in his power, either to consume, or not to consume, the commodity 
taxed. Where such taxes, therefore, are properly assessed, and upon proper 
commodities, they are paid with less grumbling than any other. When they are 
advanced by the merchant or manufacturer, the consumer, who finally pays them, 
soon comes to confound them with the price of commodities, and almost forgets 
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The impost represented a “hidden,” yet effective means of state finance. It maximized 
revenue and minimized protest at the same time. Despite these advances over the 
previous system, the impost’s administrative capacity remained vulnerable. State finance 
could be brought to a screeching halt, for example, should an enemy blockade port cities 
and interrupt commerce. As much happened during the War of 1812. These revenues 
dwindled to nearly half the federal tax composition. 
The Three-fifths Clause that Almost Was 
Out of concern for protection, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton pitched a second 
option for moments of national emergency: direct taxation. The plan rehashed earlier 
questions earlier debates had not answered. Namely, should slaves be counted? And if so, 
how much? This time around, however, Benjamin Franklin did not stir Southern fears 
over slave insurrections. As Franklin crossed the proverbial pond to England and France 
for diplomacy during his last decade on Earth, multiple times at that, “father time” had 
run its course. His political influence over the Constitution waned in comparison to his 
presence during the Articles, with him often having James Wilson read his arguments 
aloud because he lacked the strength. In fact, political fatigue had grown on the debate as 
a whole while massive war debts loomed overhead. Southern and Northern 
representatives may have disagreed over whether slaves should be counted, but these 
factors were compounded by the experience of a failed government. This made for a 
context of compromise. Northern representatives were more open to reconsider Benjamin 




 Delegates from the North and South disagreed with Benjamin Harrison’s original 
calculation. Southerners said slave productivity was lower, and Northerners said it was 
higher. The deadlock between the two sides caused it to fail. When tensions lingered over 
how to count slaves, James Madison offered an alternative:  
[I]n order to give proof of the sincerity of his professions of liberality, he would 
propose that slaves should be rated as five to three. (ED-V [1783] 1845:79) 
He and others thought this to be a fair compromise between North and South over 
taxation. They thought the plan to be among the only feasible alternatives for generating 
revenue outside the impost.  
Writing a letter to the states, members of Congress urged a swift passage: 
The ratio ultimately agreed on was the effect of mutual concessions; and if it 
should be supposed not to correspond precisely with the fact, no doubt ought to be 
entertained that an equal spirit of accommodation among the several legislatures 
will prevail against inequality which may be calculated on one side or the other. 
(ED-I [1783] 1836:98-99) 
The three-fifths proposal gained a majority votes two times over, first with a vote of five 
to three and later eleven to two (see also Einhorn 2006; Wills 2003). Because it was 
advanced under the Articles, however, unanimous approval was required for an 
amendment. Nonetheless, the majority approval of a three-fifths ratio set an important 
precedent that would be carried over to the Constitution.  
From the Articles to the Constitution 
The Articles described the union but did not empower it. That is why it failed. Learning 
from experience, American statesmen gathered at the “Annapolis Convention”9 in 1786 
                                                           
9 The “Annapolis Convention” as it came to be known was formally titled “Meeting of 
Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government.”  
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to entertain the possibility of revising the constitution. They wanted something with 
broader capacity for regulating commerce and providing for national defense. The 
urgency for reform was made clear by rebellions across the nation. From 1786 to 1787 in 
Massachusetts, for example, revolutionary veterans-turned-farmers threatened violence 
upon merchants, bankers, and the courts (Richards 2002). Many of these veterans were 
never compensated for their services in the War of Independence, and rather than receive 
relief for delinquent tax bills and outstanding debts their properties were foreclosed upon. 
They took action into their own hands as a result, and attempted to occupy a national 
weapons arsenal. Some died in their resistance; others were hanged. Eventually, the 
rebels were driven out by militia. This was Shays’ Rebellion. It sent ripples throughout 
the nation large enough to draw George Washington of Virginia back into political life, 
and ultimately the nation’s first presidency. Many politicians knew the nation was on the 
brink of collapse.  
Elite white men knew their own security, as well as their fortunes, rested upon the 
establishment of a stable political order (Brown 1987). The Annapolis Convention of 
1786 set in motion the Philadelphia Convention for the following year. State delegates 
met in the summer of 1787, though they were authorized only to amend the Articles. 
Replacing them, however, was the unspoken intent. Led by supporters of a new 
constitution, namely James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, these statesmen moved to 
replace rather than revise the old government with a new one. The Convention lasted 
from May to September, and the most contentious debates surrounded matters of slavery 
(Feagin 2000)—representation and taxation included. Representation was among the first 
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items debated, and taxation among the last. Both were essential in devising a government 
that represented “the people” and generated enough revenue to sustain itself.  
The Representation Side of Debate 
Among the first debates of the new Constitution regarded how political voice should be 
divided (Rossiter [1966] 1987). Less populous states like New Jersey preferred 
representatives to be divided equally among all states. That way the influence of larger 
states would not drown out the voices of smaller ones. More populous states like Virginia 
preferred a population-based plan. Claiming population was a proxy for wealth, and 
wealth was the basis of the body politic, delegates from these states asked why they 
should disproportionately commit resources to a union that was reluctant to offer a 
corresponding share of political influence (see ED-V [1787] 1836:178). Then there were 
outliers like Georgia and South Carolina. Even though Georgia was the least populous 
state of the union and South Carolina’s population compared more to Connecticut than 
Virginia, representatives from these states insisted political representation ought to be 
proportional to population not property value. Their insistence on this point was adamant 
and immovable. Rather than negotiate this point, they were ready to walk away from the 
union altogether.  
Upon first glance, debates over representation seemed to sort out between states 
with and without many people. That first glance would be wrong. Delegates from 
Georgia and South Carolina were political opportunists. Conceding representation to 
population would have undercut their interests initially, but as they imported more people 
through the slave trade, these politicians were sure to gain political sway. James Madison 
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observed “that the states were divided into different interests, not by their difference of 
size, but by other circumstances … principally from the effects of their having, or not 
having, slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in 
the United States” (ED-V [1787] 1845:264). That is, conflicts over representation were 
not really about representation. They were mainly about slavery (see also Feagin 2000).  
Table 2. Southern Congressional Representation by Varied Enumeration Plans* 
 Total Units Southern Portion Southern Percentage 
Representation Plan    
Articles of Confederation  
(1 representative per state) 
13 5 38.0   % 
Total Inhabitants 
(slaves equal to freepersons) 
3,929,000 1,962,000 49.9 
Freepersons Only 
(slaves not counted) 
3,231,000 1,304,000 41.0 
Three-fifths Ratio 
(5 slaves equal 3 
freepersons) 
3,651,000 1,700,000 46.5 
    
Actual Apportionment    
Senate    
in 1789 13 5 38.0   % 
in 1792 15 6 40.0 
House of Representatives    
in 1789 65 29 44.6 
after 1790 Census 105 47 44.8 
* Adapted from Solberg 1958.  
All population estimates derive from the 1790 Census and are rounded to the nearest thousand.  
Consider the representation plans discussed thus far (see Table 2). The “one state, 
one vote” rule under the Articles left Southern states with only 38.0 percent of the vote. 
By switching to a proportional plan that counted slaves and freepersons, they stood to 
gain about 12 points in political influence. Estimates from the 1790 Census indicate that 
49.9 percent of the U.S. population resided in the South. Were the plan only to consider 
freepersons, Southern representation would dwindle to 41.0 percent of the union. 
57 
 
Meanwhile, the plan that would be later introduced, the three-fifths ratio, would place 
Southern representation at 46.5 percent. Whichever strategy pursued, it was clear to 
Southern delegates they had more to politically gain by linking representation to 
population and counting slaves within this number.  
By June 30, 1787, those who supported the population-based plan had enough 
votes of support for passage. They worried, however, that this would alienate delegates 
from smaller states and make a delicate union in the making even more fragile. Nearly 
two weeks earlier William Paterson of New Jersey had introduced another representation 
scheme otherwise known as “the New Jersey Plan.” Rather than use population as the 
basis for representation, it reverted back to the one state, one vote rule of the Articles. 
James Madison acknowledged the divide, between both small and large states as well as 
slaveholding and non-slaveholding states, and offered an alternative: a bicameral 
congress. In the Senate branch, no slaves would be counted toward representation and 
states could have an equal distribution of senators. In the House, slaves would be counted 
alongside freepersons to determine the congressional representation of each state. “By 
this arrangement,” Madison remarked, “the southern scale would have the advantage in 
one House, and the northern in the other” (ED-V [1787] 1845:265). The whole matter of 
how to count slave, and to what extent, still lingered.  
Wanting unity over division, an unlikely candidate proposed what became the 
three-fifths “compromise” over representation. It was James Wilson, the same 
Pennsylvanian politician who dismissed Benjamin Harrison’s one-halves tax enumeration 
plan under the Articles and helped formalize the 1808 slave trade ban (see also 
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Finkelman 1988). Now Wilson and other Northern representatives stood on the same 
political sideline as slavemaster politicians like Charles Pinckney, who had lobbied the 
motion and motioned to second its adoption. Dissenters from the North included Elbridge 
Gerry of Massachusetts and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, but their motivations 
hardly stood on the right side of history. Gerry claimed “that three fifths of the blacks are 
to be represented, as if they were freemen” (ED-V [1787] 1845:553).10 He was against 
the three-fifths clause because it degraded freepersons of the North. Similarly, Morris 
said “that the people of Pennsylvania would revolt at the idea of being put on a footing 
with slaves. They would reject any plan that was to have such an effect” (ED-V [1787] 
1845:298). Perhaps these arguments were convincing enough for the vote on July 11. The 
three-fifths plan failed with four in favor and six against the proposal. What difference 
can a day make? A great deal, it seems. On July 12, a similar provision prevailed with a 
six-to-two vote. This time it linked representation and taxation.  
Linking Representation and Taxation, Acknowledging Slavery as the State’s Bedrock 
On July 12 of 1787, Gouverneur Morris suggested a “clause empowering the legislature 
to vary the representation according to the principles of wealth and numbers of 
inhabitants, a proviso, ‘that taxation shall be in proportion to representation’” (ED-V 
[1787] 1845:302). He was met with resistance from Pierce Butler of South Carolina, as 
well as George Mason of Virginia, that regurgitated, yet again, protests over how to 
                                                           
10 The opposition of Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts echoed the same concerns voiced earlier by 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, who claimed “the people of Pennsylvania will never agree to 
a representation of negroes” (ED-V [1787] 1845:303). 
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classify and value slaves (see also FR-II [1787] 1911:222). Are they persons? Should 
they get to vote? Are they property? If so, how come no other property was considered in 
determining representation? When Southerners felt these questions were taken too far, 
they threatened to turn their back on the union. This time it was William Davie who 
objected. He “said it was high time to now speak out. He saw that it was meant by some 
gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any share of representation for their blacks. 
He was sure that North Carolina would never confederate on any terms that did not rate 
them at least as three fifths” (ED-V [1787] 1845:302-303).11  
Gouverneur Morris later qualified his proposal, suggesting that any objections 
“would be removed by restraining the rule to direct taxation” (ED-V [1787] 1845:302).12 
Making this amendment in the spirit of accommodation, he assured slavemasters they 
would no longer have to worry about indirect taxes on Southern staples like tobacco, rice, 
                                                           
11 Like many other representatives, William Davie of North Carolina used the terms slaves and 
blacks interchangeably to refer to the same group. This suggests he overgeneralized all black 
Americans to hold a status of slaves, ignoring free black Americans altogether.  
12 Though I am less concerned with the definition of direct taxation than I am the racial politics 
surrounding it, let me offer a cursory definition since the term centers the discussion at hand. On 
several occasions, representatives from the North and South use the term interchangeably with a 
“capitation” (per head) tax that was based on population. The term, though, was not so 
straightforward to all representatives. Rufus King of Massachusetts, for example, asked, “what 
was the precise meaning of direct taxation” but “[n]o one answered” (ED-V [1787] 1845:451). A 
few years later its meaning became even more unclear when the case of Hylton v. United States 
(1796) was heard before the U.S. Supreme Court, as judges divided between defined carriage 
taxes as a direct or indirect tax. Direct taxation turned out to be a more contested term than 
perhaps the founding fathers realized (Einhorn 2006). Its definition has been revised or clarified 
many times over (e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company [1895], Pacific Insurance 
Company v. Soule [1868], Springer v. United States [1881], the 16th Amendment of 1913, Graves 
v. People of the State of New York [1939], South Carolina v. Baker [1988]) during the past three 
centuries (Ackerman 1999).  
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sugar, indigo, and later cotton. These were the same taxes on exports, imports, and 
consumptions that slavemasters and their sympathizers thought would discourage the 
peculiar institution or the slave trade.  
The amendment would not be enough, however, unless slaves were also counted 
toward representation. Rufus King of Massachusetts acknowledged as much. “This 
inequality in the appointment of representatives,” he said, “was not misunderstood at the 
adoption of the constitution” (FR-III [1818] 1911:429). Northern representatives chose to 
concede because that was the only option the South offered. King went on to say: 
the states in which slavery is prohibited, ultimately, though with reluctance, 
acquiesced in the disproportionate number of representatives and electors that was 
secured to the slave-holding states. The concession was, at the time, believed to 
be a great one, and has proved to have been the greatest which was made to 
secure the adoption of the constitution. (FR-III [1818] 1911:430) 
Without extra protections for slavery, there would be no United States. Upon its adoption, 
the three-fifths clause implicitly acknowledged slavery, sanctioned the institution by the 
state, and rewarded everyone not subjected to it.  
Though the three-fifths clause sanctioned slavery, it transformed how the 
founding fathers discussed it. Conflicts over slavery were no longer waged on the 
battleground over morality, more or less. These debates shifted to other terrains, like 
procedural arguments over whether taxes were uniform and if representation was equal 
across states. A challenge to slavery was off the table when the issues were discussed this 
way. Instead, the question that concerned these elite white men was how to count slaves. 
What increment of the black slave body would be appropriate to appease elite white men 
of both sections of the union? After more than ten years of debate, three-fifths a person 





INNOCENCE CONSTITUTES THE CRIME 
Writing to his nephew 100 years after Emancipation, essayist James Baldwin ([1962] 
1991) warned, “[T]his is the crime of which I accuse my country and my countrymen, 
and for which neither I nor time nor history will ever forgive them, that they have 
destroyed and are destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and do not know it and do 
not want to know it…. But it is not permissible that the authors of devastation should also 
be innocent. It is the innocence which constitutes the crime” (p. 5-6). Over a half-century 
before Emancipation, slavemasters and accommodators alike saw themselves as 
irreproachable for the peculiar institution of slavery—guilty of no crime. They practiced 
habitual misrecognition, akin to what philosopher Charles Mills (1997) has described as 
“an agreement to misinterpret the world, an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of 
ignorance” (p. 19, emphasis original).  
Many of the founders believed conflict was absent from their racial world, and 
there is no need for reconciliation or restoration among unequal races (Jackman 1994). 
There is no history of enslavement in which they were active participants, as the narrative 
goes, so how could they be implicated otherwise? Dominance is secured through the 
practice of white invisibility, or what sociologist Jennifer Pierce (2012) has labeled as 
“the race for innocence” (p. 64). Early white Americans proclaimed their innocence even
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as they were politically sensitized to matters of slavery. This sensitivity was blind to 
actual slaves however. Their visions of liberty were more of the metaphorical kind, where 
they were the ones in chains and tyrannical Britain was the slave driver. On the subject of 
chattel slavery, however, founding fathers like John Adams of Massachusetts admitted 
that they had never given it much thought (Robinson 1971). It was a tacit nonrecognition 
of strategic ignorance or marginal consideration that routinized a disregard for slaves’ 
humanity (Jung 2015; Mills 1997). 
Everyone is to Blame, Except the Slavemasters  
Most times Americans looked outward not inward. They absolved themselves from 
slavery as though the institution was propagated by everyone else but themselves. Those 
who cast aspersions on this claim were ostracized as erratic and dismissed as irrelevant, 
similar to how contemporary history textbooks characterize abolitionist John Brown if 
they acknowledge him at all (Loewen [1995] 2007).1 When James Otis of Massachusetts 
and Benjamin Rush of Pennsylvania, for example, pinpointed the hypocrisy of crying 
liberty from British despotism while defending slavery on the home front, their fellow 
                                                           
1 John Brown was a visionary abolitionist intent on freeing the slaves, with violence if necessary 
(Du Bois [1909] 2001). In October of 1859, on the eve of the Civil War, he led a multiracial 
group in attempt to raid the U.S. arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Standing alongside 21 people, 
Brown and his insurgents were met with force by Colonel Robert E. Lee and a platoon of 
marines. Brown would be captured, as would several others, and 10 of his men died in battle or 
shortly thereafter due to fatal wounds (two of his sons included). He was convicted of treason and 
sentenced to death by hanging. In his last words, Brown (1859) left the earth with these prophetic 
words: “Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the ends 
of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my children and with the blood of 
millions in this slave country whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust 
enactments,—I submit; so let it be done!” Just over a year later, the first shots of the Civil War 
were fired at Fort Sumter. 
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Americans dismissed them as unfit for political leadership. Others like Henry Laurens of 
South Carolina worried about the ramifications that would occur should others learn he 
was sympathetic to dangerous doctrines like abolition (Robinson 1971).2 Like other 
patriots from the South, however, he later amended this position to blame the British for 
the horrid of American slavery. They were to bear the blame, never mind inconvenient 
facts of the colonial-sponsored slave trade, a booming industry of slave dealers in Boston, 
New York, and Charleston, and a burgeoning planter class across the South.  
According to John Tyler of Virginia, “[Slavery] was one cause of the complaints 
against British tyranny, that this trade was permitted. The revolution had put an end to it; 
but now it was revived. He thought nothing could justify it” (ED-III [1788] 1836:454). In 
an early draft of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson of Virginia ([1776] 
1950) blamed King George III for slavery. The king was waging, he argued, a “cruel war 
against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the 
persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating them and carrying them 
into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in the transportation 
thither” (p. 426). Jefferson ([1776] 1950) went on to claim the king would block the 
colonists’ noble efforts of abolition. “Determined to keep open a market where MEN 
should be bought and sold, [the king] has prostituted his negative for suppressing every 
                                                           
2 It is worth noting, however, that the opposition to slavery from Henry Laurens of South 
Carolina was not because he valued the integrity of black lives. Rather it was because he worried 




legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce” (Jefferson [1776] 
1950:426). 
The passage prompted much debate over slavery among delegates, and was later 
dropped for an ambiguous phrase that indicted King George III for inciting “domestic 
insurrections among us.” This revision was agreed upon, in part, because the colonists 
saw the king as stirring up slave revolts with the alluring promise of liberty. Elsewhere in 
the early draft, Thomas Jefferson ([1776] 1950) declared,  
[the king] is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to 
purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people 
upon whom he has obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed 
against the liberties of one people with crimes which he urges them to commit 
against the lives of another. (p. 426, emphasis original) 
These words were scratched from the final draft, according to Jefferson’s reflections, out 
of consideration for his fellow statesmen in the Deep South. 
George Mason of Virginia echoed John Tyler and Thomas Jefferson. He claimed 
slavery “was one of the great causes of our separation from Great Britain. Its exclusion 
has been a principal object of this state, and most states in the Union” (ED-III [1788] 
1836:452). The British government, he claimed, “constantly checked the attempts of 
Virginia to put a stop to it” (FR-II [1787] 1911:370). Not one to hoard culpability, Mason 
also faulted Africans for slavery:  
Under the royal government, this evil was looked upon as great oppression, and 
many attempts were made to prevent it; but the interest of the African merchants 
prevented its prohibition. (ED-III [1788] 1836:452)  
Projecting blame elsewhere, John Tyler, Thomas Jefferson, and George Mason implied 
they were products of circumstance at worst and lovers of liberty at best. This love of 
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liberty was made evident, they argued, by a collective agreement to ban slave trade 
beginning in 1808. 
Progress Otherwise Known as Status Quo 
Now that the revolution was over, not even states where human bondage was a 
stronghold wanted the slave trade anymore. The exception was South Carolina and 
Georgia. According to George Mason, 
Maryland & Virginia he said had already prohibited the importation of slaves 
expressly. N. Carolina had done the same in substance. All this would be in vain 
if S. Carolina & Georgia be at liberty to import. The Western people are already 
calling out for slaves for their new lands; and will fill that Country with slaves if 
they can be got thro’ S. Carolina & Georgia. (FR-II [1787] 1911:370) 
While singling out the two states who remained vested in the slave trade, Mason 
condemned the slave trade in no uncertain terms. “Every master of slaves if born a petty 
tyrant,” he claimed. “They bring the judgment of heaven on a Country” (FR-II [1787] 
1911:370). He almost went as far as a full frontal on the institution—almost. In a speech-
turned-tirade against slavery, he concluded with the suggestion that government only 
have the power to end the slave trade but not the institution.  
 Why? Though George Mason’s attack on the slave trade was of biblical 
proportions, his cardinal sin was lying by omission. What he failed to mention was that 
Southern states like Virginia did not need any more slaves. They were plentiful. By 
cutting off supply to where the wealthiest of the wealthy vested their capital (i.e., human 
bondage), the value of slaves was sure to increase. So would Mason’s wealth portfolio. It 
is as though the more he clung to claims of liberty and freedom, the further he stood from 
empathizing with slaves. The point was not lost on everyone. James McHenry of 
Maryland, which also had a slave surplus, observed “a prohibition of Slaves into S. 
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Carolina George etc [sic]—would be a monopoly in their favor. These States could not 
do without slaves—Virginia etc would make their own terms for such as they might sell 
(FR-II [1787] 1911:378). Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina also noticed. “As to 
Virginia, she will gain by stopping their importations,” he said. “Her slaves will rise in 
value, and she has more than she wants” (ED-V [1787] 1845:459). An end to slave 
importation would bolster the value of slaves, and by extension, it would deepen the 
pockets of Virginian slavemasters.  
 Nonetheless, most delegates outside of Georgia and South Carolina shared 
George Mason’s enthusiasm to see an end to the slave trade. James Iredell, Sr. of North 
Carolina thought of the possibility more like an unattainable dream. It was almost certain 
never to come true.  
[W]ere it practicable to put an end to the importation of slaves immediately, it 
would give me the greatest pleasure; for it certainly is a trade utterly inconsistent 
with the rights of humanity, and under which great cruelties have been exercised. 
When the entire abolition of slavery takes place, it will be an event which must be 
pleasing to every generous mind, and every friend of human nature; but we often 
wish for things which are not attainable. (ED-IV [1788] 1836:100) 
An end to slavery was unattainable, he argued, because of the strong-armed politics of 
representatives from Georgia and South Carolina. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut “was 
afraid we should lose two States, with such others as may be disposed to stand aloof, 
should fly into a variety of shapes & directions, and most probably into several 
confederations and not without bloodshed” (FR-II [1787] 1911:375).  
Any time the threat of slavery loomed, Georgia and South Carolina simply 
threatened to abandon the union. James Iredell, Sr. continued with his apologetic support 
of slavery: “It was the wish of a great majority of the Convention to put an end to the 
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trade immediately; but the states of South Carolina and Georgia would not agree to it…. I 
heartily wish more could have been done” (ED-IV [1788] 1836:100-101). With rhetoric 
like this, Southern delegates like George Mason and James Iredell, Sr. and Northern 
delegates like Oliver Ellsworth painted a romanticized picture that most states opposed 
slavery and sought ways to end it. Therefore, any possibility of transcending this 
obstructionism and putting an end to the slave trade would be cause for celebration.  
 Before letting anyone else enter into celebration, James Iredell, Sr. asked, “Where 
is there another country in which such a restriction prevails?” (ED-IV [1788] 1836:101). 
Then, he answered his own rosy question with a rosy answer:  
We, therefore, sir, set an example of humanity, by providing for the abolition of 
this inhuman traffic, though at a distant period. I hope, therefore, that this part of 
the Constitution will not be condemned because it has not stipulated for what was 
impracticable to obtain…. (ED-IV [1788] 1836:101) 
Others shared in the self-congratulatory sentiment. James Madison of Virginia said, 
“Under the Articles of Confederation, it might be continued forever; but, by this clause, 
an end may be put to it after twenty years. There is, therefore, an amelioration of our 
circumstances” (ED-III [1788] 1836:453).  
Northern Accommodation, Hearing What They Wanted  
The spirit of progress crossed sectional borders. Northern delegates thought slavery’s 
days were numbered, so they preferred not to intrude. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, for 
example, offered the following advice to his Northern colleagues: “he thought it best to 
leave the matter as we find it. He observed that the abolition of slavery seemed to be 
going on in the U.S. & that the good sense of the several States would probably by 
degrees compleat [sic] it” (FR-II [1787] 1911:370). Oliver Ellsworth reiterated these 
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sentiments. “Let us not intermeddle. As population increases; poor laborers will be so 
plenty as to render slaves useless. Slavery in time will not be a speck in our Country. 
Provision is already made in Connecticut for abolishing it. And the abolition has already 
taken place in Massachusetts” (FR-II [1787] 1911:371). 
In both cases, Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth preferred a do-nothing style 
of politics when it came to the peculiar institution. Such inaction and lack of engagement 
might be labeled as what sociologist Tyrone Forman (2004) has termed “racial apathy” 
(see also Forman and Lewis 2006, 2015; Pettigrew and Meerten 1995). These statesmen 
were not overwhelmed by a sense of urgency or wrongdoing. They were not torn between 
upholding freedom or slavery. By contrast, their disposition was a non-dilemma 
(DiTomaso 2013) and an indifference for black humanity altogether (Forman 2004; 
Forman and Lewis 2006). 
It is not as though Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth denied slavery’s 
existence, or endorsed white supremacy through direct participation in human bondage. 
When told to keep their hands off slavery, their responses fell silent. The way silence 
works in this context, to adapt the words of social theorist Michel Foucault (1978), “is 
less the absolute limit of discourse … than an element that functions alongside the things 
said” (p. 27). Alongside endorsements of slavery, the absence of words from Sherman 
and Ellsworth qualified as their own compliance. A general lack of concern meant the 
outcome remained the same. They resolved whatever problems they may have had with 
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slavery by evading it.3 The national government would have few regulatory powers of 
slavery, aside from the ban on slave trade.  
 Stopping the slave trade would not end the institution of slavery. Commenting on 
the 1808 agreement to ban the slave trade, an accord formalized under Article 1, Section 
9 of the Constitution, Charles C. Pinckney explained: 
The intention was, to give Congress a power, after the year 1808, to prevent the 
importation of slaves either by land or water from other countries. The word 
import, includes both, and applies wholly to slaves. Without this limitation, 
Congress might have stopped it sooner under their general power to regulate 
commerce. (FR-III [1787] 1911:443) 
Though Pinckney alluded to no end in sight to slavery, Northern apologists insisted its 
elimination was inevitable. Even some contemporary historians (e.g., Melish 1998) share 
this position. They blindly presumed that Americans were on steady pace for gradual 
emancipation from slavery.  
 Thomas Dawes of Massachusetts claimed slavery “has received a mortal wound, 
and will die of a consumption” (ED-II [1788] 1836:41). Isaac Backus of Massachusetts 
agreed. He said:  
no man abhors that wicked practice more than I do; I would gladly make use of all 
lawful means towards the abolishing of slavery in all parts of the land. But let us 
consider where we are, and what we are doing. In the Articles of Confederation, 
no provision was made to hinder the importation of slaves into any of these states; 
                                                           
3 Even those who opposed slavery outright were at least silent enough to consent to it. Samuel 
Adams of Massachusetts, for example, was known to defend the freedoms of slaves in private, 
and was regarded among black communities as an ally within the legislative corridor (Locke 
[1901] 1965). Throughout the formations of the Declaration of Independence and Articles of 
Confederation, however, his silence on slavery was deafening. He opted for noninterference 




but a door is now open hereafter to do it, and each state is at liberty now to 
abolish slavery as soon as they please. (ED-II [1788] 1836:149)  
James Neal of Massachusetts shared these sentiments. “[T]he step taken in this article,” 
he said, “towards the abolition of slavery was one of the beauties of the Constitution” 
(ED-II [1788] 1836:107). Even one of the most ardent opponents of slavery, James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania, said much of the same. He thought of the ban “as laying the 
foundation for banishing slavery out of this country; and though the period is more 
distant than I could wish, yet it will produce the same kind, gradual change, which was 
pursued in Pennsylvania” (ED-II [1787] 1836:452).  
The mantra of progress armed Northern empathy with purpose and meaning. It 
also dulled sensibilities to critically discern the political stakes at hand. Isaac Backus and 
others wrongly assumed states would act upon their own volition and end slavery as soon 
as possible. They failed to understand what direct interests whites of the North and South 
had in preserving the institution. Slavery did not present a challenge to their political, 
social, or economic imagination. Supporting a ban on slave trade did not end slavery 
altogether, it merely ended the legal importation of African bodies. The flipside of 
banning slave trade but not slavery meant the institution could be preserved 
indefinitely—as it did until the mid-nineteenth century.  
“Caring” Racism for the Whole Family 
Not all delegates projected blame elsewhere, or naively believed the institution was 
moments away from collapse. Some embraced slavery as idyllic. They thought it to be 
not only righteous but humane. Rawlins Lowndes of South Carolina “thought this [slave] 
trade could be justified on the principles of religion, humanity, and justice; for certainly 
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to translate a set of human beings from a bad country to a better, was fulfilling every part 
of these principles….” (ED-IV [1788] 1836:272). These words deemed slaveowners as 
good stewards, like they had saved slaves from wretched origins. James Madison recalled 
some delegates bolster, “Slaves were not put to labour [sic] as young as the children of 
laboring families” (LDC-XX [1783] 1976:121). Arguments like these implied master-
slave relationships were more caring than parent-child relationships. They conflated 
exploitation with compassion and permitted, to borrow the words of sociologist Mary 
Jackman (1994), “masters’ control to become a benevolent shroud of having slaves’ 
needs and interests at heart (p. 10).  
Fugitive slave Jermain Wesley Loguen, who had escaped bondage through the 
Underground Railroad, called out the hypocrisy in comments like these. Writing a reply 
to his former master in 1860, Mrs. Sarah Logue, he offered the following remarks:  
You say you have offers to buy me, and that you shall sell me if I do not send you 
$1000, and in the same breath and almost the same sentence, you say, ‘you know 
we raised you as we did our own children.’ Woman, did you raise your own 
children for the market? Did you raise them for the whipping-post? Did you raise 
them to be driven off, bound to a coffle in chains? Where are my poor bleeding 
brothers and sisters? Can you tell? Who was it that sent them off into sugar and 
cotton fields, to be kicked and cuffed, and whipped, and to groan and die; and 
where no kin can hear their groans, or attend and sympathize at their dying bed, or 
follow in their funeral? Wretched woman! (qtd. in Aptheker [1933] 1968:450)  
Saying a master-slave relationship is as caring as a parent-child relationship, or even less 
exploitive, denies the underlying conditions experienced by slaves. Slavemasters did not 
appraise their white children with a market price, strap them to the whipping-post, place 
them in chained coffles, separate them from their siblings, send them to the fields, or 
isolate them from others in their dying moments.  
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 Unlike some of his contemporaries, Thomas Jefferson ([1783] 1999) offered a 
more nuanced view of doing slavery in a “humane” way. “There must doubtless be an 
unhappy influence on the manners of our people produced by the existence of slavery 
among us,” he wrote. “The whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual 
exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, 
and degrading submissions on the other” (p. 168). Jefferson worried slavery would have 
moral defects on slavemasters that might undermine America’s values of civility. His 
solution to slavery was not to end it however. The experiences of black slaves were more 
or less invisible to him in this context. Instead, he preferred that slavemasters be kinder to 
their subjects and spare the lash when possible. This kindness was not for the sake of 
slaves, but impressionable children with a watchful eye who might imitate what they see.  
 Other delegates like James Jackson of Georgia insisted slaves “were better off in 
their present situation than they would be if they were manumitted” (DPCUS-I [1789] 
1834:12). Seen through their eyes, slaveholders were gentle masters who gracefully 
imparted upon slaves some “culture” (see also Blauner 1969). The peculiar institution 
was maintained out of a noble, nonprofit concern of civilizing the racially uncivilized. 
Slaves’ forced labor was simply fair compensation for their masters’ care and 
consideration. Historian Eugene Genovese ([1972] 1974) described this relationship as 
Southern paternalism. Slavemasters disguised their oppression toward slaves, at least to 
themselves and those apathetic to the slave’s condition, as a relation without hostility, 




“Better not to Stain the Constitution” 
Only once does the word “slavery” appear in the Constitution: Section 1 of the 13th 
Amendment. The passage reads:  
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
The amendment was intended to end slavery, or at least most its forms. The phrase 
“except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted” 
implies that there remain exceptions for which it is permissible. This loophole was later 
exploited through a convict leasing system,4 especially in Jim Crow South, through “pig” 
and vagrancy laws as well as other “black codes.” Whites were able to create what 
journalist Douglas Blackmon (2008) has called “slavery by another name.” It was unlike 
slavery of antebellum South, whereby a slave’s status was conferred upon birth, but it 
nonetheless represented a form of bondage whereby black men, in particular, were 
compelled to provide their labor without compensation.  
Despite absence of the word slavery, its presence can be felt throughout the 
Constitution. This is no coincidence. Abraham Baldwin of Georgia recalled how 
Southern delegates insisted on inserting the words “slave” or “slavery” when debating the 
three-fifths clause, so the preservation of this institution was not implied but expressed.5 
Others resisted this language: 
                                                           
4 Convict leasing refers to practices of forced penal labor, whereby prisoners would be leased out 
to private parties in exchange for money. These private parties would then feed, clothe, and house 
prisoners often times throughout the person’s sentence of punishment.  
5 An exception to this trend is James Madison of Virginia, a slavemaster and “father” of the 
Constitution. He “thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be 
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[They] had objections to the use of the word ‘slaves,’ as Congress had hitherto 
avoided the use of it in their acts, and not acknowledged the existence of such a 
condition. It was expressly observed at the time, that making use of the form of 
expression as it now stands, instead of the word slaves, would make the meaning 
more general, and include what we now consider as included. (FR-III [1798] 
1911:378) 
William Paterson of New Jersey claimed that members of the Continental Congress “had 
been ashamed to use the term ‘slaves,’ and had substituted a description” (ED-V [1787] 
1836:289).  
Instead, Northern representatives (and some Southern ones too) preferred racial 
code words such as “importation,” “quotas of contribution,” “held to service or labor,” or 
three-fifths of “all other persons.” These terms indicate the topic of slavery’s sensitivity. 
Delegates like Jonathan Dayton, also of New Jersey, thought,  
it would be better not to stain the Constitutional code with such a term, since it 
could be avoided by the introduction of other equally intelligible words … where 
the same sense was conveyed by the circuitous expression of ‘three fifths of all 
other persons.’ (FR-III [1798] 1911:377) 
When debating the slave trade ban, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania wanted to “avoid 
the ambiguity,” single out those who supported the unpopular practice, and name the s-
word (ED-V [1787] 1845:477). James Madison met these words with opposition. He 
“thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in 
men” (ED-V [1787] 1845:478). Though avoiding direct invocation, these substitute 
words implied the same meaning.  After all, free people migrate and “unfree” people are 
imported.  
                                                           
property in men. The reason of duties did not hold, as slaves are not, like merchandise, consumed, 
&c” (ED-V [1787] 1836:478). 
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James Iredell, Sr. of North Carolina observed, “the Eastern States, who long ago 
have abolished slaves, did not approve of the expression slaves; they therefore used 
another, that answered the same purpose” (ED-IV [1788] 1836:102).6 Race-explicit 
terminology was frequently heard throughout debates surrounding the Constitution, 
though these words never made it into the final draft. Regardless of the code words that 
were eventually used, it was understood what these terms meant. Delegates knew they 
permitted slavery to continue.   
Anything but Slavery 
Rather than address slavery, some delegates like Alexander Hamilton of New York 
preferred denial and redirection.7 They insisted other sources of conflict cause the 
division between North and South. “[T]he natural situation of this country,” Hamilton 
said, “seems to divide its interests into different classes. There are navigating and non-
navigating states. The Northern are properly navigating states: the Southern appear to 
possess neither the means nor the spirit of navigation. This difference of situation 
naturally produces a dissimilarity of interests….” (FR-III [1788] 1911:332-333). Slavery 
                                                           
6 To say that most Eastern states had abolished slavery is an overstatement in 1788. 
Massachusetts declared the institution unconstitutional in 1783, and a handful of other states (e.g., 
Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island) had approved gradual plans for emancipation that 
incrementally rid human bondage for later generations. Despite these gradual plans, slaves were 
present in each of the original British colonies except Massachusetts according to the 1790 
Census. The most populous slave state was Virginia (292,627), followed by South Carolina 
(107,094), Maryland (103,036), and North Carolina (100,783). Slave populations were smallest in 
other Northern states like Connecticut (2,648), New Hampshire (157), and Rhode Island (958). 
7 Other delegates like James Madison differed from Alexander Hamilton of New York. They 
would acknowledge slavery as the divisive factor between North and South, but they stop short of 
calling for its end.  
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was not the dividing factor, claimed Hamilton, that separated North from South. Some 
Southerners like Joseph McDowell of North Carolina followed similar logic, but he did 
not point toward navigation as a divisive faction. Instead, he emphasized how the regions 
“differ in climate, soil, customs, manners, &c.” (ED-IV [1788] 1836:211). Charles 
Pinckney echoed these sentiments. “There is a real distinction [between] northern and 
southern interests. North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia in their rice and indigo 
had a peculiar interest which might be sacrificed” (ED-V [1788] 1845:270).  
 Across the sectional divide, American statesmen agreed slavery was not the 
fundament problem at hand. It was navigation for Alexander Hamilton, and climate, soil, 
customs, and manners for Joseph McDowell and Charles Pinckney. By avoiding conflicts 
over slavery in such ways, the un-naming of the peculiar institution leaves it hidden, 
inoculated, and removed by at least one degree from contention. This leaves whiteness, at 
least its idealized form (Hughey 2012), as the unquestioned standard against which all 
else is judged (Doane 1997; Frankenberg 1993). In the late 1970s, sociologist David 
Wellman ([1977] 1993) offered a novel observation to most others in the discipline: 
“prejudiced people are not the only racists in America” (p. 27). These words apply to the 
late eighteenth century as much as they do the late twentieth. Whites like Hamilton, 
McDowell, and Pinckney need not push racial animus on others to promote their 
collective interests. A refusal to problematize slavery while claiming the sectional divide 






Beneath the surface of antiracism was more racism, at least among some Southerners 
who claimed they desired an end to slavery. Proposing revisions to Virginia’s 
constitution, to purge “principles inconsistent with republicanism,” Thomas Jefferson 
([1783] 1999) offered a radical resolution: “emancipate all slaves born after passing the 
act” (p. 144). These seemingly radical words are captured in what some (e.g., Bernstein 
2003) consider as the most important American book published before 1800: Notes on 
the State of Virginia. The seven pages of prose that immediately follow, however, hardly 
sound like a ringing endorsement of abolition. Worried that freed black folks would 
annihilate whites after emancipation, or vice versa, Jefferson ([1783] 1999) thought it 
best if former slaves were “colonized to such place as the circumstances of the time 
should render most proper” (p. 145). An apartheid state was most appropriate for political 
reasons, which included “[d]eep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand 
recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained” (p. 145).  
Thomas Jefferson’s ([1783] 1999) objections were more than political. He offered 
“physical and moral” objections to integrating the races:  
The first difference which strikes us is that of colour [sic]. Whether the black of 
the negro resides in the reticular membrane between the skin and scarf-skin, or in 
the scarf-skin itself; whether it proceeds from the colour [sic] of the blood, the 
colour [sic] of the bile, or from that of some other secretion, the difference is 
fixed in nature, and is as real as if its seat and cause were better known to us. (p. 
145) 
From the contrast of black and white, Jefferson ([1783] 1999) reasons, flows a host of 
other differences. White beauty was superior to that of black, so was intelligence, work 
ethic, hygiene, and so on.  
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They seem to require less sleep. A black after hard labour [sic] through the day, 
will be induced by the slightest amusements to sit up till midnight, or later, though 
knowing he must be out with the first dawn of the morning. They are at least 
brave and adventuresome. But this may perhaps proceed from a want of 
forethought, which prevents their seeing a danger till it be present. When present, 
they do not go through it with more coolness or steadiness than the whites. They 
are more ardent after their female: but love seems with them to be more an eager 
desire, than a tender delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are 
transient. Those numberless afflictions, which render it doubtful whether heaven 
has given life to us in mercy or in wrath, are less felt, and sooner forgotten with 
them. In general, their existence appears to participate more of sensation than 
reflection. (p. 146) 
Whereas Jefferson began his thought with emancipatory intent, his subsequent words 
were like a verbal stiletto that sliced into pieces his call for emancipation. These words 
carved a vision of society in which no other alternative could be seen. It is not as though 
Jefferson simply preferred a white supremacist racial hierarchy. He saw it as the only 
option within the realm of possibility (see also Davis [1975] 1999; Freehling 1990).  
Thomas Jefferson’s desire to abandon slavery can be interpreted as expressions of 
“impression management” (see Goffman [1956] 1959). As historian John Hope Franklin 
(1976) pointed out, he was someone so adamant about the inferiority of blacks and who 
insisted whites and blacks cannot live together peacefully, so why should we expect him 
to hold sincere convictions about his self-proclaimed racially progressive views? Perhaps 
Jefferson was telling his audiences what he thought they wanted to hear. After all the 
Notes were initiated as a response to queries François Barbé-Marbois, the secretary of 
French legation to the United States, sent to governors of all the former colonies. His 
commentary packaged slavery in digestible ways for European audiences who were in the 
process of gradually emancipating their own. If slaves were deficient compared to whites 
in both biology and culture, but well-suited for grueling work in Southern regions hotter 
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than the hinges of hell, then Jefferson’s unasked question was straightforward: Is slavery 
so perverse an institution?  
The answer lay hidden in his qualifications. “I advance it therefore as a suspicion 
only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and 
circumstances, are inferior to the whites in the endowments of both body and mind” 
(Jefferson [1783] 1999:150-151). To advance suspicion in this context, however, is not to 
be suspicious at all. Elsewhere, Thomas Jefferson was quite clear that whites were 
superior to blacks by natural distinction. Therefore, equality among the races is a fleeting 
illusion that may be pursued but never attained. Qualifying these claims with “suspicion,” 
after having articulated them so forcefully, allowed him to “save face” in front of 
audiences that could have sanctioned him over unpopular views on race. It was also his 
way of saying that slavery, in one form or another, was inevitable and could not be 
evaded.  
Legacies of Innocence, the Gospel of “Feel-Good Sociology”8  
Ghosts of the past haunt us. A central theme of the American Enlightenment is that racial 
dynamics follow a liberalizing, unidirectional trajectory of progress. Racial conflict, on 
the other hand, is diminished, dismissed, or denied. Standing in the shadows of 
America’s founding fathers, these are the claims of social scientists who study racism—
past and present. Political scientist and historian Alexis de Tocqueville ([1835/1840] 
2007), writing when “cotton was king,” claimed each new generation creates its own 
                                                           
8 The reference to “feel good sociology” pays homage to sociologist John Stanfield (2008) and 
his book chapter partly titled by the same phrase.  
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unique way of seeing the world. This new vision of the world transcends “shortcomings” 
of those that preceded it, so that “every fresh generation is a new people ready for the 
care of the legislator” (de Tocqueville [1835/1840] 2007:75).9 A sense of wrongdoing 
paired with a commitment to freedom will inevitably overwhelm what economist Gunnar 
Myrdal (1944) called “the American dilemma.” Taking the moralist position, he thought 
internal tension over the black mistreatment (e.g., Jim Crow) and principled ideals like 
freedom would cause great remorse among whites. This remorse would eventually 
overcome any prejudices they held, and achieve a racial democracy that fulfilled “the 
American Creed.” From the standpoints of both de Tocqueville ([1835/1840] 2007) and 
Myrdal, prejudice and discrimination are presumed to be diminishing. Inevitably in their 
place will be more tolerant stances on racial dynamics.10 The steady-forward march of 
progress is a gospel many spread throughout the social sciences (Stanfield 2008; see also 
Steinberg 2007).  
 Consider “the Chicago School” for example. According to sociologist Lewis 
Coser (1978), “It seems no exaggeration to say that for roughly twenty years, from the 
first world war to the mid 1930’s, the history of sociology in America can largely be 
                                                           
9 Using the ideas of political scientist and historian Alexis de Tocqueville ([1835/1840] 2007) as 
a springboard, some survey analysts have shown that younger people are more likely to adhere to 
liberal views on race (see also Smith 1981; Steeh and Schuman 1992). The presumption is that 
they have been socialized during eras of greater tolerance. Meanwhile older, less tolerant 
generations phase out of the population as their lifecourse expires. For a critique of the “cohort 
replacement” thesis, as well as an alternative interpretation of liberalizing racial views, see 
“Beyond Prejudice?” by sociologists Tyrone Forman and Amanda Lewis (2015).  
10 Of course, these trends can vary by political issue and region (Firebaugh and Davis 1988). 
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written as the history of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago” (p. 
311; see also Bulmer 1984). Core members like sociologists Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, 
and others drew from anthropology to bring field methods to the discipline of 
sociology.11 They conceptualized the city as “a social laboratory” in which social 
processes, and perhaps human nature itself, could be clinically studied (see Smith and 
White 1929). “There is at least one important difference,” wrote Burgess (1929), 
“between the laboratory of the physical scientist and that of the social scientist. In 
chemistry, physics, and even biology the subjects of study can be brought into the 
laboratory and studied under controlled conditions…. The objects of social science 
research, as persons, groups, and institutions, must be studied if at all in the laboratory of 
community life” (p. 47). Park (1929) shared these sentiments: “The city always has been 
a prolific source of clinical material for the study of human nature” (p. 12).  
Like scientists experimenting on animals, hoping to extrapolate their findings to 
broader humanity, ethnographies like those of the Chicago School perpetuate what 
sociologist Victor Rios (2011) has called “jungle-book tropes.”12 This “research” often 
consists of rogue accounts, if trustworthy at all, that reinforce well-established 
                                                           
11 Consider sociologist Robert Park’s ([1915] 1967) own words on applying field methods to 
urban research. “The same patient methods which anthropologists like [Franz] Boas and [Robert] 
Lowie have expended,” he wrote, “on the life and manners of the North American Indian might 
be even more fruitfully employed in the investigation of the customs, beliefs, social practices, and 
general conceptions of life prevalent in Little Italy on the lower North Side of Chicago, or in 
recording the more sophisticated folkways of the inhabitants of Greenwich Village” (p. 3). 
12 Similarly, historian George Frederickson (1971) labeled the views of Park and other members 
of the Chicago School as accommodationist racism. 
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stereotypes that demean entire groups of marginalized people as hopeless, savage, and 
subhuman. Many readers will likely interpret the narration as related here:  
I got lost in the wild, the wild people took me in and helped me, made me their 
king, and I lived to tell civilization about it! (Rios 2011:174)  
Self-glorifying storylines like these put words into the subjects’ mouths, in ways that 
speak for the masses without the masses having much agency to speak for themselves 
(see also Bonilla-Silva, Lewis, and Embrick 2004; Young 2004). Jungle book sociology 
rearticulates ethnography as a colonial enterprise, like when early anthropologists (e.g., 
Conrad [1899] 1990) ventured into so-called “primitive” spaces to draw racialized 
comparisons between “civilized” and “savage” civilizations.  
The contrast between civility and savagery can obscure the role of power and 
domination in relationships of inequality and bolster unquestioned mantras of progress. 
Robert Park (1950) argued that the incorporation of minority groups into the mainstream 
occurs through the adoption of “American” norms, values, and general way of life (see 
also Alba and Nee 2003; Myrdal 1944).13 This adoption is, according to him, desirable 
and prescriptive. “Now that the Negroes are free and have become race, if not class, 
conscious,” wrote Park (1950), “they are in a position to state their case in a more 
articulate fashion. However, the authors of the Declaration of Independence and the 
United States Constitution have provided them with a ready made ideology” (p. 307). 
                                                           
13 More specifically, Robert Park (1950) claimed that groups progressed through historical stages 
of development, from lower to higher (contact  competition  conflict  accommodation  
assimilation). Assimilators will inevitably achieve upward social mobility in terms of education 
and occupational status as well as demonstrate less distinctiveness in terms of language use, 
intermarriage patterns, and general social distance. 
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Once this ideology is successfully adopted, the flow of rewards become progressive and 
irreversible. Never mind the structural barriers of discrimination that may stand in 
people’s way. Similar to Herbert Spencer’s notion of (1864) “Social Darwinism,” this 
position follows an evolutionary, “survival of the fittest” logic of social order (p. 474).14  
Decades after Robert Park, sociologists Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993) 
modified “the race relations cycle” with their model of “segmented assimilation” (see 
also Portes and Rumbaut 2001). They began by acknowledging the presence of much 
diversity in America, and go on to posit that immigrants do not always follow a straight-
line path of upward mobility. Instead, mobility among immigrants might follow divergent 
paths, which can include upward assimilation, downward assimilation, or upward 
mobility infused with biculturalism. A problem with this modification, as sociologist 
Margaret Hunter (2002) has pointed out, is that “it is still assumed that this so-called 
downward assimilation is undesirable and that assimilation toward the dominant group is 
best. Researchers rarely question the value of socializing our newest citizens to be more 
like Whites, both culturally and structurally” (p. 134; see also Jung 2015; Steinberg 
1981). They naturalize inequality as inevitable, if not desired, and obscure the role of 
power and domination. Instead, they assume mobility toward whiteness should be 
sought-after and is available to all.  
                                                           
14 Sociologist Auguste Comte espoused similar views through a series of texts published between 
1830 and 1842 (see Martineau [1896] 2000). In justifying a need for historical research, he 
claimed analysts should only focus on European civilizations. The reason being that analysts 
ought to only be interested in those who supposedly experienced progress under modernity.  
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Other social scientists allude that America has transcended race altogether (or is 
in the process of transcending it). Sociologist Seymour Lipset (1996) has pointed to the 
legal prohibition of discrimination. Economist James Heckman (2011) has argued that 
discrimination in the workplace is no longer a first order cause of racial inequality. 
Economists James Smith (2001) and Finis Welch (1989) have identified the narrowing 
gap between occupational status. Economists Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor (2012) 
have argued segregation levels are at their lowest since 1910. Economist Roland Fryer, 
Jr. (2007) has found steadily increasing rates of interracial marriage. Economist Richard 
Freeman (1976) has stressed the formation of a highly visible black professional class. 
Political scientists Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines (1999) have suggested 
antiblack racism plays a diminishing role in contemporary politics. As early as the 1970s, 
when the ink on various civil rights acts had barely dried, demographers Ben Wattenberg 
and Richard Scammon (1973) called shifts in whites’ racial attitudes “revolutionary.” 
Of course declarations of revolutionary change say as much, if not more, about 
the implicit and explicit assumptions behind statements about racial oppression in 
America. In the case of the founding fathers, their naïve assumptions about slavery 
permitted them to decouple the reproduction of racial inequality from their own 
(in)actions that implicated them as beneficiaries of it. Delegates involved in three-fifths 
debate accomplished this feat through a variety of strategies, from projecting blame 
elsewhere (“the British and African merchants caused slavery”) to romanticized progress 
(“an end to slave trade will eventually be an end to slavery”) to declarations of 
benevolence (“those slaves have it good”) to avoidance in terminology (“let’s call it 
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something besides slavery”) to insincere calls for emancipation (“let’s substitute 
colonization for slavery”). They eliminated their own agency within the racial hierarchy 
by willfully unseeing slavery for what it was, all the while they protected their self-
proclaimed innocence by bemoaning the “unfortunate” institution. 
Contemporary social scientists follow in the footsteps of these statesmen. 
Consider the words of sociologists Jerome Harris and William McCullough ([1973] 
1998): 
[I]n recent years whites have begun to prepare statistical studies demonstrating 
Black progress and achievements. Statistics are emerging showing Black progress 
in education, employment positions, income, etc. The irony of these studies is that 
they, too, are done in the interest of whites rather than Blacks. For it is only since 
Blacks have begun to assert themselves on a massive scale during the last decade 
that these statements of progress have emerged. Their real purpose has not been 
to show Black progress but to attempt to dampen Black fervor for change by 
implying that effective change is already taking place. It is ironic that while 
absolute gains are being made, the same data frequently reveal that relative 
ground is being lost. (p. 336, emphasis added) 
In this context of misinterpreting racial change, these studies diminish past and present 
racism as if it is no longer a problem (see also Ladner [1973] 1998; Pinkney 1984; 
Steinberg 2007; Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008). The scholars who advance this research, 
many of whom are considered seminal figures of their field, edify a structure of white 
racial dominance and reaffirm, in the name of science, the mantra of racial progress and 
declarations of white innocence. Doing so, they inadvertently answer the questions of “a 
sociology for whom?” (Lee 1976) and “a sociology for what?” (Lynd 1939).  
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 CHAPTER FIVE  
COLORBLIND DISCOURSE, COLOR-CONSCIOUS CONTEXT 
“I’m not racist, but…”. Odds are what follows this phrase will be racist. Otherwise, there 
would be no need for the disclaimer. These words may be a “kinder, gentler” expression 
of ideology than the biological racism and segregationist views of the slavery and Jim 
Crow past, not to mention the fire hoses, dog bites, and lynchings that went with them 
(Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997). This is colorblind racism. It is a racial ideology that is 
less overt and direct, but just as effective in preserving the racial order (Bonilla-Silva 
2001; Bonilla-Silva and Lewis 1999). Colorblindness does not ignore race altogether 
(Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014; Brown et al. 2003; Crenshaw 1997; Gallagher 2003). It 
affirms universal ideals of liberalism, both in a political and economic sense. It presumes 
that equal opportunities are available to all regardless of racial background. And it even 
condemns overt expressions of bigotry and prejudice. The world of racial inequality is 
understood in ways that deny how circumstances, resources, and opportunities of social 
value are historically, institutionally, or circumstantially derived.  
Individuals are assumed to be makers of their own destiny, and one’s social 
position is a measure of character and self-worth. Those who “fail” at life have no one to 
blame but themselves. In fact, they are likely “tangled in pathologies” that create their 
own cycles of inadequacy (see Moynihan 1965:29). It is as though, as sociologist 
William Ryan (1971) explained, “‘these people’ think in different forms, act in different
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patterns, cling to different values, seek different goals, and learn different truths” (p. 10). 
Cynics see them as spending the “milk money” on lottery tickets, for example, out of 
impulsiveness, short-sighted rationale, outright ignorance, or lack of workmanship. When 
racial inequality, and poverty generally, is thought to result from pathologies located 
within the individual, the oppressed are seen to lack self-respect and ambition to better 
themselves. “Which is to say that they are strangers, barbarians, savages” (Ryan 1971:10; 
see also Steinberg 1981). When whites deny race is an organizing principle that structures 
how socially-defined rewards and penalties are distributed, they eliminate their own 
agency within racial hierarchy by willfully not seeing race. Colorblindness then becomes, 
in the words of sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva ([2003] 2014), a “racism without 
racists” (p. 4). 
Origins and Implications of Racial Change 
A fundamental difference between the racial days of yesterday and today is that no longer 
do whites need to insist upon state-sanctioned, compulsory inequality to preserve their 
advantage. According to sociologists Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, and Ryan Smith 
(1997) as well as sociologists Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Amanda Lewis (1999), broad 
social transformations have caused the racial caste system to lose its persuasive appeal 
among the white masses. Some of these transformations include a modernizing political 
economy and collapse of the South’s agrarian society, demographic transitions of black 
populations out of the South to newly-developed urban centers, expanded black political 
power coupled with social movement mobilizations, and civil rights reforms in voting, 
housing, and employment. As a result of these changes, sociologist Lincoln Quillian 
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(2006) has said that whites “became increasingly unwilling to express their prejudicial 
feelings and beliefs candidly because of the development of social norms against 
blatantly racist statements” (p. 311; see also Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996;  
Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Jackman and Muha 1984; Wodtke 2016). No longer is it 
acceptable for them to publicly profess comments like “segregation now, segregation 
tomorrow, segregation forever.”1 New norms surrounding how people discuss race has 
rendered these views taboo and illegitimate before the court of public opinion.  
 What do these changes substantively mean? Some sociologists like Howard 
Schuman and his colleagues ([1985] 1997) have labeled them as “a fundamental 
transformation of social norms … at the individual level (p. 306). Pointing to 
contradictory views, they show how whites endorse principles of equality in the abstract 
but reject practical strategies that would accomplish them. Moreover, policies aimed at 
ameliorating racial inequality—ones like affirmative action—remain widely unpopular 
(Bobo et al. 2012; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Hunt 2007; Wodtke 2016). This gulf between 
belief and action is known as “the principle-implementation gap,” an attitudinal gulf that 
leads Schuman and colleagues ([1985] 1997) to conclude whites’ views are paradoxical.2 
                                                           
1 The phrase “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” was said by George 
Wallace, the segregationist governor of Alabama, during his 1963 inaugural gubernatorial 
address.  
2 Among sociologist Howard Schuman’s co-authors is Lawrence Bobo. It is worth noting that in 
other works Bobo does not emphasize paradoxical views among whites. Instead he has articulated 
a notion of “laissez-faire” racism (see Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo et al. 1997). It stresses the 
permeability among whites’ racial views, and how they often blend seemingly impersonal, 
rational, and nondiscriminatory free market views with implicit cultural stereotypes that denigrate 
people of color. Aside from methodological orientation, Bobo’s laissez-faire racism maps onto 
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Other sociologists like Mary Jackman and Michael Muha (1984) have contended that 
whites’ liberalizing racial views, at least those measured by surveys, do not indicate a 
decline in racism as much as they suggest something substantively different (see also 
Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Wodtke 2016). 
Because racist views have become stigmatized and policed by so-called “political 
correctness,” sociologists Leslie Houts Picca and Joe Feagin (2007) have maintained that 
these views have gone underground. They have not faded into the night. They have 
become hidden from plain view, tucked away in the “backstage.”3 The idea is that whites 
speak more freely among fellow whites and are less likely to self-censor racist views in 
private.  
In most public places, however, white racism cannot be served raw. Those who 
unabashedly endorse negative stereotypes run the risk of identity spoilage, and subject 
themselves to social sanction (see Goffman 1963). Colorblindness offers whites a variety 
of politically-savvy strategies to make racism palatable, including an expansive menu of 
rhetorical devices and discursive maneuvers that permit racial views to be expressed in 
subtle, implicit, and seemingly nonracial ways (van Dijk 1997; Wetherell and Potter 
1992). The idea is to communicate a positive self-image and prevent undesirable 
inferences. This requires living “inside the minds” of others, to paraphrase the words of 
                                                           
the conceptual cartography of colorblindness—as outlined by sociologists Eduardo Bonilla-Silva 
([2003] 2014) and Charles Gallagher (2003) as well as legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1997) 
3 Schuman and colleagues ([1985] 1997) have countered claims like these. They have suggested 




philosopher and social psychologist George Herbert Mead (1934), and strategically 
manage whatever impressions one projects. Regarding racial interactions, the goal is to 
avoid the violation of public norms and being labeled a “racist.” This label extends 
beyond mere description. To call someone a racist implies a normative judgment of moral 
contempt. Linguist Teun van Dijk (1984) has explained, for example, that “sounding 
racist” can be among the greatest public insults a person can dish out—especially when 
applied to whites (see also Doane 2006). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva ([2003] 2014) has 
elaborated that colorblind ideology permits whites to “enunciate positions that safeguard 
their racial interests without sounding ‘racist.’ Shielded by color blindness, whites can 
express resentment toward minorities; criticize their morality, values, and work ethic; and 
even claim to be victims of ‘reverse racism’” (p. 4; see also Gallagher 2008; Lewis 
2004). So long as racism is cooked to the proper temperature and has the appropriate 
plate presentation, whites can espouse racist views that defend their racial advantage.  
Particularity and Overlap, Colorblindness in the Context of Slavery 
So what does colorblind ideology have to do with the three-fifths clause? Quite a bit 
actually. In place of words like “I’m not racist, but…”, the “founding fathers” used 
stylistic parallels like “I’m principled against slavery, but…” (LDC-XX [1783] 
1976:120). This hallowed preface, like today’s discursive style of colorblindness, rarely 
underwent further development or elaboration. Instead, it served as an appetizer for the 
main course of racism to come. The arguments following disclaimers like these, which 
were deployed by Northern and Southern delegates alike, propped up slavery to justify 
tax or representation policies that benefitted their constituents. Ending slavery was rarely 
91 
 
a point of contention. The contraction “but” signaled as much, as well as a degree of 
awareness on the speaker’s behalf. They were conscious of their misdirection. Pattern 
usage of this discourse indicates that it was calculated. The phrase “I’m principled against 
slavery, but…” signposts an acknowledgment that, indeed, the forthcoming claim will not 
be principally against slavery. Indeed, it would principally be for slavery. When Hugh 
Williamson of North Carolina said these words, he followed them with pleas for low 
taxes for slavemasters and their wealth. “[H]e thought slaves an incumbrance [sic] to 
Society instead of increasing its ability to pay” (LDC-XX [1783] 1976:120). Like many 
of his Southern colleagues, he preferred if slaves were enumerated at one-quarters or one-
halves a person if taxes were to be distributed by population count. Hardly a rejection of 
slavery, Williamson advanced fiscal policy that would subsidize it with foregone tax 
revenue.  
Common ideological currents of colorblindness can fundamentally justify 
different racial arrangements. Though slaves were denied basic rights of citizenship and 
subjected to total white domination, the peculiar institution was colorblind to the extent 
that slavemasters and accommodators alike affirmed universal appeals to liberalism and 
diminished slavery when it conveniently served their interests. Many even condemned 
overt expressions of bigotry and prejudice. Never mind that American capitalism was 
built on the back of stolen black labor (Marable [1983] 2000). Statesmen from the North 
and South did not believe their new world was a closed system where social status was 
inherited upon birth. Borrowing observations from philosophers like Adam Smith ([1776] 
2007) and sociologists like Max Weber ([1905] 1930), many of the framers thought of 
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America as a place that values hard work, prudent spending, and delayed gratification. 
Unlike overbearing policies of the British Crown, ones that gave unearned advantages to 
the agrarian aristocracy, Americans desired a system that did not subvert the liberty of 
those belonging to the body politic. They wanted an alternative that helped those that 
help themselves. People had equal opportunities to develop their own talents and abilities. 
However, those considered unworthy like slaves were denied these same opportunities 
and reduced to bondage. The logic of white supremacy was that they deserved this 
position in life. A racial caste system was an exception to the liberal rule on at least three 
counts. One, slavery represented a benevolent arrangement and perfection of the human 
condition to many Southerners. Two, it was not significant enough to demand much 
attention let alone acknowledgment for many Northerners. And three, statesmen from 
across the sectional aisle prioritized liberalism in the abstract over liberalism in practice.  
When abstracted from a material contingency, the language of liberalism can be 
channeled for illiberal ends. According to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva ([2003] 2014), “abstract 
liberalism” is the cornerstone of colorblind ideology. It infuses decontextualized ideas of 
political and economic liberalism to explain away racial inequality and oppose practical 
solutions that could address it. Debates over the three-fifths clause centered on two 
notions of liberalism: “tax uniformity” and “representational equality.” The former 
regarded even tax distribution with consideration given to wealth, whereas the latter 
referred to regional balance within the realm of congressional representation. Wanting to 
impose “uniform” taxes and proportionally allocate representation among the states, the 
question of these debates was how to count slaves. Some claimed the work of four slaves 
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equaled that of one freeperson. Others said it was more like three slaves to every four 
freepersons. On both sides of the debate, the framers justified their valuations by relying 
upon a host of pejorative stereotypes about slaves that were rooted in both culture and 
biology. All agreed, for example, that white labor was superior to slave labor regarding 
quality and production. What they disagreed on was how much. 
Taxation in the Name of Uniformity 
A government undergirded by slavery and property comes with a seemingly paradoxical 
challenge. In order to protect these rights, the state must interfere with them. Taxes, by 
definition, are revenues generated by the government through levies on property, income, 
sales, and so on. A just government, as far as the founders were concerned, was one that 
imposed taxes that upheld principles of uniformity so that everyone would be taxed at fair 
rates. This was among the reasons for dissent from Great Britain. They claimed the 
British knew these principles in the abstract, but hardly respected them in practice when 
dealing with the colonies.  
With laws like the “Stamp Act of 1765,” the Parliament of Great Britain imposed 
taxes onto Americans without their consent (Morgan and Morgan [1953] 1995). The act, 
itself, required colonists to print materials on paper produced in London that carried a 
revenue stamp. The stamp was a high tax that could only be paid in British currency. 
Specifically, it targeted products commonly used by college students and lawyers in 
efforts to limit the size of a colonial professional class. The revenues collected from these 
taxes were expended on the colonies, although not for economic development. Most this 
money was channeled to finance their own military oversight by the British Army.  
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British rule evolved into a tax tyranny from many colonists’ perspectives—a form 
of political slavery that subjected Americans’ will to another’s whims. Their possessions 
and livelihood were at the mercy of English rule, who could subject their property to 
imperial taxation or even commandeer it through outright confiscation. With these 
experiences fresh on the founders’ minds, they approached the task of constitution-
making under the agreement that taxes should be uniform. That is, they should be 
apportioned according to wealth held by all Americans.  
The tax uniformity principle follows philosopher Adam Smith’s ([1776] 2007) 
labor theory of value. In his treatise An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations, he claimed an ideal tax system should follow the dictum of “ability to pay”: 
It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, 
not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that 
proportion. (p. 547)  
Americans from the North and South thought that taxes should be about sacrifice, 
country, and duty—all notions that were colored in their own white racial image. 
Foreshadowing the words of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. by nearly 
a century and a half, they agreed that: “Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society” 
(qtd in. Slemrod and Bakija [1996] 2008:3).4 The point of contention, however, was over 
the importance of slavery and how slaves ought to be counted.  
 
 
                                                           
4 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who sat on the Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932, wrote 
these often quoted words in his 1927 dissenting opinion of Compania General De Tabacos De 
Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 
95 
 
Putting a Number on their Worth: The Tax Value of Slaves to Freepersons 
Congress was left with the question of how to “fix the proper difference between the 
labor and industry and of all other inhabitants” (ED-I [1783] 1836:98). One-to-four, said 
Daniel Carrol of Maryland. One-to-three, said John Rutledge of South Carolina. One-to-
two, said Benjamin Harrison of Virginia. These were the ratios Southern delegates 
suggested when they compared the value of free and slave labor. Three-to-four, said 
Oliver Wolcott of Connecticut as well as Stephen Higginson, Samuel Holton, and Samuel 
Osgood of Massachusetts. This was the ratio upon which Northern delegates agreed. A 
vote was taken between these positions, counting slaves according to a two-thirds ratio. It 
would fail, and setting up James Madison of Virginia to bridge the divide. Bolstering 
about “the sincerity of his professions of liberality,” he suggested “that Slaves should be 
rated as 5 to 3” (LDC-XX [1783] 1976:121). He had enough clout to sway his Southern 
brethren while still assuring Northern representatives Dixie would make good on its 
commitment to the union. This kept slavery intact but taxed it fairly, he thought.  
Both sides agreed some tax privileges were to make up the difference for what 
they perceived as poor workmanship on behalf of the slaves, and black folks generally. 
Slavemaster politicians claimed they and their constituents were on the losing end of 
slavery. According to William Hooper of North Carolina:  
A gentleman of three or four hundred negroes don’t raise more corn than feeds 
them. A laborer can’t be hired for less than twenty four pounds a year in 
Massachusetts Bay. The net profit of a negro is not more than five or six pounds 
per annum. I wish to see the day that slaves are not necessary. (JCC-V [1776] 
1906:1080)  
Seeing black labor in general, and slave labor in particular, as neither diligent nor 
productive, others repeated similar claims:  
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• The young and old Negroes are a Burthen to their owners. (LDC-IV [1776] 
1976:569) 
 
• having no interest in their labor, they did as little as possible, & omitted every 
exertion of thought requisite to facilitate & expedite it. (JCC-XXIV [1783] 
1922:949) 
 
• It is far from being a desirable property. (ED-III [1788] 1836:270)  
Owning other human beings, these delegates argued, caused more financial cost than 
gain, and in making this claim, the 1700s became a version of novelist George Orwell’s 
([1949] 1961) dystopian Nineteen Eighty-Four.  
Freedom was redefined as slavery when slaveholders proclaimed themselves 
victims of their peculiar institution. No longer did slavery refer to a relation in which 
slaveowners subjugated slaves. The institution was misrecognized as oppressive to white 
slavemasters but tolerable for black slaves. This is the 1700s version of what is known 
today as “reverse racism,” an idea that whites see discrimination as more of a problem for 
themselves than minority groups (see also Norton and Sommers 2012; Pierce 2012). 
Political actors of the early republic, to historicize the words of sociologist Jennifer 
Pierce (2012), “disavow[ed] responsibility for racist practices at the same time they 
practice[d] racially exclusionary behavior” (p. 65). Through ontological distortion, which 
is the negation of what “is,” slavery was decontextualized and transplanted into a racial 
nightmare whereby whites embraced the mantle of victimhood for their self-serving gain. 
It permitted them to retain a general sense that slavery was undesirable at the same time 





Shifting Shades of Meaning 
Whereas George Orwell ([1945] 1963; [1949] 1961) directed attention to the 
degeneration of language with his concepts of “doublethink” and “Newspeak,” the 
founding fathers were actually accomplishing the opposite with their words. They were 
expanding the meaning of their existing vocabulary by redefining words in some cases 
and absorbing new definitions in others. By contrast, Orwell ([1945] 1963) suggested the 
language of domination eliminates antonyms and synonyms altogether, so that, for 
example, freedom can no longer be contrasted by slavery. Making this shift, words and 
their meanings part company and the concept of freedom is whitewashed.  
The word free still existed in Newspeak, but it could only be used in such 
statements as ‘The dog is free from lice or ‘This field is free from weeds.’ It could 
not be used in its old sense of ‘politically free’ or intellectually free,’ since 
political and intellectual freedom no longer existed as concepts, and were 
therefore of necessity nameless. (Orwell [1949] 1961:246-247) 
Because freedom and slavery are oppositional concepts, substituting one for the other 
creates positive associations between once contrary words. This abridges meaning in 
ways that squash subversive thought and forsake resistance. “[T]he fact that the 
prevailing mode of equality is servitude,” explained social theorist Herbert Marcuse 
(1964), “and that the prevailing mode of equality is super-imposed inequality is barred 
from expression by the closed definition of these concepts in terms of the powers which 
shape the respective universe of discourse” (p. 88).  
Depoliticized words lack their comparative points of reference, but during the 
three-fifths debate, it is not as though James Madison, William Hooper, and others 
stopped using the word slavery because it was heretical. Their discussion of slavery 
occurred within the confines of portraying slaveholders on the losing end, which 
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immunes slavery from criticism since relations associated with the institution are 
reworked altogether. This means they retained politically ambiguous words that 
embodied semantic layers and re-inscribed their meaning so that they no longer signified 
the conventional group: slaves. Slaveowners inverted the concept of slavery to frame 
themselves as slaves, and in the process made the word’s primary meaning secondary.  
When Southerners and Northerners alike affirmed their innocence of slavery and 
professed commitments to freedom, these diversions, or what sociologist Emile 
Durkheim ([1912] 2008) called transgressions, strengthened the racial order (see also 
Doane 2014). These politicians gave the appearance that slavery was being contested, or 
at least critically interrogated, but this was smoke and mirrors. The system of slavery 
remained operational. 
The North Agreed, Slavery was a “White Man’s Burden” 
Not all Northern delegates agreed with Southerners’ line of argument. Critics like 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania thought slavemasters would recoup their tax costs by 
driving slaves to the edge of their existence. He complained “for the bohea tea used by a 
northern freeman will pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable slave, 
which consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rag that covers his 
nakedness” (ED-V [1787] 1845:393). Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts agreed and said 
Southerners could absorb whatever loss unproductive slaves caused by reducing their 
standard of living. According to the notes of James Madison:  
The Arguments used by those who were rating slaves high were; that the expence 
[sic] of feeding & cloathing [sic] was as far below that incident to freemen, as 
their industry and ingenuity were below those of freemen: and that the warm 
climate within wch. [sic] the States having slaves lay, compared wth. [sic] the 
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rigorous climate & inferior fertility of the others, ought to have great weight in the 
case & that the exports of the former were greater than the latter. (LCC-XX 
[1783] 1976:122) 
These counter-arguments did not challenge negative black stereotypes. They reinforced 
them. When Northern delegates responded by highlighting how Southerners could 
recover losses from unproductive slave labor, they reinforced the presumption that the 
value of labor followed racial lines. They upheld the premise that slaves were idle, lazy, 
and unmotivated to begin with, and thus did not contribute to the generation of local 
wealth in the ways that white workers did.  
 Conceding to negative stereotypes about unproductive black labor led other 
Northern delegates, like Francis Dana of Massachusetts, to agree Southerners were made 
slaves out of slavemasters. He empathized with his “burdened” Southern brethren, and 
thought the predicament demanded compensatory treatment: 
the negroes of the Southern States work no longer than when the eye of the driver 
is on them. Can … land flourish like this, which is cultivated by the hands of 
freemen? and [sic] are not three of these independent freemen of more real 
advantage to a state than five of those poor slaves? As a friend to equal taxation, 
[Dana] rejoiced that an opportunity was presented, in this Constitution, to change 
this unjust mode of apportionment. (ED-II [1788] 1836:38)  
Defining slaves as a source of poverty rather than wealth, the enterprise became a “white 
man’s burden” (Kipling 1899:12) for Southerners, which made policy privileges for 
taxation sound reasonable and just. White Southerners’ willingness to “civilize” slaves at 
their own expense was an enterprise that demanded compensatory treatment. So their 
“good” deeds did not go unnoticed, at least from their view, they “deserved” expanded 
exclusive tax breaks Northerners did not. Several Northerners agreed. Slavemasters and 
their accommodators had inverted meaning in ways that speakers no longer said the 
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opposite of what they thought but believed the opposite of what was true—culminating to 
rationalize proslavery tax policy. 
If Slaves are Property, Why are they the only Property Taxed? 
Samuel Chase of Maryland “admitted that taxation should always be in proportion to 
property” (ED-I [1777] 1836:70). Drawing out the implications of this proposition, 
though, he worried that Northerners would escape taxes on their wealth that his Dixie 
constituents could not. 
There is no more reason, therefore, for taxing the Southern States on the farmer’s 
head, and on his slave’s head, than the Northern ones on their farmers’ heads and 
the heads of their cattle; that the method proposed would, therefore, tax the 
Southern States according to their numbers and their wealth conjunctly, while the 
Northern would be taxed on numbers only. (ED-I [1775] 1836:71) 
The South’s distribution of wealth was unique in comparison to the North because of the 
dual status of slaves as person and property. For farmers of the North, much of their 
wealth was tied to personal properties such as investments, land, and livestock. All these 
items would not be enumerated, however, in a tax plan based on population only. Chase 
went on to claim “that negroes, in fact, should not be considered as members of the state, 
more than cattle, and that they have no more interest in it” (ED-I [1775] 1836:71). Since 
cattle are not members of the state, he claimed, then why should slaves be considered as 
such? The presumption behind his rhetorical question was that one was just as valued as 
the other.  
 When figures like James Madison suggested a ratio that equated five slaves to 
three freepersons for purposes of direct taxation, Edward Rutledge of South Carolina 
remained troubled. He agonized that such an apportionment rule would levy much 
heavier taxes on free populations of the South: 
101 
 
In the Northern States the labor is performed by white people, in the Southern by 
black. All the free people (and there are few others) in the Northern States are to be 
taxed by the new Constitution; whereas only the free people, and two fifths of the 
slaves, in the Southern States, are to be rated, in the apportioning of taxes. (ED-IV 
[1788] 1836:277) 
Hypothetically speaking, Rutledge was correct. Had a $1.00 direct tax apportionment 
been imposed according to the 1790 Census, for example, per capita taxes would have 
hovered around an even $1.00 for most all the Northern states (see Table 3). Meanwhile, 
residents of Southern states would pay $1.06 on the low-end (Tennessee) and $1.45 on 
the high-end (South Carolina).  
Table 3. Burden of a $1 Direct Tax Apportioned by the Three-fifths Clause* 
Northern  Southern  
Connecticut $     1.01 Delaware $     1.11 
Maine 1.00 Georgia 1.33 
Massachusetts 1.00 Kentucky 1.12 
New Hampshire 1.00 Maryland 1.29 
New Jersey  1.04 North Carolina 1.21 
New York 1.04 South Carolina 1.45 
Pennsylvania 1.01 Tennessee 1.06 
Rhode Island 1.01 Virginia 1.39 
Vermont 1.00   
* Adapted from Einhorn 2000.  
Calculations are per capita estimates of the tax burdens for free persons within each state, as enumerated by 
the 1790 Census.  
 Samuel Chase moved to carve out an exception to the tax rule. He agreed that a 
population-based tax plan was more practical than other alternatives that invited debate 
on how to appraise and value disparate forms of wealth. Surely these would go 
unresolved. Chase “observed that negroes are property, and, as such, cannot be 
distinguished from the lands or personalties [sic] held in those states where there are few 
slaves; that the surplus of profit which a northern farmer is able to lay by, he invests in 
cattle, horses, &c., whereas a southern farmer lays out the same surplus in slaves” (ED-I 
[1775] 1836:71). His solution to this problem was to tax white freepersons only. That 
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way taxes would be levied on whites of the North and South by the same unit of measure, 
or so Chase thought. Northern representatives like Nathaniel Folsom of New Hampshire 
complained that this violated the “ability to pay” dictum.  
If labor was the source of all wealth, Nathan Folsom reasoned, then white 
Southerners would forego taxes on the very thing that made them rich. He claimed:  
it appears to me that one third part of the welth [sic] of the Southern States which 
consists in negroes, is entirely left out and no Notice taken of them, in 
determining their ability to pay taxes, notwithstanding it is by them that they 
procure their wealth. (LDC-VIII [1778] 1976:299) 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania echoed these sentiments, knowing that his antislavery 
constituents of Pennsylvania would resent shouldering taxes that Southern slavemasters 
escaped. These Northern representatives were less concerned about their moral 
reservations over slavery than they were about taxation being a zero-sum gain. If 
Southern slavemasters evaded their monetary obligation to the country, then this meant 
Northern states would make up the difference and face a tax penalty for not owning 
slaves. Some Northern statesmen thought it more than odd that the wealthiest region in 
the country resisted taxes on the source that brought them such great fortune. 
Condemning and Defending Slavery in the Same Breath 
A small minority of Virginians, particularly Patrick Henry but also George Mason, 
worried federal taxation would trample over state sovereignty and create a national 
government too powerful for its own good. Offering a rhetorical arc that gradually 
meanders from one position to another, which is typical of colorblindness, Patrick Henry 
made a seemingly contradictory argument that first condemns slavery but then goes on to 
indirectly defend it by banning national taxation altogether. His first comments 
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ambiguously speak across multiple audiences in an attempt to establish credibility for his 
later, more controversial, argument:  
it would rejoice my very soul that every one of my fellow-beings was 
emancipated. As we ought with gratitude to admire that decree of Heaven which 
has numbered us among the free, we ought to lament and deplore the necessity of 
holding our fellowmen in bondage. (ED-III [1788] 1836:591) 
By invoking religion with the words “decree of Heaven,” Henry offers a moral rendering 
of the relationship between freeperson and slave under G-d. He invokes religious-inspired 
ideals over who is a constituent member of the body politic as it relates to the legal status 
of slaves. The religious diversity of his audience, which included churches that followed 
varied doctrines and different stances on slavery, allowed him to communicate a single 
message that bundled at least two competing theological interpretations: one as natural 
and the other as sinful (see also Jordan 1968). 
To his fellow statesmen who believed divine right ordained the racial order, 
Patrick Henry’s invocation of heaven paired with his comment on the “necessity” of 
slavery represents an acknowledgment that G-d intended whites to rule the so-called 
“lesser races.” Henry may have “detested” the institution “with all the pity of humanity” 
(ED-III [1788] 1836:590), but he and other Southerners believed slavery to be inevitable. 
They claimed there was nothing they could do about the “natural” differences between 
the races. Black folks in general, and slaves in particular, were not equal to whites before 
the eyes of G-d. Therefore, a racial hierarchy like slavery could go unquestioned and 
thought of as ineradicable arrangement. To other statesmen, especially those who 
believed slavery sinful, Henry’s invocation of heaven acknowledged slaves as near equals 
(“fellow-beings”) and showed sympathy toward manumission. As they were all children 
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of G-d, there were no special capacities granted to freepersons that were not also 
extended to slaves. Both these possible interpretations could help establish rapport with 
Henry’s audiences, and they permitted him to follow a moral dualism that challenged 
slavery on one hand and permitted new ways of defending it on the other. 
White supremacy was about to be dressed in socially acceptable clothing, ones 
that adorned their colorblind texture from the sequenced structure in which they appeared 
(see also Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; van Dijk 1997; Wetherell and Potter 1992). 
After rejoicing at the thought of emancipation, which enabled Patrick Henry to stand on 
firmer moral ground to speak on a controversial subject, he endorsed slavery’s 
preservation by asserting the autonomy of localities and their self-determination: 
Let me not dwell on this subject. I will only add that this, as well as every other 
property of the people of Virginia, is in jeopardy, and put in the hands of those 
who have no similarity with us. This is a local matter, and I can see no propriety 
in subjecting Congress to it. (ED-III [1788] 1836:591) 
That is, those who “understood” the local conditions ought to govern them without 
intervention. Any outsiders who meddled in their affairs were infringing upon a way of 
life only insiders could understand. Southerners like Patrick Henry were apprehensive to 
federalism that had the capacity to override their local jurisdiction over slavery. The 
possibility was, according to them, an encroachment worse than tyranny itself.  
Compromise and the Politics of Spin 
The three-fifths agreement was a truce between both sides of the tax debate, with 
representatives from the North and South claiming political victory. Rufus King of 
Massachusetts told his constituents “that five negro children of South Carolina are to pay 
as much tax as the three governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut” 
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(ED-II [1788] 1836:37). This appeased some Northern constituents who thought the 
South claimed all the benefit of slavery without any of its liability. Before the federal 
ratio was adopted under the new constitution, their slave wealth escaped taxation 
altogether under the Articles of Confederation (Article VIII). Furthermore, many thought 
slaves were a threat to national security. Representatives like Oliver Ellsworth of 
Connecticut claimed slaves could not be trusted on the battlefield, and those that were 
disaffected would easily turn to arms in support of the enemy. Subjecting slavemasters to 
taxation on their peculiar institution was a step in the right direction of the South paying 
its way.  
 The application of direct taxes, or more precisely the lack thereof, would prove 
Rufus King wrong through the course of history. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania 
warned of this possibility. He said that direct taxes were too impractical: “It is idle to 
suppose that the general government can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the 
people, scattered over so vast a country” (ED-V [1787] 1845:393). Morris was correct. 
During most years, direct taxes never were a vital source of revenue. They generated zero 
percent of federal revenue during the 1790s, and only a fraction of taxes collected until 
the 16th Amendment of 1913 (the federal income tax) was enacted (Dewey [1903] 1934).  
Slavemaster representatives welcomed the theoretically progressive tax structure 
for political reasons. By considering slaves in the distribution of tax liability, they could 
claim they exempted lower class whites from direct taxation (Thornton 1982). In fact, 
these elites replicated this strategy at lower levels of government. States of the 
antebellum South set a precedent for among the most progressive tax structures to date in 
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America, though they were more progressive in theory than practice. Local governments 
in the South generated few revenues, as those who controlled them were more interested 
in limiting state capacity in all areas expect protections over slavery. Nonetheless, 
claiming that they carried the tax burden of their respective states helped insulate class 
conflict between slavemasters and lower-class whites while justifying their own 
overrepresentation in politics (Einhorn 2006; Robinson 1971).  
When Economic Interests in Private Property Trump Moral Outrage over Slavery 
An end to slavery took a backseat to questions on how to tax private property. 
Southerners were quick to remind Northerners they stood to lose much capital investment 
should slavery be ended (see also Finkelman 1995). Without some compensation, 
statesmen from the North and South thought emancipation would be an unjust 
evaporation of wealth. Taxation was a vehicle that could make it possible, hence the 
reason why many slavemasters were apprehensive of a centralized national tax system. 
George Mason of Virginia agonized that “by laying taxes too heavily on slaves, 
[Northern delegates] might totally annihilate that kind of property” (ED-III [1788] 
1836:452-456). Joseph McDowell of North Carolina worried, “The tax-gatherers will be 
sent, and our property will be wrestled out of our hands…. At such a distance from their 
homes, and for so long a time, they will have no feeling for, nor any knowledge of, the 
situation of the people” (ED-IV [1788] 1836:87-88).  
Among the property these no-good outsiders would confiscate were slaves, so the 
storyline goes (see Bonilla-Silva, Lewis, and Embrick 2004). George Nicholas of 
Virginia went further and told “the committee that the people of our country are reduced 
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to beggary by the taxes on negroes” (ED-III [1788] 1836:457). The out of touch, 
overreaching government they feared was the one that would ruin their peculiar 
institution. Pierce Butler of South Carolina said it plain. “The security the Southern States 
want is, that their negroes may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or 
without doors have a very good mind to do” (ED-V [1787] 1845:309). 
Quakers like Anthony Benezet (1773) of Pennsylvania, whom historian Winthrop 
Jordan (1968) considered among the foremost critics of slavery, took complaints like 
these serious. He and others devised gradual strategies of emancipation that included a 
reparations component for slavemasters as well slaves, though the former group was 
envisioned as the primary beneficiary.5 The goal of emancipation was to avoid any 
radical shake-up of the social order, as well as to offset the losses of whatever wealth 
slavemasters stood to lose. This idea of reparations for slavemasters never gained 
currency, and one might imagine the backlash if it had become law. Those north of the 
Mason-Dixon Line would be subjected to pay Southern elites for the formerly enslaved. 
Even if Northerners wanted to, which most did not, such proposals were beyond the 
capacity of their developing economies (Robinson 1971).  
Were economic capacity a non-issue, the question still left open was what would 
happen to the slaves once freed? James Galloway of North Carolina asked, “If we must 
manumit our slaves, what country shall we send them to? It is impossible for us to be 
happy, if, after manumission, they are to stay among us” (ED-IV [1788] 1836:101). He 
                                                           
5 Some plans for reparations devised by Quakers intended to compensate slaves for back wages 
(Jordan 1968). These were rare.  
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and many others could not even imagine a world in which former masters and slaves 
lived alongside one another as equals. The thought was unfathomable. Some entertained 
the idea of returning slaves to Africa or setting aside native-occupied land on the frontier, 
but none of these options were seriously pursued. A more feasible compromise, they 
thought, would be to settle their dispute over taxation and devise a fair plan for whites of 
whatever region.  
With the possibility of taxing slavery out of existence, Northern delegates worried 
they might impose the same tyranny on their Southern brethren that the British had 
imposed on the colonies. The dream of America would be soiled under these 
circumstances. “I always consider the settlement of America with reverence and 
wonder,” wrote John Adams ([1763] 1851) of Massachusetts, “as the opening of a grand 
scheme and design in Providence for the illumination and emancipation of the slavish 
part of mankind all over the earth” (p. 452). Adams’ slavery metaphor was not to be 
taken literally, as it disregarded the chattel slavery facing many black lives. For many 
white Americans, the new world represented an opportunity to fulfill philosophers Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s ([1762] 2008) and John Locke’s ([1690] 2009) visions of the social 
contract. Liberty was defined by the unfettered pursuit and attainment of private 
property—slaves included. These ideas were ones in which “men” could improve their 
situation without interference from others. They were rights that existed before a person’s 
entrance into society, making them universal and inalienable. A violation of tax 




Representation in the Name of Equality 
America is a country born out of tax rebellion, the revolutionary spirit captured by the 
phrase “no taxation without representation.” When these words were uttered by Minister 
Jonathan Mayhew in 1750 at Old West Church in Boston, Massachusetts, they weighed 
heavy on the colonial consciousness (Beneke 2008).6 His sermon was of the 
commemoratory variety (see Mayhew 1750). Reminding his church members of the 
English Revolution that occurred one hundred years earlier, as well as the execution of 
Charles I, Mayhew spoke of their Christian duty to resist the government when it no 
longer served their interests. He reminded them that, as the British gentry before them, 
they had an obligation to resist taxes imposed on them against their will and without 
Parliamentary representation.  
The message resonated among those throughout America. John Dickinson of 
Pennsylvania, for example, offered these reflections:  
Those who are taxed without their own consent, expressed by themselves or their 
representatives, are slaves. We are taxed without our own consent, expressed by 
ourselves or our representatives. We are therefore—SLAVES. (qtd. in Feagin 
2000:13, emphasis original) 
Other patriots like John Adams and James Otis claimed the government had no standing 
to impose taxes for endeavors many of Americans saw as tyrannical and a violation of 
England’s own Bill of Rights (McCullough 2001). The absence of representation meant 
                                                           
6 The sermon given by Jonathan Mayhew (1750) is entitled, “A Discourse concerning Unlimited 
Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers: With some Reflections on the Resistance 
made to King Charles I. And on the Anniversary of his Death: In which the Mysterious Doctrine 
of that Prince’s Saintship and Martyrdom is Unriddled.”   
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colonial consideration or consultation did not exist. Like slaves, American consent 
mattered none. They were to pay obedience to master Britain.  
 When Americans came together under their own independence and sovereignty, 
they returned to their revolutionary slogan of “no taxation without representation.” They 
asked themselves, “How will we determine the latter?” Above all branches of 
government, answering this question mattered most to the legislature. As James Madison 
([1788] 1999) wrote in Federalist Paper No. 51, “the legislative authority necessarily 
predominates” (p. 319). This is where elite interests are interfered with as property, in all 
its carnations, is regulated (see also Federal Paper No. 10). Therefore, figuring out its 
composition was of utmost importance to the founders. They learned by trial and error 
with the Articles of Confederation. Under this constitution, states had equal 
representation that followed a “one vote, one state” plan. Disputes over uneven 
distributions of population, wealth, and slavery proved it unworkable.  
The richest and most populous states would not support such a union moving 
forward. From their view, a republican government that respected the will of the people 
was one that put lawmaking in their hands. A populous rule or a rule by wealth meant 
power would be vested in the very districts where they reside. The criteria that made 
many states both rich and populous revolved around slavery, which made debates over 
representation not really about representation at all (cf. Ohline 1971). Like the tax 
debates that preceded them, these debates were over the importance of slavery and how 
slaves ought to be counted (see also Feagin 2000). “The institution of slavery & its 
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consequences,” observed James Madison, “formed the line of discrimination” separating 
Southern states from Northern ones (FR-II [1787] 1911:10). 
Count Them Whole: The House that Slaves Built but Could Not Reside 
When it came to taxes, slavemaster politicians denigrated slave labor, and its lack of 
productivity, as causing slaveholders to incur more cost than profit. That way they could 
claim slavemasters deserved some consideration of relief should taxes be distributed by 
population. When it came to representation, they argued the opposite. James Jackson of 
Georgia “knew this business was viewed in an odious light to the eastward, because the 
people were capable of doing their own work” (DPCUS-I [1789] 1834:350). He saw the 
South through different eyes. The peculiar institution was a destined social order: 
“however slavery may be condemned in the Eastern States, it is impossible to cultivate 
the Southern country without their assistance” (DPCUS-I [1789] 1834:240). Charles C. 
Pinckney of South Carolina agreed:  
the nature of our climate, and the flat, swampy situation of our country, obliges us 
to cultivate our lands with negroes, and that without them South Carolina would 
soon be a desert waste. (FR-III [1787] 1911:254) 
For the areas in which blacks excelled, at least according to those like Jackson and 
Pinckney, these tasks were regarded as inconsequential to whites’ sense of personhood. 
Whites of the early republic prided themselves upon their industry and sense of 
workmanship, but thought these talents and abilities were better left for more intellectual 
and cognitive enterprises.  
Sociologists Joe Feagin, Hernán Vera, and Pinar Batur ([1995] 2001) have labeled 
mythologies like these as “sincere fictions of the white self,” whereby whites see 
themselves as well-meaning, tolerant people but nonetheless advance antiblack ideas (p. 
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186). These views bolstered how elite Southerners envisioned a racialized division of 
labor. Whites could not perform arduous labor required for an economy built upon 
tobacco, rice, sugar, indigo, and later cotton. Only black slaves were capable of those 
tasks. More than that, they were preordained. It was as though the peculiar institution was 
natural, inevitable, and unstoppable. These ideas can seem counter-intuitive to 
colorblindness, but as Bonilla-Silva ([2003] 2014) has explained, “they are actually used 
to reinforce the myth of nonracialism”; they suggest differences “are almost biologically 
driven and typical of all groups in society” (p. 76).  
Other South Carolinians demanded that slaves be counted five-fifths for 
representation too. Consider the argument offered by Pierce Butler: 
[He] insisted, that the labor of a slave in South Carolina was as productive and 
valuable as that of a freeman in Massachusetts; that as wealth was the great means 
of defence [sic] and utility to the nation, they were equally valuable to it with 
freemen. (ED-V [1787] 1845:296)  
This followed the same logic also used by James Jackson and Charles C. Pinckney. It was 
the only valid alternative, in their minds, that slaves be counted whole for representation. 
Stressing political equality, Butler reasoned: “consequently, an equal representation 
ought to be allowed for them in a government which was instituted principally for the 
protection of property, and was itself to be supported by property” (ED-V [1787] 
1845:296).  
When James Jackson, Charles C. Pinckney, and Pierce Butler claimed slaves offer 
valuable economic contributions and ought to be considered for congressional 
representation, they did not argue for the franchise of slaves. Rather they clung to 
decontextualized notions of democratic representation that exclusively served their own 
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racial interests. Southerners demanded slaves’ contribution to the union be respected with 
extra legislative representation. Otherwise, the scale of political balance between elite 
whites of the North and South would be violated.  
If Slaves are to be Represented, Why Not Horses and Cattle Too?  
Some from the North opposed any enumeration of slaves at all. Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts argued that if property determines representation, then Northerners should 
not be penalized for their lack of slaves. “Blacks are property, and are used,” he argued, 
“to the southward, as horses and cattle to the northward; and why should their 
representation be increased to the southward, on account of the number of slaves, than 
horses or oxen to the north?” (FR-I [1787] 1911:206). Those who agreed insisted 
Southerners should have their enumeration reduced or Northerners ought to be placed on 
equal footing. As is, a resident of Massachusetts who owns 500 horses gets one vote. A 
slavemaster of South Carolina who owns 500 slaves gets 300 votes, plus his own. 
“Horses and Cattle,” contended Gerry, “ought to have the Right to Representn [sic]” (FR-
I [1787] 1911:208). This would be one way that political voice would commensurate with 
the wealth that made government possible, implying that all propertied interests need 
protection.  
William Davie of North Carolina took Elbridge Gerry’s argument as a sign of 
envy. Speaking to his constituents back home, he said: 
The Eastern States had great jealousies on this subject. They insisted that their 
cows and horses were equally entitled to representation; that the one was property 
as well as the other. It became our duty, on the other hand, to acquire as much 
weight as possible in the legislation of the Union; and, as the Northern States 
were more populous in whites, this only could be done by insisting that a certain 
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proportion of our slaves should make a part of the computed population. (FR-III 
[1787] 1911:342) 
Rawlins Lowndes of South Carolina thought much of the same. He claimed:  
Without negroes, this state one of the most contemptible in the Union…. Negroes 
were our wealth, our only natural resource; yet behold how our kind friends in the 
north were determined soon to tie up our hands, and drain us of what we had! 
(ED-IV [1788] 1836:272-273) 
Meanwhile, other delegates from the North, like Alexander Hamilton of New York and 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut, suggested the population plan refer to “free inhabitants” 
only. Southerners did not take kind to this proposal. Rather than engage in give-and-take 
compromise, they reverted to their preferred style of negotiation: hold the debate hostage. 
The message was implicit but unmistakable. Count slaves toward congressional 
representation (without the franchise), or watch Southern states break any dreams of a 
more perfect union. It seemed like the Articles all over again. This time, however, 
Southerners shifted the tune of their argument (see also Wills 2003). Slavemaster 
politicians like James Madison worried a population plan that counted whites only would 
mean Northern issues and concerns would dominate the legislative agenda: 
The great danger to our general government is the great southern and northern 
interests of the continent, being opposed to each other. Look to the votes in 
congress, and most of them stand divided by the geography of the country, not 
according to the size of the states. (FR-I [1787] 1911:476) 
Likewise, Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina said slaves ought to be counted on the 
principle of “equality” (FR-I [1787] 1911:567). His South Carolinian cousin, Charles 
Pinckney, agreed. “There is a real distinction between the northern and southern 
interests,” he claimed. “North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, in their rice and 
indigo, had a peculiar interest, which might be sacrificed” (ED-V [1787] 1845:270). Most 
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freepersons lived in the North, so he and other Southern statesmen preferred that slaves 
count at least partially toward representation. That way political influence between the 
two regions could be balanced. 
Once They Get a Taste of Power… 
Without a balance of power, Southerners worried about the likelihood of Northern 
usurpation. By underrepresenting slaves or worse, not counting them at all, slavemaster 
politicians argued they would inevitably become politically disenfranchised. George 
Mason elaborated,  
If the Southern States should have three fourths of the people of America within 
their limits, the Northern will hold fast the majority of representatives. One fourth 
will govern the three fourths. The Southern States will complain; but they may 
complain from generation to generation without redress. (ED-V [1787] 1845:294)  
The wealthiest and most populous districts would not rule under such circumstances, 
rather they would come under rule. The idea that power begets power was a source of 
much anxiety for Southerners. They thought once Northern states got a taste of power, 
their representatives would not want it relinquished and would do whatever they could to 
expand it. “Is it to be expected,” Mason rhetorically asked, “that [Southern states] will 
deliver themselves, bound hand and foot, to the Eastern States?” (ED-V [1787] 
1845:490). 
Charles C. Pinckney thought this inevitably meant domestic and international 
commerce, the slave trade included, would be regulated by the national government, 
which would cause Southern states to become “nothing more than overseers for the 
Northern States” (FR-I [1787] 1911:567). Without a representation plan that counted 
slaves, Southerners (and some Northerners) warned of the autocratic dangers that came 
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with a minority-ruled interventionist state. John Tyler of Virginia lambasted the slave 
trade, for example, as “disgraceful” and “wicked,” but guarded against designing a 
government that could do anything about it. Granting national regulatory powers to a 
small group of legislatures, many of whom were unfamiliar with the interests of those 
they supposedly represented, would set a precedent for a government too powerful for its 
own good.  
John Tyler asked the founders to remember Caesar: 
From the combined operation of these unlimited powers he dreaded the most fatal 
consequences…. He called to the recollection of the committee the history of the 
Athenian who, from small beginnings, had enslaved his country. He begged them 
to remember that Caesar, who prostrated the liberties of his country, did not 
possess a powerful army at first. Suppose, says he, that the time should come that 
a king should be proposed by Congress. Will they not be able, by the sweeping 
clause, to call in foreign assistance, and raise troops, and do whatever they think 
proper to carry this proposition into effect? He then concluded that, unless this 
clause were expunged, he would vote against the Constitution. (ED-III [1788] 
1836:454-455) 
Implying a domino effect, Tyler asked where the unilateral action of their national 
government would end?  
The power of prohibiting [the slave trade] was not expressly delegated to them; 
yet they would have had it by implication, if this restraint had not been provided. 
This seemed to him to demonstrate most clearly the necessity of restraining them, 
by a bill of rights, from infringing our unalienable rights…. From the combined 
operation of these unlimited powers he dreaded the most fatal consequences. (ED-
III [1788] 1836:454) 
Tyler insinuated that Northern representatives may start from humble beginnings, but like 
Athens and Caesar, they, too, would only gain in power and inevitably trade liberty for 




Many statesmen thought a disproportionate representational rule that did not 
consider the presence of slaves threatened laissez-faire-inspired pursuits of life, liberty, 
and property. This is especially true if the federal government also possessed the power 
to tax. Hugh Williamson claimed, “The southern interest must be extremely endangered 
by the present arrangement. The Northern States are to have a majority in the first 
instance, and the means of perpetuating it” (ED-V [1787] 1845:291). Outsiders could 
levy whichever taxes they preferred, on whatever objects they deemed, and for however 
much they desired. Southerners perceived “Northern aggression” as violating tenets upon 
which the republic was founded, and considered their own situation as “taxation without 
representation.” 
Quid Pro Quo, Accommodating a More Perfect Union 
The costs of ending slavery were too high for Northern delegates who worried a lack of 
compromise would sever the union. Alexander Hamilton thought it was “the unfortunate 
situation of the Southern States, to have a great part of their population, as well as 
property, in blacks” (ED-II [1788] 1836:237). Recalling slavery this way, he committed 
what sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois ([1935] 1992) labeled “the propaganda of history.” The 
institution was discussed “so impartially, that in the end nobody seems to have done 
wrong and everybody was right. Slavery appears to have been thrust upon unwilling 
helpless America, while the South was blameless in becoming its center” (p. 714). 
Hamilton’s words transformed the institution of slavery so that slavemasters were 
removed from culpability. Rather than being active agents who propagated human 
bondage onto others for the sake of profit, these elite white men were described more as 
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victims of circumstance. This is not to say that Hamilton or other Northern 
representatives advocated slavery in a direct manner.  
“It will, however, by no means be admitted that the slaves are considered 
altogether as property,” declared Alexander Hamilton. “They are men, though degraded 
to the condition of slavery” (ED-II [1788] 1836:237). Insisting slaves of their humanity 
but wanting to bridge the sectional divide, he went on to qualify:  
But representation and taxation go together, and one uniform rule ought to apply 
to both. Would it be just to compute these slaves in the assessment of taxes; and 
discard them from the estimate in the apportionment of representatives? (ED-II 
[1788] 1836:237) 
Hamilton contradicts his original position with this statement. He was caught up in what 
Howard Schuman and colleagues ([1985] 1997) have labeled the “principle-
implementation gap,” whereby whites profess beliefs of racial equality on paper but 
reject it in practice. The idea that slaves were people, deserving recognition as such, was 
sacrificed for abstract principles of “representational equality” among elite white men in 
the North and South.  
Most Northern politicians did not belong to manumission societies like Alexander 
Hamilton,7 but they recognized conflicts over slavery had to be minimized to avert a 
sectional clash. Hamilton pleaded for a spirit of compromise by appealing to Northern 
                                                           
7 Alexander Hamilton belonged to the New York Manumission Society. In many ways, these 
organizations were conservative precursors to the radical abolitionist societies of the nineteenth 
century. Rather than advance an outright end to slavery through government action, they 
preferred individual slavemasters to gives up slaves out of their own volition or in exchange for 
some form of compensation (Bernstein 2009). Other members of manumission societies that are 
featured in this dissertation include Anthony Benezet, George Clinton, Benjamin Franklin, John 
Jay, Benjamin Rush, and Melancton Smith.  
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representatives’ economic interests. He asked, “Would it be just to impose a singular 
burthen, without conferring some adequate advantage?” (ED-II [1788] 1836:237). Posing 
this question, he reminded his sectional colleagues that a portfolio tied to slavery 
permitted wealth in other forms of capital and real property to escape taxation. Siding 
with Southerners, he and others like Francis Dana argued slaveholders were saddled with 
unfair taxes. The market should determine, they contended, how resources are allocated 
and principles of tax uniformity should reward hard work and initiative rather than 
penalize it.  
Slavery was gradually falling out of favor among Northern states beginning in the 
1780s. Though Massachusetts was the only state in the union to have ended slavery by 
the Constitutional Convention, one-by-one states like New York were putting in place 
gradual plans for abolishment. Knowing this and wanting to convince the undecided, 
Alexander Hamilton filled out his argument to show how slavery benefitted the interests 
of “everyone” (except slaves): 
The first thing objected to is that clause which allows a representation for three 
fifths of the negroes…. The regulation complained of was one result of the spirit 
of accommodation which governed the Convention: and without this indulgence 
no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir, considering some peculiar 
advantages which derive from them, it is entirely just that they should be 
gratified. The Southern States possess certain staples, tobacco, rice, indigo, &c., 
which must be capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations; and 
the advantages they necessarily procure in those treaties will be felt throughout all 
the states. (ED-II [1788] 1836:237) 
Human bondage bolstered national prosperity through an agrarian economy that yielded 
raw materials that filled textile mills, generating wealth for Northern shopkeepers and 
laborers and making possible trade that primed domestic and international commerce 
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(Baptist 2014; Marable [1983] 2000). Seen this way, it is rational for Northern delegates 
to give a pass to slavery.  
The Northern economy was intertwined with the South, and the peculiar 
institution served their welfare too. Others like James Wilson agreed that a quid pro quo 
was in order, and said the South should be conceded their “indulgence” with extra 
representatives. “These are the difficulties however which [Wilson] thought must be 
overruled by the necessity of compromise” (FR-I [1787] 1911:587). Gouverneur Morris 
said, “This country must be united. If persuasion does not unite it, the sword will. He 
begged this consideration might have its due weight. The scenes of horror attending civil 
commotion cannot be described; and the conclusion of them will be worse than the term 
of their continuance” (ED-V [1787] 1845:276).  
Rufus King agreed with Gouverneur Morris and urged his colleagues to consider 
what sacrifices Southerners had made to Northern industry when casting their vote.  
Mr. KING had always expected that, as the Southern States are the richest, they 
would not league themselves with the Northern, unless some respect were paid to 
their superior wealth. If the latter expect those preferential distinctions in 
commerce, and other advantages in return. (ED-V [1787] 1845:290)  
Northern politicians forged alliances across the sectional aisle, uniting those who opposed 
and favored slavery. Oliver Ellsworth asked Northern delegates for deference. “The 
morality or wisdom of slavery,” he claimed, “are considerations belonging to the states 
themselves. What enriches a part enriches the whole, and the states are the best judges of 
their particular interest” (ED-V [1787] 1845:457). By the time the Constitution was 
ratified, most delegates from the North had convinced themselves a union with slavery 
trumped no union at all.  
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Colorblind Discourse, Color-Conscious Context 
Passage of the three-fifths clause, and the Constitution in general, required alliances 
across the sectional aisle. Jumbles of a colorblind racism, in both content and form, that 
moves across the contexts of taxation and representation helped to develop these bonds 
by overcoming, or at least diminishing, political dissymmetry that could have otherwise 
thwarted white solidarity. Politicians of the early republic could have easily followed 
divergent paths given their unique particularities, like sectional factions over religion or 
economy, but colorblindness helped facilitate empathy for Northerners who could adopt 
the racial causes of Southerners and vice versa. Even those who opposed slavery 
accommodated and absorbed subaltern worldviews of racism as their own when they 
prioritized abstract ideas of tax uniformity and representational equality over an 
institution that stripped people of their humanity and reduced them to bondage. With 
colorblind comments like “I’m principled against slavery, but…”, they even condemned 
and defended slavery in the same breath. 
Patterned attacks on slavery by slavemasters and accommodators alike were 
rhetorical during the three-fifths debate, but they indicate an internal dialogue regarding a 
shared code of ethics—a “white habitus” if you will (see Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014; 
Bonilla-Silva, Goar, and Embrick 2006).8 A common European cultural heritage among 
                                                           
8 Sociologists Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Carla Goar, and David Embrick (2006) have extended 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s ([1979] 1984) notion of “habitus” to racial dynamics. The concept 
of “white habitus” refers to socially acquired predispositions of thought and action among those 
racialized as white that become habitual, so much so that routinized behaviors go unnoticed and 
unexamined (see also Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014).  
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the framers worked to reinforce this sense of groupness (see Lewis 2004). Most could 
trace their origins to Britain, and to a lesser extent Scotland, Ireland, and Germany, and a 
vast majority followed politics loosely subscribed to Lockean liberalism (Robinson 1971; 
see also Locke [1690] 2009). Protection of property rights was foundational to their 
political understandings, which embedded beyond question ideals of what they thought 
republican government should be. Race colored all of these meanings. At some level, 
members of both sides acknowledged slavery was incongruent with commitments to 
freedom. Outright endorsements of slavery, even during the 1700s, violated a shared 
civic etiquette and ran risk of social sanction. This is, in part, why proslavery views were 
routinely prefaced with lamentations over the institution’s existence. These discursive 
strategies provided them a means to defend the indefensible. For instance, George Mason 
could lambast the slave trade as “diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind” (ED-III 
[1788] 1836:452), but nonetheless go on to advocate procedural barriers (the three-fifths 
clause) that prevented slavery from being regulated out of existence.  
Northerners and Southerners transcended their differences during the three-fifths 
debate to share a configuration of practices and meanings that asserted a common social 
location within the racial order: whiteness. Internal tensions did not prevent, as Amanda 
Lewis (2004) has explained with her notion of “hegemonic whiteness,” a fluidly tentative 
consensus agreement that cemented a recognition of shared racial interests (see also 
Hughey 2012). This finding belies narratives, as social geographer Alastair Bonnett 
(2010) has described, that discretely cast whites in oppositional terms of “heroes and 
villains: pure racists versus anti-racists, good against evil, [proslavery versus 
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antislavery]” (p. 10). Whiteness is not an identity in other words, but a power bloc 
comprised by coalitions of differentiated subgroups. This is true even as white 
Northerners and Southerners did not constitute a coherent group of people. 







Summarizing the degree of colorblind adherence (see Figure 2), nearly half of 
those I observed (71 out of 160 or 44.4 percent) deployed the frame of abstract 
liberalism. The margin of difference between North and South was marginal, however, 
with the latter holding a slight edge (33 compared to 38). Many more Southerners than 
Northerners framed the three-fifths debate under the guise of tax uniformity (31 
20.6% 23.8% 55.6%
Adherents to Abstract Liberalism (in percentages)





Tax Uniformity Representational Equality
Adherents to Tax Uniformity and Representational Equality 
Northern Representatives Southern Representatives
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compared to 22), while the two regions were fairly balanced when it came to 
representational equality (23 compared to 20). The delegates formed a collectivity across 
the sectional aisle by partaking in racism that promoted common racial interests. 
Through working negotiations and agreements, colorblindness helped forge a 
common bond of whiteness among founding fathers so that they could build an empire in 
their own lasting image. It tapped into the logics of government nonintervention and free 
markets (see Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997), as well as its slippery and seemingly 
nonracial style (Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014), to guard against slavery’s vulnerabilities. In 
part, this is because America’s wealthiest capitalists were unlike the European 
bourgeoisie (Einhorn 2000). They were a slavemaster class with many sympathizers. 
Their converging interests drove them to develop a state-sanctioned market that denied 
and endorsed the salience of race, entrenching a color-conscious, quasi-feudal society in 
the process. The fact that colorblind ideology played a salient role in shaping the three-
fifths clause merits attention because it shows how contemporary ideology was not 
created out of whole cloth in post-1960s America. This complicates straightforward 
narratives of temporal change in racism, ones that point to a distinct break from the past. 
Racial ideology of the early republic transpired within experiences, interests, and 
structural circumstances different from today’s colorblind era. Looking beyond broad 
historical brushstrokes that dichotomize racism between classical and modern forms, 
however, it becomes apparent, to extend the words of W.E.B. Du Bois ([1903] 2005), that 




PRINCIPLED CONSERVATISM OR PRINCIPLED RACISM? 
“Do blacks on welfare really need it?” Social psychologists David Sears and Tom Jessor 
(1996) have used this question to measure “symbolic racism,” what they define as belief 
system that fuses meritocratic ideas defined by individualism and self-reliance with 
stereotypes that blacks are culturally inferior (see also Brandt and Reyna 2012; Kinder 
and Sears 1981; Sears and Kinder 1971). Political scientists Paul Sniderman and Thomas 
Piazza (1993) have interpreted responses to questions like these as having less to do with 
race and more with beliefs of “principled conservatism” (see also Sniderman and 
Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al. 2000). It is as though the two are independent. 
Conservatives who oppose a robust welfare state, for example, claim these programs hurt 
their beneficiaries by fostering pathological behavior and rendering them dependent 
rather than self-sufficient (e.g., D’Souza 1995; Herrnstein and Murray 1994). Adherents 
to the “principled conservatism” thesis argue that such views do not imply anti-blackness.  
They imply that people prefer political values of localism, liberty, and limited 
government. When prejudice does play a role in racial policy debate, Paul Sniderman and 
Edward Carmines (1997) have contended that it only pertains to certain types of policies 
and people (see also Feldman and Huddy 2005). Perceptions of black effort, for example, 
predict support for government spending on blacks, but it carries little explanatory value 
for equal treatment policies (e.g., affirmative action). This inconsistency, they note,
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suggests the role of politics should be privileged in discerning Americans’ stance on 
racial policy. 
Historians like Merrill Jensen (1950), E. James Ferguson (1961), and Richard 
Kohn (1975) have offered complementary narratives. In tracing American political 
development, they claim the Constitution set in motion a weak federal government. The 
reason being, for the most part, the triumph of agrarian influences like the antifederalists 
and Jeffersonian democrats. Other historians like Bernard Bailyn (1967) and Gordon S. 
Wood (1969, 2009) have claimed state structure is a product of a republican ideology that 
prizes liberty and fears government abuses of power above all else.1 Both these camps 
neglect the political context of slavery and how racial views shaped (and were shaped by) 
political institutions. They diminish how slavery was the central institution for a 
developing American political economy and its ensuing state formation (Einhorn 2000, 
2006; Feagin 2000). Like those political scientists who advance the principled 
conservatism thesis, these historians compartmentalize race and politics as though the 
two are not intimately intertwined.  
If the principled conservatism thesis is correct, then views on the role of 
government are more political than racial. Therefore, one could expect such conservative 
values to be consistent with an array of policy issues outside of policies such as welfare 
and affirmative action—like the scope of government. Are racial views partitioned from 
                                                           
1 When debating the morality of the three-fifths clause, in fact, historian Peter Wood (2003) has 
claimed there is nothing inherently wrong about counting slaves toward political representation 
they, themselves, could not partake (see also Apple 2003).  
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views on limited government and political development? Looking to the debates leading 
to the Constitution’s enactment, the answer is no. Views on how government ought to be 
structured cannot be understood without accounting for the racialized context from which 
they were codified into law. Slavemaster politicians and their accommodators deployed 
ideals of localism, liberty, and limited government to bifurcate the structure of 
federalism. This bifurcation robustly protected the peculiar institution on one hand, and 
on the other severely limited its powers for interfering with state sovereignty. Taken 
together, these strategies created a Southern executive rule that rendered the institution of 
slavery as nearly untouchable. 
The Constitution and Southern Executive Rule 
After details of the Constitution were worked out, slavemaster politicians boasted the 
good news to their Southern constituents. They knew the boogeyman of an overreaching 
government weighed heavy on the conscious of America, a nation that stood up to 
tyrannical British rule with the words “no taxation without representation” backed by 
violent action. Edmund Randolph of Virginia eased any hesitation his constituents may 
have had. He claimed the new government posed no threat to their peculiar institution. 
Anticipating that some may worry the 1808 ban on slave trade was too much a political 
sacrifice, he preemptively countered with the following:  
[W]here is the part that has a tendency to the abolition of slavery? Is it the clause 
which says, that ‘the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states 
now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by congress prior 
to the year 1808?’ This is an exception from the power of regulating commerce, 
and the restriction is only to continue till 1808. Then congress can, by the exercise 
of that power, prevent future importations; but does it affect the existing state of 
slavery? Were it right here to mention what passed in convention on the occasion, 
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I might tell you that the southern states, even South-Carolina herself, conceived 
this property to be secure by these words. I believe, whatever we may think here, 
that there was not a member of the Virginia delegation who had the smallest 
suspicion of the abolition of slavery. (FR-III [1788] 1911:334) 
Slavemaster politicians from South Carolina echoed these sentiments to their 
constituents.  
Practically bragging to the South Carolina House of Representatives, Charles C. 
Pinckney offered this statement: 
By this settlement we have secured an unlimited importation of negroes for 
twenty years. Nor is it declared that the importation shall be then stopped; it may 
be continued. We have a security that the general government can never 
emancipate them, for no such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on all hands, 
that the general government has no powers but what are expressly granted by the 
Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several states. 
We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they 
may take refuge, which is a right we had not before. In short, considering all 
circumstances, we have made the best terms for the security of this species of 
property it was in our power to make. We would have made better if we could; 
but, on the whole I do not think them bad. (FR-III [1788] 1911:254-255) 
On the whole, Southerners were pleased with their political achievements. Passage of the 
Constitution represented restrained government capacities in most areas of public life 
except slavery. This is true for representation and taxation as seen through the three-fifths 
clause, but numerous other provisions too. 
 
 
Table 4. The U.S. Constitution and Systemic Protection of Slavery, Articles I-II 
Provision Relevant Legal Text How Slavery was Protected 
Article I, 
Section 2 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several states which may be included within this union, 
according to their respective numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, 
including those bound to service for a term of years, and 
Enumerates slaves as three-
fifths a person for taxes and 
representation, proportions 
tax liability to states by 
population (see also Article 
I, Section 9) 
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excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons.       
Article I, 
Section 8 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for 
the common defense and general welfare of the United 
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States….. 
Erects procedural barriers 
against taxing slavery out of 
existence through uniform 
taxation 
Article I,  
Section 9 
The migration or importation of such persons as any of the 
states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be 
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand 
eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed 
on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each 
person.... No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, 
unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein 
before directed to be taken.... No tax or duty shall be laid on 
articles exported from any state. No preference shall be 
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports 
of one state over those of another: nor shall vessels bound 
to, or from, one state, be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties 
in another.   
Prevents end of slave trade 
until 1808, says nothing of 
the abolishment of slavery; 
Uses the three-fifths 
formula to apportion taxes 
to the states; Exempts slave-
produced products from 
taxes and duties (also see 
Article I, Section 10) 
Article II, 
Section 1 
Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole 
number of Senators and Representatives to which the State 
may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit 
under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. 
Avoids direct vote of the 
presidency, allotting 
electors by number of 
Congresspersons in part 
determined by the three-
fifths clause 
 
 The Constitution contained at least four Articles and eight Sections that directly or 
indirectly defended slavery upon its enactment (see Tables 4 and 5). Provisions within 
these texts range broadly from limited taxation on imports and exports to the design of 
the electoral college to ensured federal assistance for controlling slave insurrections by 
force. Though my emphasis thus far has centered on the three-fifths clause, and its 
corresponding issues of representation and taxation, I contextualize these matters in this 
chapter within the broader constitutional debate. In doing so readers can gain some clarity 
to what extent slavery set a tone for shaping government on the whole. The three-fifths 
clause cuts across these provisions in some cases, as later provisions like Article I, 
Section 9 loop to it to prohibit capitation (per head) taxes without considering the 
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infamous ratio. In other cases, independent protections like a slave trade provision and 
the fugitive slave clause secure legal protection of the peculiar institution. Discussing 
these other parts of the Constitution, the aim is to show how slavemaster politicians and 
their accommodators created a federal government of executive rule where slavery was a 
focal point of its design.  
Table 5. The U.S. Constitution and Systemic Protection of Slavery, Articles IV-V 
Provision Relevant Legal Text How Slavery was Protected 
Article IV, 
Section 2 
A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other 
crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another 
state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the 
state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to 
the state having jurisdiction of the crime. No person held 
to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or 
regulation therein, be discharged from such service or 
labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to 
whom such service or labor may be due. 
Declares executive rule for 
Southern states, demands 




The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
union a republican form of government, and shall protect 
each of them against invasion; and on application of the 
legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot 
be convened) against domestic violence. 
Requires federal 
intervention for domestic 
violence, slave insurrections 
included (see also Article I, 
Section 8) 
Article V The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this 
Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of 
two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for 
proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three 
fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification 
may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no 
amendment which may be made prior to the year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner 
affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the 
first article;… 
Erects “supermajority” 
procedural barriers to 
banning slavery; Temporary 
prohibited any revisions to 
the slave importation and 
direct or capitation tax 
clauses until 1808 
 
 
Article I, Section 8: Tax Uniformity  
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Ideals of tax uniformity, the ones that guided so much of the three-fifths debate, were 
formalized even further under Article, I, Section 8. This provision ensured some forms of 
property were not taxed at higher rates than others, penetrating government much deeper 
than it may appear at first glance. Tax uniformity is not merely a peripheral function. As 
historian Robin Einhorn ([1991] 2001) has clarified, it determined the fundamental 
trajectory of political development. Tax uniformity clauses obstruct the power of future 
legislatures to revise old tax regimes or put in place new ones, particularly those of the 
progressive variety. A congress filled with a majority of slavemaster politicians surely 
would not have to worry about human bondage being taxed out of business, but what 
happens when their representation is in the minority?2 Though often dressed in the 
language of equality and fairness, tax uniformity represents a restraint on democratic rule 
(cf. Fisher 1996; Horwitz 1979). It added a layer of preemptive protection for slave 
interests by locking in place a governing structure that lacked the capacity to tax, 
regardless of how antislavery a legislative body may become.  
Slavemasters insisted the uniformity clause be adopted because they had profound 
anxieties about an all too powerful government that might interfere with private property. 
These anxieties stemmed from a combination of two factors: 1) Northern representatives 
that were hostile to their peculiar institution and 2) a national government empowered to 
                                                           
2 The “uniformity clause” is not strictly a national phenomenon. Its origins are rooted in the 
constitutional formations of slaveholding, Southern states during the late eighteenth century 
(Einhorn 2006). Once these laws were firmly planted, they spread branches across the nation to 
lower levels of government. By 1860, for example, 20 of 33 state constitutions contained a tax 
limitation provision. Of these 20, 15 specifically referred to them as “uniformity clauses.” 
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regulate commerce. Consider the comments of Rufus King of Massachusetts, for 
example. If the purpose of government, he argued, was to protect against foreign interests 
and insurrection from within, then there was no reason why slavemasters not only gained 
extra representation but received tax privileges for the wealth they possessed in slaves. 
According to him and some from the North, slavery made the nation vulnerable on both 
counts. Southerners got all the benefit of slavery without much of its burden. King 
thought this burden was one carried by Northern states. They would be required to make 
up the difference in supplying national defense and the revenues that would pay for it.  
To make things fair, Rufus King suggested the slave trade be subject to taxation: 
If slaves are to be imported, shall not the exports produced by their labor supply a 
revenue the better to enable the general government to defend their masters? 
There was so much inequality and unreasonableness in all this, that the people of 
the Northern States could never be reconciled to it. (ED-V [1787] 1845:391-392) 
King purposefully chose the words “inequality” and “unreasonableness” to make his 
case. The kind of equality and reason that concerned him did not regard the humanity of 
slaves. Rather, the kind he fought for was a fair tax distribution among Northern and 
Southern states—one where slavery was permissible as an American institution so long 
as slavemasters were willing to foot some of its tax bill. King “had hoped that some 
accommodation would have taken place on this subject… either slaves should not be 
represented, or exports should be taxable” (ED-V [1787] 1845:391-392). 
 The points made by Rufus King were exactly the kind that made Southern 
slavemasters fearful. George Mason of Virginia claimed, “we have no security for the 
property of that kind which we already have. There is no clause in the Constitution to 
secure it; for they may lay such a tax as will amount to manumission” (ED-III [1788] 
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1836:452). Mason and others worried a national government that could indirectly 
regulate slavery by laying taxes so heavy on slaves or the fruit of their stolen labor that 
the institution would no longer be profitable. Arguments like these were not exclusively 
Southern. John Williams of New York did not directly advocate slavery, but he indirectly 
supported antifederalist ideas that permitted its continuance.  
John Williams warned against a strong national government with regulatory 
power: 
In short, we can have no conception of any way in which a government can raise 
money from the people, but what is included in one or the other of these general 
terms. Every source of revenue is therefore committed to the hands of the general 
legislature. Not only these terms are very comprehensive, and extend to a vast 
number of objects, but the power to lay and collect has great latitude: it will lead 
to the passing of a vast number of laws, which may affect the personal rights of 
the citizens of the states, and put their lives in jeopardy. It will open a door to the 
apportionment of a swarm of revenue and excise officers, to prey upon the honest 
and industrious part of the community. (ED-II [1788] 1836:330-331) 
Southerners and Northerners alike opposed a centralized government the Constitution 
seemed to be advancing, while deploying a slavery metaphor to frame themselves as 
victims in the process. Some of the most fatal consequences, they thought, would come 
from a coercively redistributive tax state. Abstract notions of local sovereignty, personal 
rights, and free choice would be sacrificed on the altar of what we often refer to today as 
“big government” (see also Bonastia 2012; Lo 1990). 
Article I, Section 9: The 1808 Slave Trade Ban and Strained Taxation 
Some Northern delegates were willing to give slavery a pass, so long as they got 
something in return. The Pinckney cousins and Pierce Butler, all from South Carolina, 
brokered a compromise with Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania and Oliver Ellsworth of 
Connecticut. Terms of their agreement regarded the slave trade and deregulation. As a 
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member of the committee where the terms of this compromise were negotiated, Luther 
Martin of Maryland observed the following: 
I found the Eastern States, notwithstanding their aversion to slavery, were very 
willing to indulge the Southern States at least with a temporary liberty to 
prosecute the slave trade, provided the Southern States would, in their turn gratify 
them, by laying no restriction on navigation acts; and after a very little time, the 
committee, by a great majority, agreed on a report, by which the general 
government was to be prohibited from preventing the importation of slaves for a 
limited time, and the restrictive clause relative to navigation acts was to be 
omitted. (ED-I [1787] 1836:373) 
In exchange for continuing the slave trade for another 20 years, these Southern delegates 
agreed to support a plan that allowed for the federal regulation of commerce and lifted a 
procedural barrier (a two-thirds majority vote in the House and Senate) that undermined 
shipping and coastal-driven economy. These were otherwise known as navigations acts, 
which protected American shipping from foreign competition and granted American 
merchants monopolies over domestic commodities.3  
Charles C. Pinckney preferred a national government without the power to 
regulate commerce, but he sympathized with his Northern colleagues. Their maritime 
interests had suffered much devastation from the War of Independence. Aside from this 
sympathy, they shared “liberal conduct towards the views of South Carolina” (ED-V 
[1787] 1845:489). “Liberal conduct” in this context is codespeak for accommodation 
toward slavery. A quid pro quo was in order. In Pinckney’s mind, he  
thought it proper that no fetters should be imposed on the power of making 
commercial regulations, and that his constituents, though prejudiced against the 
                                                           
3 Not mere coincidence, South Carolina thrived on its shipping industry too. The kind of 
navigation laws their delegates supported were legacies of British rule, ones imposed onto the 




Eastern States, would be reconciled to this liberality. He had himself, he said, 
prejudices against the Eastern States before he came here, but would acknowledge 
that he had found them as liberal and candid as any men whatever. (ED-V [1787] 
1845:489) 
With the assistance of South Carolina, an intersectional alliance was forged to promote 
navigation that primarily benefitted Northern states. Immediately after this vote, Pierce 
Butler introduced the 1808 ban on the slave trade. It passed in the spirit of reciprocity. 
Northern delegates who had previously gone on record opposing it were the ones to tip 
the scales of a majority vote. This is quite the departure from their earlier disagreements.  
When Charles C. Pinckney had previously demanded outright protection of the 
slave trade, Gouverneur Morris made clear his opposition:  
He never would concur in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious 
institution. It was the curse of heaven on the states where it prevailed…. The 
houses in this city (Philadelphia) are worth more than all the wretched slaves who 
cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The admission of slaves into the 
representation, when fairly explained, comes to this,—that the inhabitant of 
Georgia and South Carolina, who goes to the coast of Africa, and, in defiance of 
the most sacred laws of humanity, tears away his fellow-creatures from 
their dearest connections, and damns them to the most cruel bondage, shall have 
more votes, in a government instituted for the protection of the rights of mankind, 
than the citizen of Pennsylvania or New Jersey, who views, with a laudable 
horror, so nefarious a practice. (ED-V [1787] 1845:392-393) 
Aside from words of contempt like “domestic slavery,” “nefarious institution,” “curse of 
heaven,” Morris sympathized with the condition of these “wretched beings” (ED-V 
[1787] 1845:392). He indicted delegates from Georgia and South Carolina, placing blame 
on them for crimes against humanity and political roadblocks to national unity.  
 Gouverneur Morris could never join a union that endorsed the slave trade and 
counted slaves toward representation. These factors undercut his own political interests, 
as well as Northern states that did not practice slavery. From his view: 
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[he] was compelled to declare himself reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice 
to the Southern States, or to human nature, and he must therefore do it to the 
former; for he could never agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade as 
would be given by allowing them a representation for their negroes; and he did 
not believe those states would ever confederate on terms that would deprive them 
of that trade. (ED-V [1787] 1845:301) 
These attacks on slavery were among the harshest throughout the Constitutional 
Convention, but they should not be interpreted uncritically. Morris never called for 
emancipation, nor did he point to concrete solutions that might accomplish such ends.  
There are at least two reasons to believe that Gouverneur Morris’ criticisms were 
more rhetorical than real. As historian Donald Robinson (1971) notes, there were about 
700,000 slaves in America worth $140 million at the time of the proposal. Annual federal 
expenditures for the first ten years of the republic equated to about $7 million. Morris’ 
plan would have, therefore, doubled the tax burden on all Americans for no less than 10 
years for emancipated compensation, and a whole other generation (or more) to 
restructure a war-torn economy foundationally structured upon slavery. And these tasks 
do not begin to address other social and political obstacles to be hurdled.  
 A second reason not to take Gouverneur Morris serious regards his not-so-subtle 
hints at his willingness to strike a deal. Laying out his attack on slavery, for example, 
Morris revealed his hand by asking the Southern delegates what was in it for him. The 
exact words were: “And what is the proposed compensation to the Northern States, for a 
sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity?” (ED-V [1787] 
1845:393). Morris was more interested in compensation than emancipation. He desired 
concessions that would benefit certain sectors of the Northern economy. Among these 
were fixing the rule of representation to secure “the Atlantic states a prevalence in the 
137 
 
national councils” (ED-V [1787] 1845:279). Morris was not interested in proportional 
rule according to population. He was interested in the representation of property, 
unattached to population counts. Otherwise, there lingered possibilities for an 
“oppression in commerce” (ED-V [1787] 1845:308). 
In a country dominated by slavemasters and farmers, not to mention the westward 
expansion that would develop economies different from Pennsylvania, Gouverneur 
Morris wanted to ensure maritime and shipping interests were protected.4 He followed an 
economic philosophy of “a rising tide lifts all boats,” so long as elite businessmen from 
coastal cities captained those boats. Morris was the same politician who had earlier 
blamed delegates from select Southern states for slavery’s persistence. When his 
commercial interests converged with South Carolina, however, he compromised his 
stance toward emancipation and joined a political coalition with them to preserve the 
peculiar institution (see Bell 1980). James Madison of Virginia thought the coalition, 
which temporarily drove a wedge between Southern states,5 to be all too convenient for 
“a member who on all occasions, had inculcated so strongly the political depravity of 
men” (ED-V [1787] 1845:298). He accused Morris of selling out his values for the sake 
                                                           
4 So too did his New England colleague Roger Sherman of Connecticut. Forming the compromise 
with Gouverneur Morris and South Carolinian slavemasters, he “said it was better to let the S. 
States import slaves than to part with them, if they made that sine qua non” (FR-II [1787] 
1911:374). 
5 The wedge among Southern delegates regarded divisions over whether representation should be 
based on population or property. Southern states where slaves were abundant (Virginia) favored 
the former, while Southern states whose wealth was located more in developed real estate (South 
Carolina) preferred the latter. The population plan would eventually smooth over these 
differences, it was more explicit in its defense of slavery.   
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of profit, and rhetorically asked, “If the representatives of the people would be bound to 
the ties [Morris] had mentioned, what need was there of a Senate?” (ED-V [1787] 
1845:298). 
Tax Limitations and Exemptions  
With the compromise over navigations, Virginians like George Mason and Richard 
Henry Lee, as well as some Northern delegates like Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts, worried Congress would be given too much power. Such a play 
emboldened the legislative body to regulate commerce (see also “the commerce clause,” 
Article I, Section 8), and by extension any trade that involves slaves or slave labor 
products. Charles C. Pinckney tried to ease such concerns by saying that was not the 
case:  
it was an agreed point, a solemnly understood compact, that, on the Southern 
States consenting to shut their ports against the importation of Africans, no power 
was to be delegated to Congress, nor were they ever to be authorized to touch the 
question of slavery; that the property of the Southern States in slaves was to be as 
sacredly preserved, and protected to them, as that of land, or any other kind of 
property in the Eastern States were to be to their citizens. (FR-III [1787] 
1911:443) 
Pinckney reminded his Southern brethren that Northern representatives never suggested 
slaves be emancipated, and in all likelihood never would. Such a proposal would 
undoubtedly threaten any possibility of ratification. His argument did not resonate with 
delegates like Pierce Butler and John Rutledge of South Carolina and Patrick Henry of 
Virginia. They worried not of what the Constitution expressed but what it implied.  
 The resolution John Rutledge and Patrick Henry desired was “an exact 
enumeration of the powers comprehended” (ED-V [1787] 1845:139). Meanwhile Pierce 
Butler “repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme, in taking away the 
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powers of the states” (ED-V [1787] 1845:139). Henry thought the Constitution, as 
drafted, granted near infinite power to the federal government—nearly all of which could 
be directed to end slavery. “Among ten thousand implied powers which they may 
assume,” he argued, “they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one of your 
slaves if they please” (ED-III [1788] 1836:589). Those pushing the cause of federalism 
thought these concerns were blown out of proportion.  
James Madison urged his Southern colleagues to reconsider. Any threat to slavery 
would surely end the union before it began, but he argued so would alternatives such as 
the one proposed by John Rutledge and Patrick Henry. Madison “brought doubts 
concerning its practicability” (ED-V [1787] 1845:139). With as much trouble as 
delegates had in agreeing upon the necessarily sketchy details of the Constitution (not to 
mention a previous constitution that failed), the task of explicitly expressing all powers of 
the federal government would almost certainly translate into death by deliberation. Henry 
held to his convictions and refused to sign the Constitution to the very end. He was not 
alone. Others like George Mason, Luther Martin, and Richard Henry Lee withheld their 
signatures too. What eventually came out of protests like these, however, were added 
layers of protection for Southerners and their peculiar institution.  
Aside from the 1808 ban on slave trade clause, Article I, Section 9 linked 
capitation or direct taxes to the three-fifths clause.6 It required that if any head taxes were 
                                                           
6 The direct taxation clause remains of contemporary relevance. Legal scholar Beverly Moran 
(2010) had proposed that to fulfill philosopher Adam Smith’s ([1776] 2007) vision of capitalism, 
some form of a wealth tax ought to be put in place. The purpose of this tax would be less about 
downwardly distributing capital, however, and more about stabilizing the economic system as 
well as protecting the rich from “poor people’s movements” (see also Piven and Cloward 1971). 
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to be levied, they must rate slaves at 60 percent the rate of freepersons. This effectively 
offered slavemasters a subsidy of foregone revenue on 40 percent of their wealth in 
human bondage (Einhorn 2006). Of course, slavemaster politicians did not frame the tax 
break as such. John Rutledge claimed: 
In the Northern States the labor is performed by white people, in the Southern by 
black. All the free people (and there are a few others) in the Northern States are to 
be taxed by the new Constitution; whereas only the free people, and two fifths of 
the slaves, in the Southern States, are to be rated, in the apportioning of taxes. 
(ED-IV [1787] 1836:277) 
From Rutledge’s point of view, linking a head tax to the three-fifths clause still meant 
slavemasters were subjected to taxes those in the North were not. Nonetheless, paying 60 
percent of a tax bill as opposed to 100 percent offered some relief.  
Not only were slavemaster politicians like John Rutledge concerned about direct 
taxes that could be imposed on slaves, but they were troubled by the possibility of 
indirect taxes from Northern politicians who may be vindictive toward their interests in 
slavery. Rutledge went on to clarify his problem with the navigation acts:  
But the principle objection is, that no duties are laid on shipping; that, in fact, the 
carrying trade was to be vested in great measure, in the Americans; that the ship-
building business was principally carried on in the Northern States. (ED-IV 
[1787] 1836:277) 
As discussed, slavemaster delegates were paranoid that indirect taxes might be 
exclusively imposed on products and goods—like tobacco, rice, sugar, indigo, and later 
                                                           
An obstacle that could prevent such a tax is Article I, Section 9. As legal scholar Andre Smith 
(2015) has explained, antitax advocates routinely cite this provision to claim the constitution 
prohibits federal taxation on most forms of wealth. This includes a progressive wealth tax that 
might otherwise alleviate the worst racial wealth disparities on record, particularly following the 
housing collapse of the mid-2000s (see Kochhar, Fry, and Taylor 2011).  
141 
 
cotton—made possibly by slave labor. A tax structure that generates, they argued, its 
revenues from taxes on imports and exports migrates tax responsibilities southward. 
Charles Pinckney (second cousin of Charles C. Pinckney) complained:  
If, as no doubt, you will in future confine your imports to the amount of your 
exports of native products, and all your revenue is to be … raised by taxes or 
duties on your imports, I ask you who pays the expense, and who, in fact, enables 
you to go on with your Government at all, and prevents its wheels from stopping? 
I will show you by the papers which I hold in my hand. This, sir, is your Secretary 
of the Treasury’s report, made a few weeks ago, by which it appears that all the 
exports of native products, from Maine to Pennsylvania, inclusive, for the last 
year, amounted to only about eighteen millions of dollars; while those among the 
slaveholding States, to the Southward of Pennsylvania, amounted to thirty-two 
millions or thereabouts, thereby enabling themselves, or acquiring the right, to 
import double as much as the others, and furnishing the Treasury with double the 
amount the Northern and Eastern States do. (FR-III [1787] 1911:442) 
Southerners like Rutledge and Pinckney claimed they would be payers of import and 
export taxes but not the benefactors of them. They found it untenable to structure a 
government so that slavemasters subsidized the spoils of Northern industry.  
George Mason claimed he opposed slavery, but allowing the federal government 
to regulate commerce would be worse. He thought such actions inevitably led to a 
“domino effect,” whereby tyranny would triumph over liberty. He and other Southerners 
worried customs officials could levy charges so high that their economies would be 
rendered unprofitable. It would indirectly steer agrarian-based states toward producing 
alternative staple goods (Alden 1961; Jensen 1950). Navigations acts were an affront to 
slavery. On this basis, slavemaster politicians moved to exempt certain imports and 
exports (Southern staples) from taxation altogether. This accomplished the same feat as 
the uniformity clause. The exemptions tied the hands of legislatures who might otherwise 
jeopardize slavery. Policymakers had a limited range of tax options at their disposal. It 
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was the Southern way of truncating America’s political institutions from their very 
inception, one that left a lasting legacy of de facto government nonintervention (Einhorn 
2009). Once in place, tax laws like these impeded political struggles against slavery and 
guaranteed its preservation.  
Article II, Section 1: The Electoral College, an Ace in the Hole 
Why bother with a popular vote when you can have an ace in the hole? That was the logic 
of slavemaster politicians when it came to electing a president. To increase the odds of 
their man winning, they wanted some assurance. Article II, Section 1 put in place an 
electoral college, the same institution that determines presidential elections today. James 
Madison principally agreed with the popular vote. “The people generally could only 
know and vote for some citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of general 
attention and esteem,” he declared (ED-V [1787] 1845:337). His support did not go 
unqualified, however.  
There was one difficulty, however, of a serious nature attending an immediate 
choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the 
Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the 
election, on the score of negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this 
difficulty, and seemed, on the whole, to be liable to fewest objections. (ED-V 
[1787] 1845:337) 
In other words, Madison was troubled by the possibility that more populous states in the 
South would be disenfranchised by the masses of ineligible voters (slaves) and have to 
defer their political interests to the North. Therefore, a direct vote for the executive 
branch was to be avoided at all costs. The alternative Southerners devised was to 
apportion electors by the number of Congresspersons for each state, which in turn was 
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determined by the three-fifths clause. This is how Thomas Jefferson of Virginia would 
become known as the “Negro President” (Wills 2003).  
 “Slave enumeration without representation” made the presidency of Thomas 
Jefferson possible. Though the “Negro President” heralded the victory as democracy’s 
triumph of majority rule, he actually received fewer votes than his opponent John Adams 
(Wills 2003).7 That mattered none with an electoral college that translated the slave count 
into Southern political clout. Jefferson received eight more delegates than Adams, but at 
least 12 of his total count derived from a population unrecognized as people and 
dispossessed from the franchise (Freehling 1990). The electoral college ensured, with 
help from the three-fifths clause, a minority of Southerners held a majority voting bloc 
that would steer the course of American history (Richards 2000). Of the nation’s first 62 
years, slavemasters would dominate the presidency for 50 years, the House Speaker’s 
chair for 41 years, and Chair of the House Committee on Ways and Means8 for 42 years. 
The exclusive list of re-elected presidents—George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, James Monroe, and Andrew Jackson—included only the names of those 
who held others in human bondage. In many ways, the electoral college made possible 
                                                           
7 Aaron Burr of New York tied Thomas Jefferson of Virginia for the most electoral votes (Ferling 
2004). Both were of the same party, but Jefferson had the support of the House of Representatives 
and public opinion. He extended the position of vice president to Burr, who accepted and then 
withdrew from the race.  
8 In many ways, the House Committee on Ways and Means is the most powerful committee in 
Congress. This is as true today as it was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Why? As sociologists Isaac Martin and Monica Prasad (2014) have explained, state capacity in its 
entirety runs through taxation (see also Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009). The Committee on 
Ways and Means is delegated most power for revenue-raising within the legislative branch. 
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what can be characterized as a slavemaster oligarchy, or what historian Leonard Richards 
(2000) calls a “slaveocracy” (p. 3). 
 Southern political domination was not quarantined to the executive branch 
(Baptist 2014). With a complicit Senate, Southern presidents composed a Supreme Court 
that favored slavery. No less than 18 of the first 31 Justices owned slaves. As much is 
evident from some of the infamous decisions that were rendered, like Dred Scott v. 
Sandford (1857). A majority rule of seven justices declared, in no uncertain terms, that 
black residents—free and unfree—were not citizens, and the federal government 
possessed no power to regulate the expansion of slavery in new U.S. territories (see also 
Jung 2015). As sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois ([1935] 1992) recalled, “The whole legal 
status of slavery was enunciated in the extraordinary statement of a Chief Justice of the 
United States that Negroes had always been regarded in America ‘as having no rights 
which a white man was bound to respect’” (p. 10). 
 These rights were bound to be further disrespected under a political system that 
rewarded slavery’s expansion. Since population directly determined influence over the 
electoral college and congressional representation, and the slave trade was unlimited until 
1808, Southerners were incentivized to import more African bodies. Figures recorded by 
the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (see Figure 3) indicate more than a 15-fold 
increase between 1787 and 1807, from 2,406 imported slaves to 36,217. Even when the 
ban ended the international slave trade, the Constitution said nothing of the domestic 
slave trade. It went on undeterred under what historian Ira Berlin (1998) has called the 
“Second Middle Passage,” forcibly breaking up families and relocating slaves from 
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everything they knew in the process (see also Kolchin [1993] 2003). When slaves 
decided to marry, most through custom not law, the wedding vows they took were 
amended to read “’til death or distance do us part” (see Foster 2010). Full bloom of the 
cotton economy during the early nineteenth century exacerbated these trends. The more 
elite Southern men partook in human bondage, the more power they wielded.  
Figure 3. Estimated Arrivals to the U.S. through the Slave Trade, 1787-1817 
 
Source: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (accessed March 22, 2016) 
Article IV, Section 2: The Fugitive Slave Clause 
When debating what became the “privileges and immunities” or “comity” clause (Article 
IV, Section 2), which reads “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States,” Pierce Butler and Charles C. Pinckney 
fretted over the possibility that slavery would not be respected by those in states where 
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slavemasters “strayed” to free spaces? Do property rights upheld in some states supersede 
rights upheld in others? Would claims to ownership be jeopardized? What entity would 
mediate these processes? Like other Southerners, Pinckney desired some guarantee that 
slavery would be protected. That way those states without slavery could not undermine 
what some Southerners like Patrick Henry believed to be their birthright. The fugitive 
slave clause compelled extradition of fugitive slaves (as well as free black persons who 
had no recourse). In the words of Butler and Pinckney, it “require[d] fugitive slaves and 
servants to be delivered up like criminals” (ED-V [1787] 1845:487). It meant that if a 
person were reduced to human bondage in one state, then that status would have to be 
recognized in all other states.  
Northern delegates like James Wilson of Pennsylvania and Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut opposed a fugitive slave clause. Such a provision, they claimed, placed an 
unfair financial burden on those north of the Mason-Dixon Line. Wilson complained, 
“This would oblige the executive of the state to do it at the public expense” (ED-V [1787] 
1845:487). Northerners would foot the bill for monitoring, housing, and returning 
suspected runaways, and they pointed out that no comparable type of law existed to 
protect runaway livestock. Sherman would go on to say that he “saw no more propriety in 
the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant than a horse” (ED-V [1787] 
1845:487). Never mind that the clause put black freepersons at risk. Northern 
representatives like Wilson and Sherman were more concerned with their horses.  
The fugitive slave clause made black freepersons of the North vulnerable to 
property claims from those interested in turning them into slaves. As historian Donald 
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Robinson (1971) explains: “the difference between free Negroes and horses was that the 
owners of horses in the North would counteract horse thieves from outside the state, 
whereas free Negroes might not have anyone interested in preventing them from being 
dragged into slavery” (p. 229). Adding to this vulnerability were state governments of the 
North that had little interest in protecting the rights and freedoms of black freepersons. 
Nor was there any penalty for those who stole black freepersons and reduced them to 
bondage. Another implicit appeal of the fugitive slave clause, one that helped garner 
Northern support, was that it discouraged slaves from migrating northward and free black 
people from living in their communities. In many ways, Northern representatives were 
just as reluctant to welcome black residents into their states as Southern slavemasters 
were to lose their property.  
Article IV, Section 4: Slave Revolt Suppression 
The domestic violence provision, otherwise known as Article IV, Section 4, commits the 
federal government to offer military support in keeping the peace among states (see also 
Finkelman 1996). Largely because of language, the provision had little support when first 
introduced. Its wording empowered the national government to intervene in cases of 
“domestic violence,” but delegates were hesitant to empower the national government. 
They were uneasy about the possibility of overreaching state sovereignty and impeding 
upon domestic affairs (see FR-II [1787] 1911:466-467). Once the language was revised 
from “domestic violence” to “insurrections,” the subtext of slavery was unmistakable. 
Even proslavery supporters who had long stressed localism embraced the provision. So 
long as it meant that slave revolts would be crushed with military might, they welcomed 
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the federal government’s muscle of force with open arms. Writing Federalist Paper No. 
43, James Madison ([1788] 1999) acknowledged the provision made “true that force and 
right are necessarily on the same side in republican [government]” (p. 273).  
  James Madison put into words the anxieties that were on many Southerners’ 
minds. He went on to write:  
an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who during the 
calm of regular government are sunk below the level of men; but who in the 
tempestuous scenes of civil violence may emerge into the human character, and 
give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate 
themselves. (Madison [1788] 1999:273) 
The looming threat of insurrections caused slavemasters to lose sleep at night, 
particularly those in communities within states like Maryland and Virginia where slaves 
outnumbered them. They anguished over the idea that slaves would rise and demand their 
rightful title of person not property. Madison warned such events would put an end to the 
nation. With laws like the domestic violence provision, he claimed “it is a sufficient 
recommendation of the federal Constitution that it diminishes the risk of calamity for 
which no possible constitution can provide a cure” (p. 274). Madison would rather squash 
slave resistance and protect the institution than overturn the so-called republican 
government that he and others had built. Perhaps the irony was lost on them. Many of 
these elite men had just partaken in a revolution whereby they claimed King George III 
had made slaves out of Americans. Now these statesmen worried slaves would allege the 
same complaints against them. 
Article V: “Supermajority” Requirements and Temporary Amendment Blocks 
By requiring “supermajorities” to amend the Constitution, the framers deepened their 
design of a foolproof legal document that was resistant to change. Southerners demanded 
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the provision be put in place out of concern for Northern encroachment. Virginians like 
George Mason and John Tyler as well as North Carolinians thought the national 
government, once in the hands of maritime interests, would silence their concerns and let 
them fall on deaf ears. They worried slavery would be threatened. Article V was one 
means to ease these concerns. It required that amendments follow one of two procedures. 
Either two-thirds of both the House and Senate can approve of an amendment or a three-
fourths majority of all states. To give some perspective as to how effective this provision 
became, consider how rare amendments are throughout American history. Aside from the 
Bill of Rights, and the three amendments after the Civil War (the 13th, 14th, and 15th 
Amendments), the Constitution has been amended only 14 times during its 200+ year 
existence. These supermajority procedural requirements gave slavery near immunity and 
ensured its endurance.  
Elsewhere within Article V were provisions that adding temporary blockage to 
amendments on the slave trade ban and capitation clauses. These only further protected 
the already secure institution of slavery. They were added near the closing days of the 
Convention at the insistence of John Rutledge of South Carolina. Saying these 
amendment procedures did not go far enough, “he never could agree to give a power by 
which the articles relating to slaves might be altered by the states not interested in that 
property, and prejudiced against it” (ED-V [1787] 1845:532). To alleviate his concerns, 
he suggested the following words be added: “provided that no amendment, which may be 
made prior to the year 1808, shall in any direct manner affect the fourth and fifth sections 
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of the seventh article” (ED-V [1787] 1845:532). He got his way. Really, most all 
slavemasters got their way. 
Accommodators Gave an Inch, Slavemasters Took a Mile 
“If slavery be thus fatally contagious,” asked writer Samuel Johnson (1775) of England, 
“how is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?” (p. 
89). Northern politicians did not pathologize Southerners as racist conspirators of slavery. 
If they had, perhaps their representatives would not have entertained one nation under the 
same roof. Instead, they chose to engage their sectional counterparts and partake in give-
in-take deliberation—at least they thought it would unravel that way. The problem was 
that Southerners did more taking than giving, and they sculpted a government in their 
own slaveowning image. The North offered a gamut of concessions. Not only did 
Southern slavemasters gain extra congressional representation for their slaves, but they 
also designed an electoral college for selecting presidents that tilted in their favor. The 
slave trade was protected for the first 20 years. Slave-produced products were exempted 
from taxes and duties. Federal aid would be made available for suppressing slave revolts. 
Supermajority requirements ensured the status quo of slavery remained intact. 
Preemptive exemptions were made so that slavery could not be regulated out of 
existence. In return, the North gained a few perks that served their commercial interests. 
These were few in comparison, despite Southern claims otherwise. When Northern 
representatives requested more, or even hinted at requests that might question slavery, the 
South threatened to walk away from the union.  
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 Those who claim today’s seemingly nonracial expressions of localism, liberty, 
and limited government are not racism so much as they are political conservatism would 
do well to scrutinize their claims under the microscope of history (e.g., Sniderman and 
Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman et al. 2000). Formation of the 
Constitution was less about disputes over political principle and more about designing an 
expansive federal when it came to protecting slavery (cf. Bailyn 1967; Jensen 1950; 
Ferguson 1961; Kohn 1975; Wood 1969, 2009). These contests were more a difference of 
degree than anything. Those delegates who opposed the peculiar institution did not do so 
on fundamental grounds. Instead, voices of dissent emerged when slavery did not align 
with their own economic interests (navigation acts, slave trade ban), political philosophy 
(blacks do not merit representation), and nationalist tendencies (country first). These 
forms of opposition do not directly contest the institution of slavery, which suggests that 
delegates generally lacked a consensus on how to think about it. Therefore, debates over 
the Constitution were more about defining the parameters of racial interests embedded 
within the institution of slavery.  
In the name of localism, liberty, and limited government, slavemaster politicians 
and their accommodators designed a government that was of at least two minds. Its 
power was bifurcated in opposing directions, both of which served the economic interests 
of slavery. The Constitution codified into law a limited government that protected private 
property on one hand. Even if policymakers had the desire to bring about a racial 
democracy, which most did not, their national government was too emasculated with 
safeguards that stripped away any possibility of fulfilling it. On the other hand, these 
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statesmen created an expansive government that could intervene whenever slavery was 
under assault. Deeming slavery a local matter is to say the institution is beyond the 
jurisdiction of national government. Yet when slavemaster politicians demanded this 
local matter be respected by other localities, among the only ways to ensure slavery’s 
protection was to make it the jurisdiction of national government. They demanded 
protectionist rights for slavery that not only disrespected but superseded the sovereignty 
of all other states. What seems like a paradox between “weak” and “strong” government, 
or local and national interests, can be seen in another light when one considers racial 
ideology. There was no paradox, just foolproof protections for the interests of white 
supremacy.  
This point was as true in the late eighteenth century as it would in 1860 when 
South Carolina seceded from the union. States from Maine to Iowa had enacted 
antislavery laws that nullified federal doctrine and even protected the franchise of some 
African Americans. Though it is commonly assumed by members of the general public 
(see Loewen and Sebasta 2010) as well as some academics (e.g., McDonald 2000) that 
South Carolina departed because of “states’ rights,” these views are more political than 
they are accurate. The first reason South Carolinians gave for their departure was:   
We assert that fourteen of the States have deliberately refused, for years past, to 
fulfill their constitutional obligations, and we refer to their own statutes for proof.9  
These fourteen states refused to uphold constitutional provisions like the fugitive slave 
clause, and therefore did not accommodate America’s sacred institution (see also Baptist 
                                                           
9 This passage derived from the secession document entitled the “Declaration of the Immediate 
Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.” 
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2014; Loewen and Sebesta 2010). Sociologist James Loewen (2010) has argued that 
“South Carolina was not for states’ rights, but against them…. South Carolina seceded 
because it was against states’ rights, that it was outraged at states’ rights” (p. 5, emphasis 
original).  
If we define democracy as government “of the people, by the people, for the 
people,” then the Constitution fails on all counts. The Constitution’s slavery-protecting 
provisions hardly make it of the democratic variety, and its expansiveness violates 
political values of conservatism. Seeds from which the American political views of 
localism, liberty, and limited government blossomed are planted in the same racism that 
justified slavery. They did not germinate out of their volition, independent of the peculiar 
institution. Therefore, they cannot be understood outside of its context. Founding fathers 
who popularized these values are the same individuals who used them as tools to defend 
holding others in human bondage. For them, these values were interpreted foremost as 
the unfettered right to slavery. That is why we ought to reconsider labels like “lion of 
liberty” that historian Harlow Unger (2010) has applied to figures like Patrick Henry. 
After all, the same man who gave America those famous words of “give me liberty, or 
give me death” opposed the Constitution because it interfered with personal freedoms and 





WHEN THE PRESENT BECOMES PAST 
How does racism operate across history? Does a classical/modern dichotomy accurately 
describe ideological change? If not, what other queries might we pursue? I do not pretend 
to have fully answered these questions, but introduce them as problematic beginnings for 
more work to come. They wrestle with ways present-day racism is commonly contrasted 
with the past. Rather than advance an argument that racial ideology is invariable across 
time, the point I wish to stress is that racism is too complicated to distil down to grand 
narratives of a classical-modern dichotomy. By transplanting insights about today’s 
racism into historical soil where some presume they do not belong, my goal has been to 
show why sociologists need to reflexively question our conventional narratives, apply 
theoretical concepts to varied contexts, and refine them as new empirical insights are 
accumulated. The point is to draw attention to the fundamental character(s) of racial 
ideology, so that sociologists can offer more compelling empirical statements that capture 
the fluidly varied dynamics of racism. How does one get there from here? 
 I think a starting point for understanding racism in all its content and form begins 
with forsaking tendencies toward generalization. This focus represents a shift away from 
broad causal theories that seek to explain what governs change in racism and moves 
toward more in-depth descriptions of the basic qualities of racial ideology (see also 
Doane 2006). The conclusions I advance are akin to what sociologist Harold Blumer
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(1954) described as “sensitizing concepts.” They do not stand upon definitive or 
invariable propositions, but offer “a general sense of reference and guidance in 
approaching empirical instances…. merely suggest[ing] directions along which to look” 
(Blumer 1954:7). Sensitizing concepts can bring into focus salient characteristics of racial 
ideology, and offer guidelines for how it might be studied in other settings.1 The idea is to 
introduce substantive points that might amend broader frameworks for how those in the 
social sciences and humanities understand racism.  
The prevailing classical/modern dichotomy introduces at least three major 
problems that I have identified by looking inward at the debate surrounding the three-
fifths clause. A first problem regards the presumption that change in the material 
underpinning of racism foreshadows its change in content and form (Bobo, Kluegel, and 
Smith 1997). A second problem involves thinking about racism in terms of central 
tendency, as though those who subscribe to it share a common sense understanding 
(Feagin 2010; Omi and Winant [1986] 1994). And a third problem treats racism of past 
and present like they were ruptured from one another and discretely separated by time 
(Barker 1982; McConahay 1986; Omi and Winant [1986] 1994). In what follows, I 
present alternative interpretation to each of these points. The ideas I introduce, when 
isolated, are not necessarily novel nor are they controversial. Taken together, however, 
                                                           
1 I do not see sensitizing concepts in the same light as others in the symbolic interaction tradition. 
Sociologist Kathy Charmaz (2003) has referred to them, for example, as “background ideas” that 
“provide starting points for building analysis, not ending points for evading it” (p. 259). Because 
my inquiry serves as a critical conscious of sorts for the sociology of racism, I see sensitizing 
concepts as a provisional end point that departs from established theory. 
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my hope is that they hang together in a usefully cohesive way—a way that bridges gaps 
between our empirical and theoretical studies within the sociology of race and racism. 
Racism as Autonomous Not Reflective 
Is racism a reflection of other social forces? Sociologists Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, 
and Ryan Smith (1997) have claimed that Jim Crow ideology lost its mass appeal because 
the foundational political economy crumbled beneath it. No longer did whites need a 
belief system bound to biological views of black inferiority and a formal apartheid 
society (see also Bonilla-Silva 2001; Bonilla-Silva and Lewis 1999).2 The examples they 
use to elaborate their thesis regard shifts like: (1) the demographic and economic 
transitions (e.g., industrialization, “the Great Migration,” collapse of the cotton economy) 
that expanded black power, (2) the mobilization of newly acquired resources within black 
communities by civil rights leadership for political and economic gain, and (3) black 
economic empowerment that inhibited critical political victories over the old planter 
aristocracy which would inevitably lead to their demise.  
In the supposedly post-racial world, Lawrence Bobo and his colleagues (1997) 
have maintained that whites defend their social position on new ground. They concede 
basic rights of citizenship to people of color but view discrimination, past or present, as 
                                                           
2 To be fair, Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, and Ryan Smith (1997) qualified their historical 
claim: “We do not advance a purely materialistic interpretation that would, perforce, render 
popular racial attitudes of little social impact. Such theorizing at once misunderstands the role of 
human agency and subjectivity and the highly contingent nature of the critical events and actions 
that helped to bring about the shift from Jim Crow racism to laissez-faire racism” (p. 31). This 
point becomes diminished, however, when most all the examples used to substantiate their point 
emphasize changes in the political economy. 
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playing little to no role in persisting disparities in housing, education, employment, and 
so on. Instead, these inequalities are viewed not as products of market- or state-driven 
practices organized around race but as a result of cultural inadequacies held by people of 
color themselves (see also Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014; Brown et al. 2003; Crenshaw 1997; 
Gallagher 2003). 
 Presuming ideological change follows change in the political economy gives 
epistemic privilege to one over the other and can contradict the notion that racism 
“acquires relative autonomy in the social system” (Bonilla-Silva 1997:474; see also 
Bonilla-Silva 2015).3 This fails to explain how remarkably different structures, rooted in 
fundamentally unique political economies, can be rationalized by common ideological 
currents. Within debate surrounding the three-fifths clause, “founding fathers” from the 
North and South did not extend the same basic rights of citizenship to slaves as they did 
freepersons, but they deployed seemingly antislavery discourse (“I’m principled against 
slavery, but…”) and decontextualized notions of abstract liberalism (“tax uniformity,” 
“representational equality”) to defend a rigid racial hierarchy. Even many of the same 
racial stereotypes overheard today about blacks being lazy and unproductive were tapped 
during the late 1700s to justify why slavemasters deserved relief from a tax plan that 
would be based on population counts.  
                                                           
3 The idea that racism, once developed, has the capacity to acquire independence and live a life of 




The vocabulary of colorblindness may be similar, but contexts in which it was 
deployed is dissimilar. Not to understate the broad historical brushstrokes of racial 
change, there are fundamentally different relations between slave and employee. As 
sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois ([1935] 1992) explained, the employee is “not real estate. 
The tragedy of the black slave’s position was precisely this; his absolute subjection to the 
individual will of an owner” (p. 10). At the same time, it is important to recognize that 
common comments overheard today, like “I’m not racist, but…” (see Bonilla-Silva and 
Forman 2000), have deep-seeded antecedents that whites have put to use for centuries. 
Even slavemasters worried about establishing their non-racist credentials, and they 
desired to “save face” when it came to the moral politics of slavery. The endurance of 
colorblindness alongside antiblack cultural tropes during debates of the three-fifths clause 
implies that what we often think of as contemporary racism was not created out of whole 
cloth in post-1960s America. Instead, the ways that racial ideology is deployed can 
possess a historically dualistic character.  
Racism often interacts with other social forces, from an agrarian to postindustrial 
political economy, to justify a racial hierarchy. It can also stand outside of them, 
possessing a certain degree of independence from external forces. Turning the gaze back 
onto localized actors who have the agency to enact ideology, racism’s autonomy derives 
from people’s empowerment to develop, transmit, and control it (Lewis 2004). These 
autonomous features expand when people have the capacity to reinterpret and translate 
racism to new circumstances, like political economies that transition from one mode of 
production to another. As historian Barbara Fields (1982) has explained, the racist 
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vocabularies people inherit do not wither away and die even when their lives undergo 
radical change. Instead, these same vocabularies can be attached, often in tacitly routine 
ways, to new circumstances (Jung 2015). Seen this way, people implement racial 
ideology by means that constitute its own embodied structure (see also Bourdieu [1979] 
1984:468).  
When I say racial ideology takes on a life of its own, I do not mean it in a 
“Frankenstein” sense (see Fields 1982). To spell out the analogy, it is not as though 
racism is something that dies only to come alive again to lead a reckless life of a monster. 
This reifies racial meaning as though it has its own hereditary (see also Fields 1990). 
Racism takes a life of its own in a sense that it cannot be attributed to other social forces 
(e.g., change in the political economy). It is a running definition that is achieved through 
routinized activity, not through, to use the language of social theorist Louis Althusser 
([1968] 1971), interpellating individuals into racial subjects through some preformed, 
atemporal, and logical model. Racial actors do not preserve racism in some 
overdetermined fashion, but because it serves some practical purpose in their lives (Hall 
1984). People (re)create racism because it helps them to make sense of the world in 
which they live or want to live, even as their sense of the world is not totalizing or 
complete. That is, the reproduction of racism flows not from abstract rules that govern 
their action but from practical strategies in which actors strive to maintain or advance 





Racism as Internally Differentiated Not Dominant  
Is racism in a hegemonic moment? First, let me clarify what is meant by the term. Social 
theorist Antonio Gramsci ([1946] 1971) explained that hegemony refers an instant when 
a dominant group’s ideology transcends its limits and “become[s] the interests of other 
subordinate groups too… to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself through 
society” (p. 181).4 Seen through the eyes of sociologist Joe Feagin (2010), hegemony has 
long been achieved through what he labels as “the white racial frame.” This refers to a 
system of signifying that justifies discrimination against people of color. He claims:  
For centuries the white racial framing of ingroup superiority and outgroup 
inferiority has been, to use Antonio Gramsci’s term, hegemonic in this society—
that is, it has been part of a distinctive way of life that dominates all aspects of 
society. (Feagin 2010:11, emphasis original) 
Sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994) draw from Gramsci to offer 
a similar claim. They have argued, “Race becomes ‘common sense’—a way of 
comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world,” and that this common sense is 
needed so that ruling groups can “consolidate their hegemony” (Omi and Winant [1986] 
1994:60, 67).5  
                                                           
4 For sake of historicizing the influences of social theorist Antonio Gramsci ([1946] 1971), it is 
worth noting that he credited social theorist V.I. Lenin with “the concept and the fact of 
hegemony” (p. 381). These moments of hegemony are desirable, at least to those who stand atop 
hierarchies, because subjugation is more effective when the ruled rule themselves and coercion is 
avoided (Gramsci [1946] 1971). 
5 Sociologist James Thomas (2014) has identified the notion of “racial common sense” as a 
conceptual breach. Sociologist Michael Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994) have claimed 
their theory of racial formation represents “the sociohistorical process by which racial categories 
are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (p. 55). If race is “an unstable and decentered 
complex of social meanings constantly being transformed,” as Thomas (2014) has pointed out, 
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Describing hegemony as an achieved moment that is synonymous with dominant 
ideology (Feagin 2010) or racial common sense (Omi and Winant [1986] 1994) runs 
counter to how Antonio Gramsci used the term. It is as though a hegemonic moment is a 
central tendency that occurs when adherents share a unified meaning system (see also 
Snow et al. 1986). On the contrary, Gramsci ([1946] 1971) described hegemony as an 
unfinished project because common sense is “continually transforming itself” (p. 324). 
When Feagin (2010) claimed the white racial frame has been hegemonic for centuries, 
this obscures the rarity of such moments because they are “very particular, historically 
specific, and temporary moment[s]” (Hall 1986:15). Another way of seeing racism, as is 
evident from debates surrounding the three-fifths clause, is that it is disjointed and 
episodic.  
Racial common sense is more tentative and fleeting than it is a stable 
achievement. On one hand, for instance, delegates from the South and North denigrated 
slave labor as causing slaveholders to incur more cost than profit due to its perceived lack 
of productivity. On the other hand, these same delegates claimed the country could not do 
without slave labor. Economic growth would stop dead in its tracks, and places like 
“South Carolina would soon be a desert waste” (FR-III [1787] 1911:254). So which is it: 
Is slave labor a liability or asset? The answer is both. Racism’s durable effectiveness lies 
in its ability to bend to shifting contexts and volatile demands. Delegates exhibited no 
problem oscillating between contradictory views about slave labor so long as these views 
                                                           
“[then] the mechanisms that produce racial common sense would not act uniformly, nor would 
common-sense remain common for long” (p. 82). 
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were leveraged for their own gain. They did not share a consensus racial worldview 
because their views (plural) were unstable, incoherent, and dependent upon the situation 
at hand. Hegemony in this sense is a process without end.   
Backing away from claims that a hegemonic moment has been achieved because 
people subscribe to a dominant ideology or share a racial common sense, I think of 
ideology not as some central tendency but as dispersed and “multi-centered.” A lack of 
consensus can make racism appear as tumultuous and unable to withstand conflict. These 
very competing views, however, cater to cleavages among whites and keep them vested 
in a racial order. The capacity for varied streams of racism expands the ideological toolkit 
so that whichever interpretive tool is needed for a particular moment is available 
(Jackman 1994). Fragmentation among whites’ own ideology permits them a 
spontaneous repertoire that can adapt to whatever situation so that racial rule is cemented 
without popular consent. There is no need for a “common sense” (Omi and Winant 
[1986] 1994) or “dominant frame of mind” (Feagin 2010).  
For three-fifths debate, the question of ideology was less about whether a racial 
rule should exist. Delegates across the sectional aisle agreed it should. The question was 
more about the terms of this racial rule and the ways they ought to be justified. These 
terms regarded how to maximize political clout and minimize tax liability. Sometimes 
delegates propped up the value of slave labor to promote these interests, other times they 
did not. The fractured nature of racism can blur distinctions among whites by drawing 
attention to what they share. Despite differences on how to justify the racial rule, they 
agreed that a racial rule should exist. Agreement on this point is foundational. It smooths 
165 
 
over what may otherwise seem like a chaotic aggregate of racisms and directs them 
toward a common purpose: defending their social position within the racial order 
(Hughey 2012; Lewis 2004).  
Racism as Historically Continuous Not Discrete 
The heavy historical hand of colorblindness, as shown through the three-fifths debate, 
draws attention to the relation between past and present—a relationship our conceptual 
language wants to deny. Words like “modern racism” (McConahay 1986) and “new 
racism” (Barker 1982) denote a sequence where the present breaks from the past. This 
reduces history to a mere background, and does not treat “what people do in the present 
as a struggle to create a future out of the past, of seeing the past not just as the womb of 
the present but the only raw material out of which the present can be constructed” 
(Abrams 1982:8, emphasis original). Since history facilitates what ideas and actions are 
possible, it needs to be apprehended in theoretical and analytic terms. The terms modern 
racism, post-Civil Rights era, and new racism, after all, cannot be defined without 
referring to two points in time. To speak of one point without the other is to diminish the 
historically comparative reference of what is conceptualized.  
The idea that racism has historical continuity implies ideological change does not 
follow a linear path. This parts from Michael Omi and Howard Winant ([1986] 1994) 
who have argued the U.S. has witnessed a rupture in racial dynamics, moving from a 
racial dictatorship toward a racial democracy: “It is obvious that the attitudes, practices, 
and institutions of the epochs of slavery, say, or of Jim Crow, no longer exist today” 
(Omi and Winant [1986] 1994:71). My analysis of the three-fifths clause offers a more 
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complicated story of slavery. It shows how the past consisted of clustering ideologies that 
condemned and supported the institution at the same time (see also Mignolo 1995; 
Thomas 2010). 
Literary scholar Walter Mignolo (1995) has offered an alternative view of history 
that does not follow a linear path, with one stream of ideas displacing another. Instead, he 
argues that historical change is better understood as an unfolding process of clustering 
epochs. Sociologist James Thomas (2010) has extended this idea to show how racism is 
not a product of modernity, as is generally understood in the field (e.g., Bonilla-Silva 
1997; Mills 1997), but its development precedes modernity. He has pointed to the very 
racialization processes that subjugated Jews during medieval times, ones that demarcated 
their bodies as black and deemed them a threat to Christianity (see also Fredrickson 1971; 
Gilman 1991), have been rearticulated to justify later racist arrangements in history. Two 
examples he identified to substantiate his claim regard Nazi Germany and the American 
Jim Crow South, eras where rights of citizenship, intermarriage, and other resources were 
denied on a racial basis. How does this alternative interpretation of history apply to the 
three-fifths clause? 
Whereas Walter Mignolo (1995) and James Thomas (2010) have traced legacies 
of the past across epochal distinctions in which they are typically quarantined, my 
analysis unearths how the antecedents of colorblindness have a rich, deep history that 
hardly make it of the “new,” “modern,” or “post-Civil Rights” variety. It is true that 
delegates like Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts equated slaves with sheep and cattle for 
the sake of gaining political representation. It is also true that others like James Wilson of 
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Pennsylvania and Roger Sherman of Connecticut worried more about equal treatment for 
their horses than they did about black freepersons when debating the fugitive slave act. 
Both accounts represent the outright denial of personhood to people of color that were 
typical of the antebellum period. Right alongside these arguments, however, were 
colorblind claims by even those who belonged to manumission societies. For example, 
Alexander Hamilton of New York refused to acknowledge that slaves were mere property 
only to reduce them as such thereafter. Principles of “uniformity” and “equality” took 
precedent for him, so that taxes and representation could be fairly distributed among the 
North and South. Even many Southerners espoused the style of colorblindness, by 
prefacing their defenses of slavery with claims like it was “the pity of humanity” (ED-III 
[1788] 1836:590) and “diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind” (ED-III [1788] 
1836:452). “[N]othing could justify it” in the minds of some (ED-III [1788] 1836:454). 
So they claimed.  
Patterned use of colorblind discourse alongside denying people of color their 
personhood suggest a classical/modern dichotomy is misplaced because these racisms 
can, and perhaps often do, overlap. Present becomes past and past becomes present 
because the two are not sequenced but bound together (Mead 1932). It is like how 
quantum physicists conceptualize light as possessing dual properties (Jung 2015). 
Whereas light is understood as both wave and particle, racism can be thought of as both 
past and present. Lacking clear boundaries, its enactment across time reaches both 
backward to what today’s scholars think of as traditional racism and forward to what we 
think of as new racism. Rather than impose a distinction upon the two, an alternative 
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view sees racism not as a historicized noun but a historicizing verb. Racism requires 
constant articulations and rearticulations to retain its usefulness, in ways that racial actors 
filter their interpretations through past experiences and vice versa. Presuming change in 
racism misses an opportunity to unearth relative constancies underneath what 
transformations have transpired, ones that have cast a long shadow over subsequent 






























Thinking about the development of the knowledge and what we know of racism, it is not 
as though the standards behind truth claims appeared during modernity with the 
introduction of the scientific method and have remained unchanged ever since. Standards 
of the knowledge production, as sociologist David Swartz (1997) has written, remain a 
work in progress, as “one does not arrive at final truths but proceeds as an ongoing 
project of correction and rectification of past errors” (p. 31). Seen this way, knowledge 
production is not so much an accumulation of snowballing truths. What was once 
accepted knowledge is not rejected after all. Rather advancing knowledge occurs through 
realignment of empirical findings that challenge taken-for-granted assumptions (see 
Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passerson [1968] 1991). This entails a process of reflexivity 
whereby researchers introspectively question themselves, the questions they ask, and the 
methods that may yield answers—a process that dynamically plays out from the inception 
of a project to its conclusion. Changing these taken-for-granted assumptions, I have come 
to conclude, requires abrupt shifts in theoretical or empirical outlook, so that new 
knowledge revises itself to offer more robust truth claims.   
Why Ideology  
Ideology yields orientations to and conceptions of the material as well as the symbolic 
orders of social existence. Because group interests are anchored in concrete struggles 
over resources and opportunities of social value, the ideology that advances them is not 
free-floating but deliberative. It yields what sociologist C. Wright Mills (1940b) 
described as “vocabularies of motive,” since “acts will be abandoned if no reason can be 
found that others will accept” (p. 908). That is, ideology assumes a rational character for  
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justifying social action. Sociologist Charles Tilly (2006) echoed this point when he 
wrote: “[O]nly humans start offering and demanding reasons while young, then continue 
through life looking for reasons why” (p. 8). This broad-sweeping implication does not 
mean ideology is always deployed in intentional ways, nor are interactions guided by a 
series of “cost-benefit calculations” in the utility-maximizing sense. “[W]e all constantly 
make use of a whole set of frameworks of interpretation and understanding,” claimed 
cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1984), “often in a very practical unconscious way, and 
[those] things alone enable us to make sense of what is going on around us, what our 
position is, and what we are likely to do” (p. 7). Ideology perseveres, in other words, 
because it yields practical utility and purposeful meaning for people’s immediate 
circumstances and experiences (Gramsci [1946] 1971; Horkheimer [1937] 1972). 
 Possessing an emotion-laden dimension, the ideologies people advance help 
frame how they understand their circumstances and “hoped-for realities” (Platt and 
Williams 2002:331, emphasis original). Sociologist Joe Feagin (2010) and legal scholar 
Katheryn Russell-Brown ([1998] 2009) have suggested that even bodies can yield a 
socializing function that captures affect and emotion that does not also translate into 
words. In this way, ideology can entail deep structures of unelaborated meaning that need 
not be systematic. It can bend to a variety of circumstances in this way, and even absorb 
new meanings to yield people a rich array of cultural and emotive repertoires. That 
people have available to them an array of cultural and emotive repertoires implies the two 
blend in some form and fashion. Feelings can, in other words, coalesce with rhetorical 
representations of racial dynamics. A poignant example lies in what Russell- Brown 
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([1998] 1999) has labeled the “criminalblackman,” in which the sheer thought of crime 
conjures up images of black men and fear for one’s life. Sociologists Pamela Oliver and 
Hank Johnston (2000) have argued that this means ideology can carry as much (if not 
more) of a “nonpejorative function” or a reality-distorting function, as captured in 
phrases like “false consciousness” (p. 42).1 Ideological interpretations should not be 
taken as genuine truth claims about social existence, but as interest-promoting assertions, 
which can manifest discursively through claims-making strategies, that maintain or 
advance group position within a social order like race (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2001; Fields 
1990).  
In fact, discourse is among the most overt expressions of ideology (van Dijk 
1984). Linguist Teun van Dijk (1993) has argued that discourse is a function of inequality 
reproduction, especially when “seen to express, signal, confirm, describe, legitimate, or 
enact ethnic dominance, as in communication with or about ethnic minorities” (p. 94). 
Standing in contrast to the Saussurean tradition of semiotics, which locates meaning in 
the structure and form of signs or semiosis, I think of discourse as transactional words 
that represent evolving relations between groups (see also Emirbayer 1997). It is true that 
discourse can follow some internal system of patterned rules. Words and the syntactic 
structure in which they are arranged signal ideas, but they carry little meaning when 
abstracted from who says them and what social position they occupy. My approach is to 
take these rules and show how they represent and justify the racial order. These rules are 
                                                           
1 A pejorative function of ideology, for example, is represented in some marxian interpretations 
of false-consciousness (e.g., Dant 1991). 
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built on the logics of inclusion and exclusion, as they yield an expressive system for 
drawing distinctions and ranking groups.  
Race and Racism, Are They Concepts Worth Keeping? 
Is racism a concept worth keeping? Does it offer clarity for understanding power 
relations between racial groups? Can it be discerned from other seemingly related terms 
like prejudice, stigma, and discrimination? I think the answers to these questions are yes, 
even while recognizing some problems that come with the term. The problem of 
definition is not restricted to the study of racism. This is a sociology problem. Sociologist 
Harold Blumer (1931) argued that within the discipline, convoluted theory has less to do 
with methodological precision and more to do with vague concepts: 
I suspect that the milling and halting condition of our own science does not come 
directly from the inadequacy of our techniques, as almost everyone contends, but 
from the inadequacy of our point of view. The effort to rescue the discipline by 
increasing occupation with method and by the introduction of precision devices is, 
I venture to suggest, working along the wrong direction. Perhaps, like other 
sciences in the past, we await a conceptual framework which will orientate our 
activities into productive channels. (p. 528; see also Mills [1959] 2000) 
Speaking to Blumer’s point, racism can be as ambiguous as most any other sociological 
construct. Some of those who adhere to the term, like activist Stokely Carmichael and 
political scientist Charles Hamilton (1967), have been accused by others like sociologist 
Robert Miles (1989) of “conceptual inflation.” This is because racism is often evoked 
wherever racial disparities are present, but those who evoke the term rarely pinpoint the 
mechanisms that (re)produce them. Historian George Fredrickson (2002) claimed that 
racism’s analytic precision is muddled when applied this way. The term is transformed 
into a blanket concept loosely applied to anything construed as racist. Sociologist Loïc 
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Wacquant (1997) has recommended “forsaking once and for all the inflammatory and 
exceedingly ductile category of ‘racism’ save a descriptive term referring to empirically 
analyzable doctrines and beliefs about ‘race’” (p. 222). Cultural critic Paul Gilroy (1998) 
has suggested the continued use of racial categories, even if the intent follows antiracist 
leanings, not only reifies racial differences but reinforces them. 
The conceptual origins of race and racism are debated. Some like George 
Fredrickson (2002) described them as an outgrowth of antisemitism during the late 
Middle Ages, in which Jews were seen as the pale of the earth under European 
expansionism—particularly by the Spanish (see also Thomas 2010). Others like 
anthropologist Audrey Smedley (1993), historian Ronald Takaki (1993), and sociologist 
Howard Winant (2001) have located race and racism within modernity along with the rise 
of Enlightened Reason, and they pinpoint its development in Western European 
colonialism during the fifteenth century. In many ways, as sociologist Amanda Lewis 
(2004) has theorized, the concepts of race and racism are inseparable. A small group of 
scholars, or at least those that are explicit about their views, think about race in biological 
terms. Geneticists Edwin van Den Oord and David Rowe (2000), for example, have 
defined races as “genetic entities because generations of ‘reproductive isolation’ have led 
to differences in gene frequency across racial groups,” (p. 286). In contrast, my views are 
more akin to sociologist Ann Morning (2011) who has described race as more of a folk 
classification system that distinguishes groups from one another on a loose basis of 
phenotype (e.g., skin color, eye shape, hair texture). The developing ideology that deems 
these ascribed differences as inherently unequal and a basis for uneven distributions of 
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socially-defined rewards and penalties represents what I label as racism. Because I 
borrow from sociologist William Julius Wilson (1973) to conceptualize racism as “an 
ideology of racial domination or exploitation,” I use the terms “racism” and “racial 
ideology” interchangeably (p. 32; see also Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2001).  
 Does racism have conceptual utility? I disagree with those who claim racism is 
not discernable from prejudice. In common usage and academic writings alike, 
sociologist Lincoln Quillian (2006) has observed “the term prejudice or discrimination 
can be substituted with racist or racism without a significant change in social science 
meaning” (p. 301). Sociologists Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond (2009) have 
claimed “prejudice is in no way qualitatively distinct from racism and should not be 
portrayed as such” (p. 352). Consider these typical definitions: 
• Prejudice is an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization (Allport 
1954:10).  
 
• Prejudice is an irrational attitude of hostility directed against an individual, a 
group, a race, or their supposed characteristics, an unreasonable prejudgment 
(Better 2002:19). 
 
• Prejudice is an unreasonable negative attitude towards others because of their 
membership in a particular group (Fishbein 1996:5).  
With their emphasis on faulty logic, irrational attitudes, and unreasonable prejudgments, 
at least five problems arise with these definitions.  
One, these definitions presume the language of attributes and divorce individuals 
from their broader context (Blumer 1958; Goffman 1963; Williams 1988). Two, they 
reduce prejudice to ungrounded abstractions and diminish how racial conflict regards 
practical battles over socially-defined resources (Bonilla-Silva 1997; Feagin 2000; 
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Wellman [1977] 1993). Three, they imply that prejudice involves cognitive distortion and 
departs from reasoned interests (Bonilla-Silva 1997; Jung 2015; Lewis 2004; Williams 
1988). Four, they offer no mention of structural or power dynamics among intergroup 
relations that prejudice applies (Bobo and Fox 2003; Jackman 1994). And five, they 
stress affective disposition among dominant group members that are anchored in 
intergroup hostility or sense of threat and neglect how whites need not push animus on 
other groups to promote their collective interests (Bonilla-Silva 1997; DiTomaso 2013; 
Hughey 2012; Lewis 2003; Lewis and Diamond 2015; Wellman [1977] 1993).2 For these 
reasons, among others, psychiatrist Frantz Fanon (1967) suggested resisting any “habit of 
considering racism as a mental quirk, as a psychological flaw must be abandoned” (p. 
77). 
Walking in the long shadow of Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, it is as 
though “prejudice operates to disguise the moral conflict in the minds of whites produced 
by the clash on the social level between the American Creed and anti-Negro practices” 
(Ellison [1944] 1998:82). These definitions prioritize whites’ moral consciousness over 
the material advantages they receive by occupying the dominant racial position.3 Fix 
                                                           
2 Sociologist Mary Jackman (1994) has extended this critique to survey analysts working within 
sociologist Harold Blumer’s (1954) “race prejudice sense of group position” tradition (e.g., Bobo 
1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997; Quillian 1995). Though their 
definition is more in-line with structural interpretations of racism, as it stresses the relational and 
positional character of racial dynamics, these scholars have not pinpoint how unequal relations 
often persist in peaceful terms. Whites can and often do reproduce racial inequality by offering 
preferential treatment to other whites rather than overtly discriminating against nonwhites 
(DiTomaso 2013; Royster 2003; see also Tilly 1998). 
3 Meanwhile, the emphasis on whiteness, as well the “mainstream” values, neglects black agency 
within racial relations, and begins from the starting point that black culture(s) is deficient and 
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certain problems within whites’ free will and prejudice will be eradicated, so these 
definitions presume. By contrast, Barbara Fields (1990) has described racism as “the 
language of consciousness that suits the particular way in which people deal with their 
fellows. It is the interpretation in thought of the social relations through which they 
constantly create and recreate their collective being” (p. 110).  
Racial ideology connects ideas and practices that systemically culminate across 
multiple institutional domains (e.g., housing, employment, education) to create 
inequality, from a material basis like wealth (Oliver and Shapiro [1995] 2006) to a 
symbolic basis like emotion (Harvey Wingfield 2010), which is sorted out along racial 
lines (see also Feagin 2006; Reskin 2012). In the words of social psychologist Margaret 
Wetherell (2003), the discursive medium of ideology is “intimately involved in the 
construction and maintenance of inequality” (p. 13). Because whites occupy a dominant 
position within the racial hierarchy, its group members can assert their idealized views, 
both consciously and unconsciously, as “the common interest of all the members of 
society” and “represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones” (Marx and 
Engels [1846] 1970:65-66; see also Bonilla-Silva 1997). These interests are grounded in 
practical matters, even though they manifest in unevenly orchestrated ways. That is, 
racism makes more sense in some white worlds than it does in others. Certain racial 
actors embedded within other social axes of inequality (i.e., gender, class) have the 
                                                           
inferior. According to Myrdal (1944), “it is to the advantage of American Negroes as individuals 
and as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem 
by the dominant white Americans” (p. 929).  
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potential to recognize they have much to lose by not endorsing it (Lewis 2004). This 
implies a certain degree of ideological inconsistency, and at times incoherence, among 
whites (and other racial groups too). All actors are, in other words, implicated in racial 
affairs to varying extents (Bonilla-Silva 1997).  
“A Case for the Case Study Method”4 
My decision to study discourse of the three-fifths clause assumes a case study approach 
that is both exploratory and descriptive. This approach is appropriate for the research task 
at hand for reasons outlined by sociologists Anthony Orum, Joe Feagin, and Gideon 
Sjoberg (1991): 
1. It permits the grounding of observations and concepts about social 
action and social structures in natural settings studied at close hand. 
 
2. It provides information from a number of sources and over a period of 
time, thus permitting a more holistic study of complex social networks and 
of complexes of social action and social meanings.  
 
3. It can furnish the dimensions of time and history to the study of social 
life, thereby enabling the investigator to examine continuity and change in 
lifeworld patterns.  
 
4. It encourages and facilitates, in practice, theoretical innovation and 
generalization. (p. 6-7) 
My focal area constitutes a case that consists of bounded historical events comprised of 
patterned, coherent, and sequenced activity (Stake [1995] 2005). In fact, it possesses a 
degree of typicality (e.g., congressional procedure, coalition formation, desire for specific 
                                                           
4 The subheading “A Case for the Case Study Method” draws from sociologists Joe Feagin, 
Anthony Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg (1991) who edited a book by the same name.  
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legal actions). Sociologist Diane Vaughan (1992) has argued that this condition serves as 
a launching point for learning something general from the specific (see also Blumer 
[1969] 1998). From this methodological position, my intent has been to remain true to the 
particularities of the three-fifths debate and situate it within a contextual long view of 
how racial ideology has historically unfolded.  
 The three-fifths clause as a case study represents a counter-intuitive selection for 
my research task because I am mapping what we know of racism in the contemporary 
onto a context that acknowledges a formal racial rule. This provision is among the few 
places within the Constitution that acknowledge the existence of slavery. Like what 
philosopher Charles Mills (1997) has labeled as “the racial contract,” it formalizes black-
white relations within the political realm of representation and taxation. Civil rights 
leader Dr. Martin Luther King (1967) drew upon the three-fifths clause to point out how 
little has changed since the summer of 1787: 
When the Constitution was written, a strange formula to determine taxes and 
representation declared that the Negro was 60 percent of a person. Today another 
curious formula seems to declare he is 50 percent of a person. Of the good things 
in life, the Negro has approximately one-half those of whites; of the bad things of 
life, he has twice those of whites. Thus, half of all Negroes live in substandard 
housing, and Negroes have half the income of whites. When we turn to the 
negative experiences of life, the Negro has a double share. There are twice as 
many unemployed; the rate of infant mortality (widely accepted as an accurate 
index of general health) among Negroes is double that of whites. The equation 
pursues Negroes even into war. There are twice as many Negroes as whites in 
combat in Vietnam at the beginning of 1967, and twice as many Negro soldiers 
died in action (20.6 percent) in proportion to their size in the population. (p. 6-7) 
Evoking the three-fifths clause, Dr. King made connections with the late twentieth 
century. He pointed to various socioeconomic indicators in which black folks fare worse 
than whites, which in truth could have been extended to most every socioeconomic 
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indicator available. Moving forward a half century, many of these observations remain 
true today.  
The type of anti-black racism that causes these racial disparities, Joe Feagin 
(2006) has argued, cannot be understood without historicizing their origins to the 
institution of slavery.5 I use the three-fifths clause as a case study in a similar way. 
Instead of using the past to understand the present, however, I use the present to better 
understand the complexities of the past. Pursuing a case study in this fashion permits me 
to scrutinize key concepts and taken-for-granted assumptions about what we know of 
racial ideology in America and how it has evolved over time. It permits me to transplant 
ideas about “new,” “modern,” and whichever word choice of novelty one prefers into 
historical soil some presume that they do not belong.  
Why Fieldwork and Not Some Other Method 
The attention to detail, with a focus on what people are doing and saying within their own 
contexts and an attempt to understand these things from their vantage point, positions the 
ethnographer to ground her or his study to capture the messiness of life—the running 
definitions of meaning and action that emerge out of relationships. It positions us, I think, 
to address novelist Ralph Ellison’s rightful concerns over privileging the general over the 
                                                           
5 Racial dynamics are much more complex than racial binarism (Bonilla-Silva 2004). In many 
ways though, black-white relations represent an archetype for relations between whites and all 
other minority groups (Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014; Feagin 2000). It stands to reason then that 




specific and missing the ideas and actions that define people. Commenting on how 
sociologists miss the complexity of black urban life, he says: 
They only abstract it and reduce it to proportions which the sociologist can 
manage. I simply don’t recognize Harlem in them. And I certainly don’t recognize 
the people of Harlem whom I know. Which is by no means to deny the 
ruggedness of life there, nor the hardship, the poverty, the sordidness, the filth. 
But there is something else in Harlem, something subjective, willful, and 
complexly and compelling human. (qtd. in Harper’s Magazine [1967] 1995:110) 
This “something else” is what ethnography, perhaps more so than any other method in 
sociology, can capture. The richness of data complicates the task of imposing rigid 
sociological categories that may make for sound logic and coherence but are otherwise 
unrecognizable to those we study.  
Some mixed-methods studies show how respondents answer surveys one way but 
interviews another. In their analysis of white college students’ racial attitudes, for 
example, sociologists Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Tyrone Forman (2000) discovered only 
a quarter of respondents opposed affirmative action outright when asked in a survey 
format. Once these students were probed further during interviews, over half the sample 
reversed their position. They did so indirectly with semantic maneuvers like “I support 
and oppose it…,” “Jobs should go to the most qualified person,” or “Racism happened a 
long time ago” (see also Gallagher 2003). Using these discursive strategies, whites 
couched their racial views in political correctness—free from the liability of “sounding 
racist” (see also van Dijk 1984). They treated surveys as “multiple-choice exams in 
which respondents work hard to choose the ‘right’ answers (i.e., those that fit public 
norms)” (Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014:11), and these right answers are predetermined ones 
already prepackaged and filtered by the survey instrument (Weiss 1994). This has led 
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researchers like Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000) to observe that higher levels of 
prejudice, and perhaps more authenticity, are exhibited in interviews. Stated beliefs in 
principle are insincere reflections of whites’ willingness to institute racial change because 
they remain within the realm of hypotheticals and say little about conviction (see also 
Jung 2015). This means analysts ought to be weary of attitudes reported through surveys. 
By that same token, however, inferences drawn from interview data come with their own 
host of problems.  
The gulf between what people say and do, claimed C. Wright Mills (1940a), is the 
“central methodological problem of the social sciences” (p. 329; see also LaPiere 1937; 
Merton 1940). All too often words and actions do not match. People often times, in fact, 
have no problem with advancing worldviews that are inconsistent and contradictory to 
their actions (Deutcher 1966). They are comfortable with it. At their worst, verbal 
accounts can be reduced to hypothetically irrelevant scenarios because the contingencies 
in which they are articulated become either diminished or ignored. Sociologists Lyle 
Warner and Melvin DeFleur (1969) explain that this is problematic because it abstracts 
meaning that is context-dependent and collectively negotiated among actors (see also 
Blumer [1969] 1998).  
Within the sociology of racism, for instance, several notable studies (e.g., Bonilla-
Silva 2001, [2003] 2014; Young 2004, 2010) rely upon interviews as their primary mode 
of data collection but go on to advance conclusions that link saying with doing. When 
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997, 2001, [2003] 2014) asserts discourse as the crystallizing 
feature between ideas and praxis, his research on colorblindness implies that interview 
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data uncover “real” beliefs that affect how racial actors interact in a situated context. 
Meanwhile, sociologist Alford Young’s (2004) has shown how marginalized black urban 
men make sense of labor market networks outside their local neighborhoods. Though 
Young stresses an interest in cognitive framing up front, he goes on to imply what people 
say inevitably translates into how they form personal strategies for navigating race- and 
class-based obstacles to achieve upward mobility. The claims of Bonilla-Silva and Young 
may very well be correct, but the conceptual links they claim are not directly observed.  
What people say and do are situational events. Structured and semi-structured 
interviews as a mode of data collection constrain how people otherwise act and react 
outside the interview context. Even though these approaches are more spontaneous and 
perhaps less imposing than are closed-ended survey instruments, they do not have the 
flexibility to capture a fuller portrait of our subjects (Blauner and Wellman [1973] 1998). 
Other times people treat the interview context as “a therapy session or confessional” 
(Eliasoph 1999:482, emphasis original), and it becomes a place where interviewees can 
be forced to discuss topics they otherwise think little about. An interview schedule may 
impose a researcher’s agenda onto subjects without considering what they believe and 
how it is important (or unimportant) in their own lives. Furthermore, counting patterned 
responses can skew an analysis by placing equal weight across respondents who have 
well-formed, developed answers and those who do not (Jerolmack and Khan 2014). Since 
what is said in the context of an interview is so significantly impacted by the situation of 
the interview itself, then sociologists should have reasonable doubt to believe that what 
people say during an interview is consistent with how they act in other contexts. These 
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inferences may lack validity. For these reasons, among others, analysts ought to be wary 
of studies that use verbal accounts as a proxy for explaining social behavior (Jerolmack 
and Khan 2014; see also Duneier 2007; Pager and Quillian 2005).  
If the purpose of a study is to understand subjects from their own perspectives, in 
their own language and from the situations whereby these views are articulated, then one 
approach is to minimize interruptions that can come from an interview schedule and 
avoid the introduction of a formalized research instrument altogether (Lewis 2004). That 
is, take an unobtrusive position in the field that samples social action across contexts over 
time. This permits researchers to compare and contrast how saying and doing interrelate, 
and more specifically, ethnography is well positioned to bridge this gulf. Observations of 
circumstances whereby people activate their views through in situ interactions permits 
the researcher to transition her or his analysis from verbal accounts that may be irrelevant 
to how social action unfolds to the situated discourse that rationalizes action itself.  
Historical Ethnographic Content Analysis 
Speaking on the promise of ethnography, sociologist Gerald Suttles (1976) declared the 
method “is one of the ways in which abstract conceptual content of sociology has kept in 
touch with the available world of empirical observation” (p. 1).6 Sociologists Howard 
Becker and Blanche Geer (1957) have described it as “the most complete form of the 
sociological datum” because it permits researchers to observe and compare what people 
                                                           
6 Here, sociologist Gerald Suttles (1976) was speaking of urban ethnography in particular, but I 
believe the observation extends beyond this domain to other ethnographic fieldsites. In my 
project, his comments speak to the importance I place on historical ethnography in linking 
abstract sociological framing to the social action of creating legal rules that people must follow.  
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say versus do (p. 31). Treating social actions as the primary unit of analysis, an 
ethnographic approach permits researchers to situate themselves within an interactive 
context (Lewis 2004). The sampling procedure is less about obtaining a representative 
group of individuals, and more about sampling a broad range of situations and 
interactions. This epistemological stance privileges observations of interaction over time 
as more reliable than self-reports found in either interviews or surveys (Becker 1996). 
The former offers verification by cross-referencing what people say against what they do, 
whereas the latter does not.  
No clear typology specifies what is or is not ethnography. In practice, the method 
is used broadly to connote research that ranges from interviews and participant 
observation (e.g., Moore 2008) to prolonged submersion in the field (e.g., Anderson 
1990). What I label “Historical Ethnographic Content Analysis” (henceforth HECA) is a 
synthesis of two methods: “ethnographic content analysis” and “historical ethnography.” 
Sociologist David Altheide (2006) has defined the former as “an integrated method, 
procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents 
for their relevance, significance, and meaning,” where “the emphasis is on discovery and 
description, including search for contexts, underlying meanings, patterns, and processes” 
(p. 93; see also Altheide 1987). Diane Vaughan (2004) has described the latter as “an 
attempt to elicit structure and culture from documents created prior to an event in order to 
understand how people in another time and place made sense of things” (p. 321). The 
historicizing approach through texts permits ethnographers to learn from others even 
when they are no longer around (see also Medick 1984; Fenske 2007).  
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HECA is ethnographic in the sense that it emphasizes what people do and say in 
context. By translating text into experience (cf. Clifford 1986),7 it takes seriously what 
Alfred Schutz (1962) described as first-level constructs and practices that people 
incorporate in interactions with others. It is sensitive to the social contexts of experience 
in which meanings are (re)created. The data categories and analyses I apply throughout 
my investigation are tested against what people say and do, paying close attention to the 
rationales that link representation and action together. Harold Blumer (1940) noted that 
interaction is necessarily about the subjectivity of social action. It is a matter of inference 
and judgement located within specific relationships, acts, and circumstances (see also 
Blumer 1954, Goffman 1983). “[T]he meanings that things have for human beings are 
central in their own right,” Blumer ([1969] 1998) argued, and those meanings “are 
socially produced through interaction with one’s fellows, and that in the process of 
interaction, the meanings of things are interpreted and reinterpreted” (p. 2-5). These 
processes of making meaning, in other words, are co-constructed and derive from 
interpretive interactions (Becker 1996). 
An Ethnography of Text, How Does That Work? 
Unlike conventional practices of ethnography (e.g., Becker 1996; Becker and Geer 1957), 
HECA does not require a participatory mode of data collection whereby researchers 
                                                           
7 Similar methods have been well-established in Germany since the 1980s, particularly within the 
field of anthropology (see Eibach and Lottes 2002). Only recently has “historical ethnography” 
emerged onto the American sociological scene (e.g., Hunter 2013; Vaughan 1996). 
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directly engage those they study.8 Sociologist Marcus Hunter (2013) has described it as 
thinking of texts as “the lasting or remaining documentary evidence that will supply the 
historical ethnographic data necessary to (re)construct the stakes of a given time and 
community” (p. 231). The method helps researchers historicize peoples’ perspectives 
from their own eyes, as well as describe the activities with which they have engaged. 
Simultaneously, it positions researchers to move beyond the surface events of their 
fieldsite to elaborate analytic perspectives that can be different from how people interpret 
their own views and actions. Borrowing from the symbolic interaction tradition, at least 
some of its strands that stress structure, this method does not presume the circumscribed 
racial hierarchy is a given—not without accounting for the interactions where these 
structures are anchored and negotiated (see Blumer [1969] 1998; Wellman 1988). After 
all, local settings can be understood only in the context of broad sociohistorical processes 
(Burawoy 1998; Burawoy et al. 1991). 
Because HECA follows a retrospective reconstruction of discourses and events 
that were recorded in historical artifacts, anthropologists John and Jean Comaroff (1992) 
have reasoned that this means archives serve as the logical fieldsite. The data can range 
broadly, spanning manuscripts, pamphlets, news articles, speeches, correspondences, 
personal accounts, and meeting proceedings, among other items. According to 
sociologists Julia Adams, Elizabeth Clemens, and Shola Orloff (2005),  
                                                           
8 One might say the ethnographic position of being physically present for participant observation 
is an outdated idea, especially in light of the information age where so much social activity takes 
place in digital space (Hammersley and Treseder 2007).  
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archival documents are problematic texts, themselves in need of discursive 
deciphering; that explanatory accounts of history writ-large must be understood as 
narratives with their own rhetorical devices and plots; and that every observation 
and utterance makes sense only in the context of a symbolic order. (p. 27) 
They should not be taken at face value. Otherwise, ethnographers run the risk of 
committing what sociologist Stephen Steinberg (1993) has called the “ethnographic 
fallacy.” This happens when researchers follow a “seeing is believing” epistemology and 
blindly accept observations without critical reflection. The way I think of observations 
recorded in historical texts is like an iceberg of data. Only the tip may be seen from the 
surface, but just below lurks much more. This means that implicit knowledge is most 
always present in these texts. 
Texts are not conceptualized in an abstract manner where discourse is uncoupled 
from action. Paraphrasing sociologist John Heritage (1984), they are products and 
reflections of historically situated social activity. When seen this way, these texts permit 
ethnographers to adjudicate between what people say and do—discerning how the two 
relate to one another in the process. It allows for the accumulation of data in such a way 
that positions ethnographers to explain the “how” and “why” questions of when certain 
discourses are deployed to justify certain actions that can be verified through historical 
record, along with what circumstances, and which motivations drive these formations 
(see also Bourdieu [1979] 1984). That is, the method lends itself to building causal 
claims. “Ethnographers can give temporal structure to data collection that may put them 
as close to inherently exclusive causal contingencies as any research can” (Katz 
2002:459). Rather than singular causes though, the richness of understanding the path 
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dependences of local actors in contexts, and what many factors they influence and are 
influenced by to make meaning, take into accounts multiple causal forces that are at hand.  
The Fieldsite: A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation 
To study debates surrounding the three-fifths clause, I rely upon the archives entitled A 
Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation. This collection is held by the Library of 
Congress, and it is among the most robust sources of congressional record. My focus is 
narrowed to the timeline in which these debates unraveled, 1775-1788, and thus the data I 
cover span the ratification of both the Articles of Confederation and U.S. Constitution. A 
bulk of the text I analyze is drawn from the following sources:  
• Journals of the Continental Congress (1774-1789),  
 
• Letters of Delegates to Congress (1774-1789),  
 
• The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, and  
 
• The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (1787-1788).  
Each of these titles comes with its own set of strengths and weaknesses. Most all of them 
are incomplete. They may not be verbatim transcripts. They may be filtered through 
subjective eyes. They may include inaccuracies and words taken out of context. They 
may range broadly in their emphasis, with some stressing parliamentary procedure and 
others highlighting substantive debate. Below I provide an overview of each title. The 
goal is to delineate the strengths of each as well as address what kinds of questions they 
are suited to answer.  
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The Journals of the Continental Congress (1774-1789) mostly consist of records 
directly transcribed from the notes of Charles Thomson. For 15 years, he served as 
secretary of the Continental Congress. This lent a certain degree of continuity for a 
political body that experienced turnover throughout the years. Thomson’s records were 
not a solo production, though. Before many of them could be cleared for publication, 
parliamentary procedure subjected them to committee approval for verification purposes. 
To add an extra layer of validity and depth, these journals include official reports from 
Congress for supplemental purposes. That way the inquisitive student can cross-reference 
various reports for the sake of confirmation.  
The Letters of Delegates to Congress (1774-1789) consists of letters, diaries, 
public papers, essays, speeches, and policy drafts written by members of the First and 
Second Continental Congress. The bulk of this title, however, is comprised by letters 
between delegates and their political constituents. Most all the letters featured were 
written when one of the involved parties was a member of Congress. The title was 
designed with the purpose of supplementing the official record with private 
correspondences, and the final texts featured are not randomly sampled. Texts are omitted 
if they were either repetitious or trivial, and did not contribute to the exhaustiveness of 
the final product. These omissions are noted throughout to give readers a sense of how 
common or uncommon some concerns were. All the documents were collected from 
universities, historical societies, and private parties with the assistance of the Library of 
Congress, U.S. Congress, and Ford Foundation. 
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The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, also known as “Farrand’s 
Records,” covers the Constitutional Convention from its beginning in May to its end in 
September. It consists of a hodgepodge of notes from numerous sources. Some of these 
notes derive from William Jackson of South Carolina, who was charged with the task of 
keeping records for the Constitutional Convention. Historians have scrutinized his notes, 
and general character, many times over. They have found omission of crucial details, a 
lack of proper experience, and indications of his being being a more successful lobbyist 
than note taker (Beeman 2009; Berkin 2002; Collier and Collier 1986). Rather than rely 
too heavily on Jackson’s record, this title features the notes of James Madison of Virginia 
too. These are widely considered the most authoritative account of the Constitution 
Convention. This is because Madison had access to the complete records of the 
Convention that were confidentially kept by George Washington of Virginia, which 
allowed him to fill out details he had missed and cross-verify what information he had 
recorded. Aside from these advantages, Madison’s notes are the only ones available to 
cover the Convention in its entirety.9 A strength of “Farrand’s Records” is that it marks 
                                                           
9 Legal scholar Mary Bilder (2015) has claimed there is reason to be skeptical of James 
Madison’s record. He did not set out to offer a comprehensive account, but fell into this role years 
later at Thomas Jefferson’s (Virginia) urging. Jefferson did not attend the Convention due to 
diplomatic service in France. Madison is known to have revised his records until his death in 
1836, covering layers of revision in the process by changing his interpretation of the Convention, 
the role he played in these debates, and what stances he took on the Constitution. Sensitive to 
details he perhaps knew would mold images of an early nation to later readers, Madison left 
behind artifacts that represent an overt example of political posturing. Over the years, he drifted 
from federalist positions shared with Alexander Hamilton of New York toward what became 
known as the “Democratic-Republican Party.” Madison’s notes were posthumously published in 
1840, after all those who signed the Constitution had perished. 
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discrepancies between sources. It also includes materials from other delegates in 
attendance, like original notes as well as direct correspondences, that allows for 
triangulation.  
Unlike other manuscripts in the collection, The Debates in the Several State 
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (1787-1788), otherwise known 
as “Elliot’s Debates,” document the transitional period between the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787 and the First Federal Congress of 1789. It was during this time when 
the Constitution was dispersed among the states, and their own delegates debated its 
merits for ratification. Because most these proceedings were taken by an appointed 
person at the local level, there is much variation in their quality and depth. The case of 
Pennsylvania, for example, only includes commentary from those who supported the 
Constitution while its opponents’ commentary is omitted altogether. For other states like 
New Hampshire and North Carolina, these proceedings are incomplete and feature only 
segments of the debate. Among other states like New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, 
however, the records are thick with detail and day-to-day summaries.  
The Elite Bias Justified: They are the Purveyors of Ideology 
My understanding of the three-fifths debate is filtered through the perspectives of those 
who chose to write about it, either through correspondences, private record, and 
publication. In conventional ethnographies, these types of subjects are considered 
informants (Fenske 2007). They play a crucial role in my study because they filter which 
data are available, and possibly how the discourses surrounding the three-fifths debate 
were (re)constructed over time. This may bias the data to certain extent, since these 
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delegates had their own agendas in shaping how the debates unraveled. You could say, 
then, that a heavy reliance upon their accounts causes my data to suffer from an elite bias 
that privileges their voice, or at least their recollections of the debates, over others. My 
argument can live with this limitation because it turns the gaze upward toward sources of 
ruling relations (Harding 1987). These elites exerted so much influence on constitutional 
content, they possessed disproportionate access to the purveyors of ideology (see van 
Dijk 1997). As philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ([1846] 1970) observed, 
“The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the 
ideas of those who lack the means of material production are subject to it” (p. 64).  
The founding fathers had more disposable power to impose their will onto others 
even if there was resistance. My narrow focus on discourse among elite white men joins 
feminist (e.g., Smith 1987) and antiracist (e.g., Embrick 2011) approaches that insist 
upon “studying up” rather than “down.” The point is to render a more holistic 
understanding of how domination works. Consider the point made by sociologist Sandra 
Harding (1987) on class dynamics between employer and employee: 
While employers have often commissioned studies of how to make workers 
happy with less power and pay, workers have rarely been in a position to 
undertake commission studies of anything at all, let alone make employers happy 
with less power and profit. (p. 8) 
As she alludes, a standpoint that gazes upward at power yields a fundamentally different 
type of perspective. It positions researchers to look toward the source of ruling relations, 
which are defined as a running definition. The racial order embodied in slavery is not 
self-evident. Rather it requires active participation by those with the power to sustain the 
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institution. That said, I am not interested in understanding these individuals on their own 
terms as individuals. I am more interested in the “collective representations” they 
advanced with regards to defending slavery (see Durkheim [1912] 2008).  
Sampling Strategy, Deciding What to Study 
I focused my analytic strategy by sampling documents according to whether they contain 
the words “three-fifths,” “three fifths,” or “3/5s.” A purposeful sampling approach is 
warranted here because conceptual adequacy is prioritized ahead of frequency and 
representativeness (Altheide 1987). The transferability of what conclusions I offer lies in 
extrapolation that is “based on the validity of the analysis rather than the 
representativeness of the events” (Mitchell 1983:190). My sampling procedure yields a 
primary dataset of 1,493 pages of primary and secondary texts. When some 
contextualization is warranted, I also incorporate original sources outside the collection 
like the Notes on the State of Virginia written by Thomas Jefferson ([1783] 1999) and 
The Federalist Papers written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. 
([1787/1788] 1999). The documents I sampled permit me to observe the discourse of 160 
people of the early republic, a vast majority of whom served as a political representative 
in some capacity. Their participation, however, was uneven. Over one-third offered few 
words, simply asked clarifying questions, or restated points already well-established. The 
texts sampled range from 1775 to 1789. This allowed me to review what was said by the 
same actors said over one and a half decades, and position my analysis to stress the 
“how” questions of social process. That way I could detect how ideas and practices of 
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discourse chain onto one another and identify a conceptual link that forges with time (see 
also Mitchell 1983). 
Ethnography’s Serendipity Factor 
John Comaroff (2009) has noted that ethnography “rests on a dialectic between the 
deductive and the inductive, between the concept and the concrete, between its objectives 
and its subjects, whose intensions and inventions frequently set its agenda. The failure to 
grasp this may account for the autonomic dismissal of ethnography as unrigorous, 
unreplicable, unfalsifiable, and the other (non)u words with which it is regularly damned” 
(qtd. in Becker 2009:546). Not all researchers can know what questions they want to 
investigate prior to doing the research, nor what theories to use to guide the data 
collection and analysis. Yet this does not necessarily mean these kinds of studies are less 
rigorous, systematic, or theoretically informed. Perhaps it is just the opposite when we 
consider some of the classic ethnographies of sociology, from Carol Stack’s (1970) All 
Our Kin to Elijah Anderson’s (1978) A Place on the Corner. These studies followed an 
iterative development process whereby they did not know what to study until after they 
had submerged themselves in the field. Only then were they able to use these early 
experiences to guide the formation of a question and strategy for how to answer it. These 
are models to which I aspire.  
An alternative way of doing science regards the grounded theory approach, 
developed by sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967). It is unique from 
traditional, positivistic-leaning orientations, in that it does not begin with a discretely 
stated research problem, pre-specified type of analysis, and testable or falsifiable 
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hypotheses. Instead it often begins with a general topic, perhaps not even a developed 
question, and a collection of qualitative data (Charmaz 2006). From there, researchers are 
at liberty to pursue developing patterns, openly wrestle with unexpected findings, and 
perhaps even redraw or elaborate on old theoretical explanations (Vaughan 1992). 
Conventional modes of science can run the risk of closing off, rather than opening up the 
production of knowledge. This is because they follow, as Howard Becker (2009) has 
described, what everyone already knows and blindly accepts. Such modes are akin to 
what sociologist Thomas Kuhn (1962) labeled as “normal science,” which regards an 
approach preoccupied with extending the prevailing paradigm rather than building 
knowledge that falls outside of it. Though I do not endorse Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) 
grounded theory for the project at hand,10 my strategy incorporates one of its key tenets. I 
embrace the notion of keeping a research design flexible enough so that hypotheses can 
be adjusted, and the focus reoriented, in light of discovering unanticipated findings. 
Standing in the shadows of sociologists like Michael Burawoy and his colleagues (1991), 
                                                           
10 Those who endorse grounded theory presume researchers begin the process with as clean a 
theoretical slate as possible, and then engage in theory-building that is based off one’s 
observations in the field (Charmaz 2006; Glaser and Strauss 1967). This stance 
compartmentalizes theory and data analysis as though the two are discrete processes. Another 
way of looking at methods is outlined by sociologists Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz, and Linda 
Shaw (1995) who have argued “the ethnographer’s assumptions, interests, and theoretical 
commitments enter into every phase of writing an ethnography and influence decisions that range 
from selecting which events to write about to those that entail emphasizing one member’s 
perspective on an event over those of others” (p. 167; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
There is no foolproof distinction to be made between theory and observation, given that facts can 
be observed but these facts can neither be collected nor interpreted by themselves.   
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I see deviations from what might otherwise be reasonably expected as prime moments for 
theory building. 
Coding Decisions and the Unexpected Road Traveled 
Rather than sweep my presumptions and mistakes under the rug and present an end 
product of research, let me be transparent about my interpretations and how I arrived at 
certain analytic decisions (Becker [1986] 2007; Vaughan 2004). My analysis began with 
a different intent. The original purpose was to empirically test a structural interpretation 
of racism: the “racialized social systems” framework (Bonilla-Silva 1997). Reading this 
theory as an overtime thesis explaining change in racial ideology, I began with the 
purpose of documenting how racism shifts in patterned and resilient ways through 
formative tax conflicts across American history. As the data collection and analysis 
process unraveled, my study’s scope was scaled back from multiple tax conflicts to one 
tax conflict: the three-fifths clause.11 This was a logical starting point as a case study. 
Historian Robin Einhorn ([1991] 2001; 2006, 2009) has explained that the three-fifths 
clause was so formative with its emphasis on uniformity and principles of “fair” taxation 
that it later shaped how most governments across the U.S. approach property taxes. 
Because the clause also regards the racial politics of representation, the analysis was 
expanded accordingly to account for this topical area. 
                                                           
11 The logic of restricting my analysis to taxation follows the lead of “new fiscal sociology” 
(Martin 2008; Prasad 2006; Martin and Prasad 2014; Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009; see also 
Schumpeter [1918] 1991). Taxes have of way of laying bare the most fundamental social 
arrangements, as all public institutions run through the state’s capacity to generate revenues that 
finance the services and protections they provide. 
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Once data collection and analysis commenced, I was overwhelmed by the volume 
of texts related to my topic and their richness. Beginning my preliminary analysis, I 
observed that my codebook did not mesh with the observations I made and there were 
other important questions to ask that precluded my original expectations.12 The scope of 
the project was scaled back for practical and substantive reasons, shifting from several 
cases to one. The major substantive reason being that I entered the field with an agenda 
that was removed and unreflective of the activity I later observed. I began the analysis 
looking to record overt expressions of white supremacy during three-fifths debate. These 
were common but not exhaustive.  
In an era where white beliefs in black inferiority were typical, a counter-intuitive 
finding I discovered was that even slaveowners worried about “saving face” and 
establishing “non-racist” credentials when debating slavery. Edmund Randolph of 
Virginia, for example, “lamented that such a species of property existed; but as it did 
exist, the holders of it would require [some] security” (ED-V [1787] 1845:304). Like 
many others, he transitioned back-and-forth between contradictory positions that 
simultaneously deplored and defended the peculiar institution. The moral politics of 
slavery, in other words, rendered the racial ideology that justified it a varied, contested 
phenomenon. Though this observation jars with literature on today’s racial ideology that 
                                                           
12 Many of these reflections about my own research were inspired by sociologist William Foote 
Whyte’s (1955) Street Corner Society. In his methodological appendix, he recounted a similar 
experience. He entered the field with expectations formed by the preexisting literature, only to 
learn that his focus did not reflect the pressing concerns of those he observed. Only with an 
extended presence in the field did he learn what his final topic would be, what questions needed 
to be asked, and how he should go about answering them.  
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stresses a sharp break from the past, it does satisfy an emphasis on discovery that is 
important to most all philosophies of science. Only through a research design that is open 
to change, however, was I able to take what was learned during early stages of the project 
and allow it to inform subsequent decisions on which data to look at, what to look for, 
how to code, and so on. 
Open and Axial Coding with Multiple Researchers 
Since my orientation combines a hybrid approach of induction and deduction, I entered 
the coding process with two goals. The first goal was to verify what extent colorblind 
ideology informed debates of the three-fifths clause (see Chapter Five). This consisted of 
identifying when delegates deployed the frame of “abstract liberalism,” what is theorized 
as the cornerstone of colorblindness (Bonilla-Silva [2003] 2014). The “abstract 
liberalism” code was designed to guide the initial analysis not trap it. As the analysis 
process unraveled, this code was further differentiated by topical context: 
“representational equality” and “tax uniformity.” Meanwhile, my analytic second goal 
was to develop original codes reflective of patterns observed in the data (see Chapters 
Four and Six). These were developed through an open coding process, which is a 
grounded approach that begins with repeatedly reading the data without imposing any 
predetermined interpretations (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). The analysis shifted to 
axial coding after preliminary themes were developed, which involves the simultaneous 
evaluation of the raw data and initial set of codes. The idea is to follow up on deviant 
observations and “miscellaneous” patterns. Not only does this permit me to capture a 
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fuller range of overarching themes among the data, but it positions my analysis to fulfill 
its emphasis on conceptual development.  
After preliminary codes were established, two additional researchers were 
introduced into the analysis process. Whereas I coded all 1,493 pages of data, the 
secondary researchers reviewed about 25 percent of the dataset. These “triple-coded” 
documents were chosen purposefully. I arranged all texts in chronological order and 
divided them into twelve roughly equal segments. Then three segments at the front-, 
middle-, and back-ends of the dataset were selected for the secondary researchers to code. 
This strategy ensures they were exposed to a diverse selection of the dataset, so they 
could track discourse spanning the observed timeline. The role of the secondary 
researchers was to assist with operationalizing the final codes, adding any additional 
codes that I missed, and performing thematic analysis. In this study, thematic analysis 
refers to identifying similar and overarching patterns among the data and codes (Fereday 
and Muir-Cochrane 2006). Together through a reiterative and reflexive process, we 
referenced the open and axial codes to help identify common themes across the data that 
satisfied a point of saturation. This can be defined as “the point in data collection and 
analysis when new information produces little or no change to the codebook” (Guest, 
Bunce, and Johnson 2006:65). It is a point where additional data points do not tell me 
anything that was not already discovered.   
 
“Why am I to believe you?”: Concerns of Validity and Reliability 
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Like any scientist, I do not want my research to be inaccurate and without confirmation. 
My own sense of the historical situation, the ways data are coded and understood, and 
how the final analysis is presented all represent urgent matters of concern. To validate the 
reliability of both my data and analysis, I follow a two-prong procedure of triangulation. 
The first prong regards “source triangulation.” Paying close attention to historical texts 
permits the historical ethnographer to draw inferences from otherwise inaccessible 
interpretations and contexts of racism in the past. Yet it also places a certain degree of 
vulnerability in the analysis, one that regards the politics of representation.  
How do I know if these accounts are accurate? What motivated their framing? 
Which events were distorted or withheld? Why might these be important? And how do I 
move the analysis beyond the immediate details shared? Being at least one degree 
removed from direct observation, these questions represent some of the concerns that 
historical ethnographers need to address (Hunter 2013; Stanfield 1993). To account for 
these considerations in my study, I cross-reference multiple accounts of the same events 
to verify what was (not) recalled, confirm patterned observations, and offer a more 
comprehensive narrative. The idea was to gain a sense of how reliable the recorders of 
history were. 
The second prong of triangulation involves intercoder reliability checks. I 
included this strategy to measure the consistency of coding decisions between 
independent researchers (Krippendorff 1980). The coding decisions assigned were 
transformed into enumerative data (e.g., dummy variables like 1 = presence of abstract 
liberalism, 0 = absence of abstract liberalism) that were later used to calculate indices 
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indicating levels of “intercoder agreement” (Tinsley and Weiss 1975). The index I relied 
upon is “Percent Agreement.” It refers to the percentage of coding decisions between 
analysts that match, and it ranges on a “0-to-1” scale with “0” meaning no agreement and 
“1” meaning perfect agreement (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002).  
Figure 4. Intercoder Reliability: Percentage Agreement between Coding Decisions 
 
   
 
   
 
Note: PR signifies primary researcher, while SR1 and SR2 signify secondary researchers 1 and 2.  
The minimum intercoder reliability is a coefficient level of < .80.  
The percentage agreement formula is calculated as follows: 














whereas Percentage Agreement (PA) equals the total number of coded agreements (TA) 
divided by the number of coded units for potential agreement (n). Researches often prefer 
this index for its straightforward interpretation, but a major drawback is its inability to 
account for agreement that occurs by “chance” (Suen and Lee 1985). In other words, this 
index has overestimation tendencies and is a liberal measure of intercoder agreement. I 
set a minimum level of reliability at a coefficient level of .80 to offset this limitation, 
which is a high threshold for agreement but generally acceptable for most research 
(Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002).13 All coding decisions between myself and 
the other researchers surpassed this mark (see Figure 4). 
Studying the Past without becoming Trapped by It 
A historicizing inquiry like my own may be anchored in past events, but its relevancy is 
not necessarily located in problems of the past (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005). No 
Taxation without Discrimination represents my attempt of studying the racism of the past 
without becoming trapped by it. Clarity for understanding the present is linked to social 
formations that transcend the current moment, and have been shaped by the heavy hand 
of history. Only through an interrogation of the past can we understand these processes. 
Seen this way, history is more than events that have preceded us in time. History is both 
an epistemology and ontology, since its construction requires consideration of what it is 
                                                           
13 Though I offer a threshold of intercoder agreement, in most cases I refrain from offering 
statistics that summarize how many delegates adhered to racism. This omission is purposeful. I do 
not wish to impose a frequentist logic and suggest such statistics imply representativeness (see 
Small 2009). These are irrelevant criteria for the purposes of my argument. I do not wish to claim 
that these elite white men participated in the three-fifths debates to the same extent and exerted 
relatively similar levels of political influence. Both situations are not the case. 
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(we think) we know and how (we think) we know it. It is not a place located firmly in the 
past but a process—one of constructing previous events as they relate to the present.  
 HECA is a method I use to engage what we know about racism and how we know 
it. It allows me to problematize the classical/modern dichotomy that social scientists and 
historians all too often apply to distinguish racial ideology of today from yesterday. I do 
this by grounding the dichotomy’s assumptions within a substantive historical debate, 
empirically scrutinizing the conceptual pillars that hold up these assumptions, and 
invalidating them by transitional focus from the general to the specific (see also Vaughan 
1992). The point is to accumulate data in ways that build upon existing theory so that 
generalizability is not an endpoint but a process. The conclusions I offer move away from 
the tendency to explain change in racism over time. Instead, I ask readers to reconsider 
the fundamental question: “What is racism?” (see also Doane 2006, 2014). The answers, I 
think, are better clarified with history. No longer do whites claim “I’m principled against 
slavery, but…”. Instead, they say “I’m not racist, but…”. The words have changed, but 
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